Daniela Sicurelli

Normative Power Europe: A Credible Utopia?

Studies on the international identity of the EU have stressed the normative feature of European foreign policy. At the same time, scholars have pointed out that the inconsistency between the EUs rhetoric and behaviour and the lack of reflexivity undermines its credibility. How does reflexivity affect collective identity? To what extent does the EUs utopian rhetoric affect its credibility as a normative power? In order to address these questions, we investigate the self-representation of the EU as an international actor, the extent to which this self-representation provides a basis for reflexivity and, finally, the impact of the EUs identity narratives on its credibility. We focus on the normative power of the EU in the institutionalization of the International Criminal Court and in the elaboration and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.

Empowering Africa: normative power in EU–Africa relations

ABSTRACT The EUs identity construction as a normative power has often been described as a practice by which the EU portrays itself as a force for good while at the same time depicting other actors as inferior, thereby disempowering them rhetorically. In contrast to this, our findings indicate that in its relations to Sub-Saharan Africa, the EU intends to empower African countries by referring to them in a framework of solidarity and partnership. We trace this mechanism of empowering by analysing how the EU promoted the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Kyoto Protocol to African countries while at the same time trying to enable these countries to play an active role in the negotiations related to these institutions as well as in the institutions themselves. At the same time, though, this attempt to empower Africa displays crucial limits concerning the effectiveness of the EUs attempts to promote norms and the international image of the EU itself. We argue that these limits might constrain the process of EU identity construction as a normative power.

Framing Security and Development in the EU Pillar Structure. How the Views of the European Commission Affect EU Africa Policy

Abstract The increasing integration of development and security policies in European foreign policy raises problems of coordination between the pillars of the EU. Literature on EU external relations stresses the lack of definition of the competences of the Council and the European Commission in the cross‐pillar space, but the way the Commission and the Council relate to each other in EU security and development policies is under‐explored. This article, focusing on EU Africa policy, argues that the lack of clear decision‐making procedures for peace‐building issues makes framing a crucial instrument in affecting the policy process. The Commission, by framing security as a first pillar issue, proves able to establish three types of relationship with the Council: pushing the Council to take specific actions, replacing the Council and even triggering conflicts of competence with the Council.

The EU as Promoter of Environmental Norms in the Doha Round

This article investigates the reasons why the EU tried to promote environmental norms in the Doha round. It argues that the EUs support of a ‘greener’ World Trade Organization stems from tensions between the rigidity of the domestic dynamics of positive integration in the EU and the increased bindingness of negative integration commitments undertaken under the WTO. Consensual decision-making procedures in the EU led societal groups to push for stringent food safety and environmental regulations in the EU, and made them very resistant to change. These dynamics of positive integration, however, produced rules that were inconsistent with negative integration commitments undertaken under the WTO, at a time when the creation of a quasi-judicial dispute settlement mechanism in the trade regime had greatly increased the bindingness of WTO rules. As a result of the twofold effect of domestic and international institutional constraints, EU decision-makers were subject to compelling incentives to try and strengthen legitimate exceptions from WTO rules and immunise European regulation against WTO legal challenges. Empirical evidence on how the EU shaped its trade-and-environment agenda in the run-up to the Doha Round in 2001, as well as how it negotiated in the subsequent period, lends support to the argument.

The Federalization of the EU, the US and 'Compound Republic' Theory: The Convention's Debate

This article compares the process of federalization of the EU with the American federal experience. It argues that both the EU and the US share features of compound polities, according to James Madisons conceptualization of these during the Philadelphia convention debate. Regardless of the specific institutional structures derived from the compound republic theory, the article stresses the importance of that theory for an understanding of the European integration process and its development. The article advances the conclusion that the Brussels convention, charged with drafting a new constitutional treaty for the EU, had to necessarily preserve the compound nature of the EU.

The European Union, Preferential Trade Agreements, and the International Regulation of Sustainable Biofuels

The EU has increasingly turned to PTAs (Preferential Trade Agreements) to spread environmental norms internationally. We argue that the rationale for this strategy is to be found in the tensions between the rigidity of the domestic dynamics of positive integration in the EU and the increased bindingness of WTO negative integration commitments. Consensual decision‐making procedures in the EU both drive the stringency of environmental regulation and make it resistant to change. When such environmental standards are challenged in the WTO, incentives arise for the EU to push for international environmental rules that can grant immunity from WTO legal challenges. When changing WTO rules is not an option, PTAs become a valid alternative. We illustrate the plausibility of our argument through an in‐depth case study of the EUs attempt to include provisions defining environmental sustainability criteria for the production of biofuels in the ongoing negotiations for a PTA with Malaysia.

The EU’s preferential trade agreements with Singapore and Vietnam. Market vs. normative imperatives†

ABSTRACT By negotiating Free Trade Agreements the EU aspires both to increase the competitiveness of its industry and contribute to sustainable development in the partner country. It pursues a flexible approach to norm promotion which aims at supporting developing countries in their attempt to adjust to international standards. Ideational and institutionalist scholars interpreted this approach as a manifestation of its normative power. We show that in the negotiations with Singapore and Vietnam the positions of the EU were not consistent with its declared goals, since they put stronger pressures upon Vietnam to adjust to regulatory standards. We explain this lack of consistency as the result of different patterns of interest group mobilization in the two negotiations. Those patterns, in turn, depend upon the bargaining power the EU has with single trade partners, competition between the EU and third countries, especially the US, and the structure of the economy of the trade partners.

The conditions for effectiveness of EU human rights promotion in non-democratic states. A case study of Vietnam

Abstract By tracing the reform process of the penal code in Vietnam, this paper tests the impact of the European human rights policy on a non-democratic state. Despite the lack of government recognition of an independent civil society in Vietnam, the EU has affected domestic debate on death penalty and indirectly steered a reform process that has led to the reduction of the number of capital crimes. This case study identifies the conditions that facilitate the effectiveness of the EU as a promoter of human rights in non-democratic states. On the target side, political elites responsive to public criticism, and, at the same time, interested in enhancing the country’s international status are more likely to endorse EU sponsored norms. On the EU side, the use of conditionality measures in support of softer measures proves instrumental to make European human rights policies visible for the public and able to shape government’s policy.

An institutional approach to foreign policy-making: the EU, the USA and crisis management in Africa

Since the end of the cold war, the USA and the European Union (EU) have developed different foreign and security policies towards Africa. The USA has prioritised the fight against terrorism, while the EU’s foreign policy has been primarily driven by the goal of structural stability. The difference between the two approaches can be partially explained by pointing to the different power resources of the two actors. Nevertheless, these structural differences have not prevented variations in how the two actors have redefined their foreign policy approaches over time and opted for alternative policy instruments. Comparison between the US and EU interventions in Sudan and Somalia shows that domestic factors account for the differences and variations in their respective foreign policy frameworks. This article argues that these differences and variations make the distinction between a ‘military America’ and a ‘civilian power Europe’ more nuanced than depicted by the mainstream literature on transatlantic relations.

The EU as a ‘Normative’ or Traditional ‘Market’ Trade Power

Trade policy is among the most prominent policies to be placed under supranational competence of the EU. For this reason, trade negotiations represent a preferential arena for the EU to emerge as a normative leader internationally. This aspiration has affected the positions of the EU both in the Doha Development Round, since 2001, and in the negotiation of PTAs, since 2006. Due to this commitment to norm promotion, constructivist and institutionalist scholars have represented the EU as a distinct player in international relations. From these perspectives, identity and institutional pressures that shape its negotiating positions make it a different actor in the international trade arena, namely, a normative power. On the contrary, mainstream political-economy scholars challenge the representation of the EU as an exceptional actor and tend to conceive of European trade policy as the result of the preferences, patterns of political mobilization, and influence of organized societal groups. These arguments point to the importance of different factors in determining these domestic political processes, including traditional market access concerns, domino effects triggered by the trade policy initiative of the EU’s major trade competitors, and different levels of integration in the GVCs with partner countries.