Daniel Thym

RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE UNDER ARTICLE 8 ECHR IN IMMIGRATION CASES: A HUMAN RIGHT TO REGULARIZE ILLEGAL STAY?

Applying the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to immigration cases has always been a balancing exercise between the effective protection of human rights and the Contracting States’ autonomy to regulate migration flows. In its recent case law, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECtHR) has considerably extended the protective scope of Article 8 ECHR by granting autonomous human rights protection to the long-term resident status independent of the existence of family bonds under the heading of ‘private life.’ This has important repercussions for the status of legal and illegal immigrants across Europe, since the new case law widens the reach of human rights law to the legal conditions for leave to remain, effectively granting several applicants a human right to regularise their illegal stay. The contribution analyses the new case law and develops general criteria guiding the application of the ECHR to national immigration laws and the new EU harmonisation measures adopted in recent years.

The Intergovernmental Constitution of the EU's Foreign, Security & Defence Executive

The legal and institutional rules governing the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) constituted a central element of the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009. The post of High Representative and the establishment of the European External Action Service were intended to lay the basis for more effective external action. This contribution sets out to explain the persisting distinctiveness of the legal regime for CFSP and CSDP as the manifestation of intergovernmental executive power in two steps. Firstly, a counter-intuitive reading of the Treaty articles in the light of institutional practice supports the identification of their executive character. Secondly, the contribution high-lights the characteristics of CFSP and CSDP under the heuristic label of ‘legal intergovernmentalism’, which designates distinct decision-making procedures and legal effects in comparison with supranational law. On this basis, the con-stitutional peculiarity of foreign, security and defence policy as an expression of intergovernmental executive power takes shape.

The Intergovernmental Branch of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Executive

Among the Lisbon Treaty’s reform steps the reconfiguration of the Union’s external representation assumes a central role. It is often referred to as one of the Treaty’s most prominent achievements which allows Europe to move beyond institutional introspection and concentrate on ‘reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world’.It remains to be tested whether the new institutional architecture permits the Union to translate the Treaty’s grand declaration into specific policy actions. Definite answers may so far not yet have been given. Our legal analysis may, however, shed light on the role of the political and security committee, thereby identifying both the executive character of the Union’s foreign policy powers and their continued intergovernmentalism.

Weiche Konstitutionalisierung - Optionen der Umsetzung einzelner Reformschritte des Verfassungsvertrags ohne Vertragsänderung

Die Geschichte der europaischen Integration ist eher durch die Abfolge langsamer Reformen gekennzeichnet denn durch grose Wurfe. Die aktuelle Ratifikationskrise des Verfassungsvertrags konnte eine Ruckbesinnung auf die alte Tugend der kleinen Schritte bewirken. Nach den negativen Referenden in Frankreich und den Niederlanden gehen viele Beobachter vom Scheitern der Verfassung aus, wahrend die Staatsund Regierungschefs offiziell eine „Zeit der Reflexion“1 ausgerufen haben. Seitens der Wissenschaft wurden mogliche Auswege aus einem Ratifikationsdilemma schon im Vorfeld erwogen und durchdacht.2 Einige der entwickelten Optionen sind nach den negativen Referenden im Kernland der Union faktisch hinfallig, da sie direkt oder indirekt auf ein gescheitertes Referendum im Vereinigten Konigreich oder einem kleinen Mitgliedstaat der Peripherie zugeschnitten waren. Stattdessen ruckt eine andere Moglichkeit in den Vordergrund: die Umsetzung einzelner Reformschritte des Verfassungsvertrags auf Grundlage des geltenden Vertragswerks in der Fassung von Nizza. Diesem Ausschnitt aus der Gesamtdiskussion widmet sich dieser Beitrag. Der besondere Reiz dieser Variante liegt darin, dass sie keine Entscheidung uber das endgultige Schicksal des Verfassungsvertrags beinhaltet. Eine „weiche Konstitutionalisierung“ auf Grundlage des geltenden Vertragsrechts kann man einerseits als Zwischenstufe im fortlaufenden Ratifizierungsprozess betrachten, die auch dazu beitragt, die Burger vom Mehrwert des Verfassungsvertrags zu uberzeugen und damit die Grundlage fur sein spateres In-KraftTreten zu legen.3 Andererseits kann man in der faktischen Teilumsetzung des Verfassungsvertrags eine Alternative fur dessen In-Kraft-Treten sehen, die an seiner Stelle einzelne ausgewahlte und vermeintlich unstreitige Reformvorhaben ohne Vertragsanderung verwirklicht.4 Politisch ware eine weiche Konstitutionalisierung zweifellos umstritten. Gegner wurden sie als Missachtung des demokratischen Mehrheitswillens in Frankreich und den Niederlanden geiseln, Befurworter dagegen auf die vermeintliche Unterstutzung derselben Mehrheit fur einzelne Reformschritte verweisen.5 Dessen ungeachtet stellt sich die Frage, ob sich zwi-

The Schengen Law: A Challenge for Legal Accountability in the European Union

This article examines challenges for accountability arising from the development of the Schengen law within the framework of the European Union. Building upon the substantive body of research by other authors on general implications of the integration of the Schengen acquis, it focuses on recent developments after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam and evaluates to what extent the European institutions have so far met the challenges for accountability stemming from the intergovernmental origin of the Schengen law. The article identifies various persisting deficiencies in the areas of transparency, institutional balance and judicial review and proposes specific actions, which should be addressed vigorously by the European institutions.

United in Diversity - The integration of enhanced cooperation into the European Constitutional Order

The “unity dogma” has long characterized the European law discourse. In many of its landmark decisions the European Court of Justice had recourse to the “unity argument,” such as in Costa vs. E.N.E.L., where it rightly states that “the executive force of Community law cannot vary from one state to another ... without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.”1 Other expressions of the “unity dogma” include the legal principle of non-discrimination enshrined in the fundamental freedoms, which lie at the heart of the single market, or the political concept of acquis communautaire obliging new Member States to subscribe to all existing Community laws. Indeed, the establishment of a supranational legal order requires a continued focus on its uniform application in the Member States without which the effectiveness of European law is at stake. My intention is not to call into question the underlying rationale of this quest for unity. The aim of this contribution is rather to show that the asymmetric non-participation of individual Member States in selected areas of Union activity can be embedded into the existing European legal order and does not contradict its constitutional aspirations, thereby giving substance to the Union’s motto “United in Diversity.”2

Competing Models for Understanding Differentiated Integration

Debates about differentiated integration are among the rituals of European integration. Whenever the EU enters a critical stage, politicians and academic observers evoke the option of ‘multiple speeds’, ‘concentric circles’ or related terminology and call upon some Member States to proceed towards closer integration without the participation of others. More recent arguments about differentiated integration replicate earlier debates and yet, there is something novel about them. It is true that the experience with various forms of differentiated integration over the past two decades has been fairly positive: defence policy, justice and home affairs and the generic mechanism for enhanced cooperation demonstrate that differentiated integration within the EU framework may proceed rather smoothly in practice. Also, the crisis of monetary union does not originate primarily in the asymmetric non-participation of some Member States, but in the structural deficits of both the Treaty design and its implementation. This shows that differentiated integration can support the integration process.What is new about recent developments, however, is the pertinence and visibility of differentiated integration as a result of the euro crisis. It is no longer a peripheral occurrence, but takes centre stage in legal and political debates. The assessment of the constitutional implications of differentiated integration has become a vital question for the future of Europe: Does it undermine the supranational rule of law? Is Union law capable of domesticating ‘satellite treaties’ outside the EU framework? What are the consequences for the institutional balance and the role of Member States? In addressing these questions, this contribution will defend the proposition that legal difficulties can be contained – both in the case of intra-EU differentiation and satellite treaties under public international law (III.). Differentiated integration may stabilise the rule of law by accommodating internal tensions and heterogeneities, while it may, at the same time, undermine the legitimatory infrastructure of the European project (IV.).

The Failure of Union Citizenship Beyond the Single Market

If we want the Court of Justice of the European Union to employ citizens’ rights to foster a supranational vision of justice, we have to move beyond a minimalist reading of free movement as correcting unwelcome outcomes at the national level. What would be required instead is a vision of social justice for the Union as a whole, not only for those moving to other Member States.

Legal Solution vs. Discursive Othering: The (Dis)Integrative Effects of Supranational Differentiation

Debates about differentiated integration are full of rhetoric extremes: while proponents often present it as a magic potion allowing the EU to thrive, critics portray the (non)participation of some Member States in selected policy projects as a deadly poison that lays the axe unto the roots of the unitary vision of legal supranationalism. This contribution contends that both positions exaggerate the significance of differentiation due to a widespread misunderstanding among legal academics and political actors about the significance of the law for the success or failure of the integration process. Against this background, a dual argument will be put forward. To begin with, differentiation can be accommodated with the essential features of supranational integration through law – notwithstanding repeated claims to the contrary. As a pragmatic tool, it allows the EU institutions to overcome a stalemate of decision-making, thereby deepening integration in diverse policy fields such as justice and home affairs, monetary union or defence. Nevertheless, a critical reappraisal of differentiation is warranted, which moves beyond legal-institutional arguments and considers how differentiation interacts with the broader crisis of European constitutionalism by undermining the legitimatory infrastructure of the European project.

Searching for Solidarity in the EU Asylum and Border Policies : Constitutional and Operational Dimensions

Solidarity was once at the core of the European integration process. While originally intended to facilitate further integration, solidarity, in recent years, has often been associated with the intention of safeguarding existing policies. This article attempts to untangle this polysemous concept. It discusses the constitutional significance of solidarity, ultimately distinguishing four discernible dimensions in the EU context: transnational solidarity, inter-state solidarity, solidarity between a particular group of individuals and, finally, the institutional dimension. It unpacks the interaction between solidarity, loyalty and mutual trust, ascertaining them as interlocking principles. We focus on solidarity in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, revealing it to have legal effects which require compensatory action to support the application of supranational rules. Nonetheless, the principle can be realized in different ways, and it is far from certain whether the EU institutions are able to muster the political clout and the political legitimacy necessary to overcome divergences of opinion and perception. Against this backdrop, we sketch what EU institutions have undertaken to operationalize the principle in the ambit of EU asylum and border control policies to respond to the refugee policy crisis. The contributions to this special issue delve more deeply into the different aspects of this central theme.