Daniel R. Ames

Helping one's way to the top: self-monitors achieve status by helping others and knowing who helps whom.

The authors argue that high self-monitors may be more sensitive to the status implications of social exchange and more effective in managing their exchange relations to elicit conferrals of status than low self-monitors. In a series of studies, they found that high self-monitors were more accurate in perceiving the status dynamics involved both in a set of fictitious exchange relations and in real relationships involving other members of their social group. Further, high self-monitors elevated their social status among their peers by establishing a reputation as a generous exchange partner. Specifically, they were more likely than low self-monitors to be sought out for help and to refrain from asking others for help. This behavior provides one explanation for why high self-monitors acquire elevated status among their peers--they are more attuned to status dynamics in exchange relations and adapt their behavior in ways that elicit status.

Strategies for Social Inference: A Similarity Contingency Model of Projection and Stereotyping in Attribute Prevalence Estimates

Most models of how perceivers infer the widespread attitudes and qualities of social groups revolve around either the self (social projection, false consensus) or stereotypes (stereotyping). The author suggests people rely on both of these inferential strategies, with perceived general similarity moderating their use, leading to increased levels of projection and decreased levels of stereotyping. Three studies featuring existing individual differences in perceived similarity as well as manipulated perceptions supported the predictions, with similarity yielding increased projection to, and decreased stereotyping of, various in-groups and out-groups. Evidence that projection and stereotyping may serve as inferential alternatives also emerged. The model and accompanying results have implications for research on social comparison and projection, stereotyping and prejudice, and social inference.

Vicarious Shame and Guilt

Participants recalled instances when they felt vicariously ashamed or guilty for another’s wrongdoing and rated their appraisals of the event and resulting motivations. The study tested aspects of social association that uniquely predict vicarious shame and guilt. Results suggest that the experience of vicarious shame and vicarious guilt are distinguishable. Vicarious guilt was predicted by one’s perceived interdependence with the wrongdoer (e.g. high interpersonal interaction), an appraisal of control over the event, and a motivation to repair the other person’s wrongdoing. Vicarious shame was predicted by the relevance of the event to a shared social identity with the wrongdoer, an appraisal of self-image threat, and a motivation to distance from the event. Implications for intergroup behavior and emotion are discussed.

Punishing Hubris: The Perils of Overestimating One's Status in a Group:

Individuals engage in status self-enhancement when they form an overly positive perception of their status in a group. We argue that status self-enhancement incurs social costs and, therefore, most individuals perceive their status accurately. In contrast, theories of positive illusions suggest status self-enhancement is beneficial for the individual and that most individuals overestimate their status. We found supportive evidence for our hypotheses in a social relations analysis of laboratory groups, an experiment that manipulated status self-enhancement, and a study of real-world groups. Individuals who engaged in status self-enhancement were liked less by others and paid less for their work. Moreover, individuals tended to perceive their status highly accurately. Mediation analyses showed that status self-enhancers were socially punished because they were seen as disruptive to group processes.

It’s the Thought That Counts: On Perceiving How Helpers Decide to Lend a Hand

How do people react to those who have helped them? The authors propose that a recipient’s evaluation of a helper’s intentions and the recipient’s own attitudes about future interactions with the helper depend partly on the recipient’s perceptions of how the helper decided to assist: on the basis of affect, of role, or of cost-benefit calculation. When a recipient perceives that the decision was based on affect (i.e., positive feelings about him or her), he or she will be more inclined toward future interaction and reciprocation than if he or she perceives the decision as based on role or cost-benefit calculation. It is proposed that these “decision modes” signal the helper’s underlying attitudes about the recipient, which in turn, clarify their relationship. A boundary is also identified: The negative impact of apparent cost-benefit thinking is greatest when the amount of help provided is small. Predictions are confirmed in four studies of actual and experimentally manipulated helping episodes.

The Roles of Entitativity and Essentiality in Judgments of Collective Responsibility.

Two studies investigated the roles of entitativity and essentiality in judgments of collective responsibility. Analyses focused on four group types (i.e. intimacy groups, task groups, social categories, and loose associations). Repeated measures analyses revealed that intimacy groups and task groups were rated highest in entitativity while intimacy groups and social categories were rated highest in essentiality. Correlational analyses revealed that entitativity played a more central role in judgments of collective responsibility for all four group types. However, tests of interaction effects revealed that essentiality moderated the effect of entitativity on blame judgments. Implications of the role of collective responsibility in intergroup relations are discussed.

What's good for the goose may not be as good for the gander: the benefits of self-monitoring for men and women in task groups and dyadic conflicts.

The authors posit that women can rely on self-monitoring to overcome negative gender stereotypes in certain performance contexts. In a study of mixed-sex task groups, the authors found that female group members who were high self-monitors were considered more influential and more valuable contributors than women who were low self-monitors. Men benefited relatively less from self-monitoring behavior. In an experimental study of dyadic negotiations, the authors found that women who were high self-monitors performed better than women who were low self-monitors, particularly when they were negotiating over a fixed pool of resources, whereas men did not benefit as much from self-monitoring. Further analyses suggest that high self-monitoring women altered their behavior in these negotiations--when their partner behaved assertively, they increased their level of assertiveness, whereas men and low self-monitoring women did not alter their behavior.

The Agreeableness Asymmetry in First Impressions: Perceivers' Impulse to (Mis)judge Agreeableness and How It Is Moderated by Power

Prior research shows that perceivers can judge some traits better than others in first impressions of targets. However, questions remain about which traits perceivers naturally do infer. Here, the authors develop an account of the “agreeableness asymmetry”: Although perceivers show little ability to accurately gauge target agreeableness in first impressions, they find that agreeableness is generally the most commonly inferred disposition among the Big Five dimensions of personality (agreeableness, extraversion, conscientiousness, openness, and emotional stability). Using open-ended impressions based on photographs, videos, and face-to-face encounters, three studies show agreeableness as the most prevalently judged of the Big Five, although it is also poorly judged in both absolute and relative terms. The authors use interpersonal power to reveal an underlying mechanism. Manipulating the power of perceivers relative to targets substantially shifts impression content, suggesting that habitual interaction and relational concerns may partially explain perceivers chronic interest in assessing agreeableness despite their limited ability to do so.

Emotionally unskilled, unaware, and uninterested in learning more: reactions to feedback about deficits in emotional intelligence.

Despite the importance of self-awareness for managerial success, many organizational members hold overly optimistic views of their expertise and performance-a phenomenon particularly prevalent among those least skilled in a given domain. We examined whether this same pattern extends to appraisals of emotional intelligence (EI), a critical managerial competency. We also examined why this overoptimism tends to survive explicit feedback about performance. Across 3 studies involving professional students, we found that the least skilled had limited insight into deficits in their performance. Moreover, when given concrete feedback, low performers disparaged either the accuracy or the relevance of that feedback, depending on how expediently they could do so. Consequently, they expressed more reluctance than top performers to pursue various paths to self-improvement, including purchasing a book on EI or paying for professional coaching. Paradoxically, it was top performers who indicated a stronger desire to improve their EI following feedback.

Not So Fast: The (Not-Quite-Complete) Dissociation Between Accuracy and Confidence in Thin-Slice Impressions:

After decades of research highlighting the fallibility of first impressions, recent years have featured reports of valid impressions based on surprisingly limited information, such as photos and short videos.Yet beneath mean levels of accuracy lies tremendous variance—some snap judgments are well-founded, others wrongheaded. An essential question for perceivers, therefore, is whether and when to trust their initial intuitions about others. In three studies of first impressions based on photos and videos, the authors examined accuracy for Big Five trait judgments as well as corresponding reports of confidence. Overall, perceivers showed a limited ability to intuit which of their impressions were more accurate than others, although a curvilinear effect emerged: In the relatively few cases where perceivers reported an absolute lack of confidence, their accuracy was indeed comparatively low. Across the studies, judgment confidence was shaped by sources at the judgment level and the judge level that were unrelated to accuracy.