Sergio Fabbrini

Intergovernmentalism and Its Limits: Assessing the European Union's Answer to the Euro Crisis

The Lisbon Treaty has institutionalized a dual constitution, supranational in the single market’s policies and intergovernmental in (among others) economic and financial policies. The extremely complex system of economic governance set up for answering the euro crisis has been defined and implemented on the basis of the intergovernmental constitution of the EU. The euro crisis has thus represented a test for the validity of the intergovernmental constitution of the Lisbon Treaty. Although the measures adopted in the period 2010-2012, consisting of legislative decisions and new intergovernmental treaties, are of an unprecedented magnitude, they were nevertheless unable to promote effective and legitimate solutions for dealing with the financial crisis. In the context of an existential challenge, the intergovernmental approach faced a structural difficulty in solving basic dilemmas of collective action.

The Return to the State: Critiques

This symposium features three critiques of Gabriel Almonds argument—by Eric A. Nordlinger of Brown University, Theodore J. Lowi of Cornell University, and Sergio Fabbrini of the University of Trento.

Federalizing Italy: The Convergent Effects of Europeanization and Domestic Mobilization

On 7 October 2001, 16,257,606 Italian voters went to the polls to vote in a referendum on the reform of those articles of the constitution (n.114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 127) concerned with the relations between the central state and the regions. The reform was introduced by the parliament one year before in ‘double reading’. As the constitution expressly declaims (art. 138), constitutional amendment may be required to pass through popular scrutiny, if approved by parliament in the second reading with an absolute majority and not a qualified majority of 2/3 of MPs. In fact, the parliamentary opposition to the amendments raised the required number of citizens’ signatures within three months of the publication of the constitutional amendments as required by the same article 138 of the constitution, to call for a popular referendum to confirm the new law. Once the referendum has been called, 10,434,419 voters (64.2%) approved the amendments, where 5,819,187 (35.8%) rejected it. It was the first referendum on constitutional change in the Italian post-Second World War history. The amendments imply specific exclusive legislative powers for the national state (in its traditional domain); concurrent legislation between the national state and the regions in crucial domains for the former; and allocation of the remaining policy responsibilities to the regions. The reform, nevertheless, does not introduce a chamber of regional representation. Thus, the Italian unitary state has been significantly reformed in the direction of a more decentralized territorial organization (see Table 1). With the success of the referendum, the process of federalization of the Italian state has made a step forward. Why did it happen? Our answer is the following. The constitutional reform of the Italian unitary state has been the outcome of a happy combination of two pressures, one from Europe and another from domestic actors. To develop this argument, we shall proceed as follows. First, we give a brief description of the evolution of the territorial organization of the Italian state, in order to show the

Features and Implications of Semi-Parliamentarism: The Direct Election of Italian Mayors

An important electoral and institutional reform has been introduced in Italian local government since 1993: the direct election of the mayor and of the president of the provincial government, but with the possibility that the legislature may pass a vote of no confidence in them. Through this reform a new system of government has been established: semi-parliamentarism, institutionally different from the established democratic systems of government. So far, this system appears to have had positive effects on the stability of Italian local government, although it did not reduce (as it was not expected to do) the traditional multi-party format of the Italian local party system. The question arises whether the latter insignificant effect might constrain the former positive effect.

Integration without supranationalisation: studying the lead roles of the European Council and the Council in post-Lisbon EU politics

Abstract This special issue follows up on a stream of recent contributions on what has been identified as a particular phase of post-Maastricht European integration: the ‘new intergovernmentalism’ and ‘the intergovernmental union’. This literature considers the European Union’s (EU) core intergovernmental forums for policy coordination, the European Council, the Eurogroup and the Foreign Affairs Council as central to EU decision-making. These bodies perform functions related to policy initiation and implementation which were traditionally associated with the European Commission. Intergovernmentalisation is primarily detectable in new areas of EU activity such as economic governance and foreign affairs which operate mainly outside the community method and in policy sectors which depict a mix of legislative and non-legislative decision-making mechanisms, such as justice and home affairs and energy. More integration is achieved without significant further supranationalisation. These developments affect how the Union’s main decision bodies operate and how interinstitutional relations are structured.

From consensus to domination: the intergovernmental union in a crisis situation

Abstract After clarifying the concept of intergovernmental union, the article analyses the performance of the latter during the euro crisis. The economic policy side of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) epitomises the intergovernmental union because based on the principle of voluntary coordination between member state governments as a condition for advancing the process of integration. Tested during the euro crisis, because of the distrust emerged between member states, EMU has ended up in creating a highly centralised policy regime, where the creditor member states have come to play a domineering role with regard to debtor member states. Hierarchical relations between national governments have finally substituted consensus with domination. The absence of a European legislative check on the decisions taken by the intergovernmental Euro Summit and Eurogroup has made domination an unjustifiable feature in the eyes of the public opinion of the debtor member states.

Democracy and Federalism in the European Union and the United States. Exploring Post-National Governance

Preface About the authors Introduction Part 1: The EU from Federalist Projects to a Supranational Polity Part 2: Features and Problems of the US Federal Polity Part 3: Market, State and Social Rights in the EU and US Part 4: The Constitutional Challenges of a Supranational Polity

Political and institutional constraints on structural reforms: interpreting the Italian experience

During 2011 Italy reached the verge of a financial default because of its huge public debt. Neither the centre-right nor the centre-left governments that alternated in power in the 2000s were able to introduce the reforms necessary for reducing the debt and promoting growth. The impotence of the government became incompatible with the requirements of the countrys continued presence in the eurozone. In November 2011, under the pressure of financial markets and eurozone institutions and leaders, the incumbent centre-right government was obliged to resign, and was substituted by a government composed of technocrats and experts, the Monti government. This lasted until December 2012 and was supported in parliament by a cross-partisan coalition; it was able to introduce some of the structural reforms required, because of the threat of default but also because it did not need to seek the electoral support of powerful constituencies. This article advances an interpretation of the Italian crisis of November 2011,...

Political Change without Institutional Transformation: What Can We Learn from the Italian Crisis of the 1990s?

Since 1991 Italy has witnessed the crisis of its post-war consensual model of democracy. While in other democratic countries consensualism has been justified by ethnic or linguistic or religious cleavages, in Italy it is ideological cleavage that has justified the politics of accommodation among the leaders of the main parties. Consequently, as in the other consensual democracies, postwar Italy was unable to experience the alternation in government between opposed political options. The formation of a power-sharing political system at the governmental level was supported by the institutionalization, at the level of policy-making structures, of a sort of oligarchic pluralism, through which a network of organized minorities (in the public administration and in the interest groups) ended up by controlling the huge resources of the Italian state. These institutional and policy-making structures conflicted with the requirements imposed by the process of European integration. Different social actors were activated to challenge the legitimacy of that power-sharing system. A political change followed, indicated by the collapse of the postwar party system. But given the timing and the nature of the crisis, and the ambiguity of the new electoral law introduced by the old parties before their final collapse, the new parties proved able to resist the pressure for institutional transformation, although they had to agree with important policy changes in order for Italy to meet the Maastricht criteria for adopting the new European common currency. But these policy changes continue to be jeopardized by the institutional inertia of the old governmental system.

The American System of Separated Government: An Historical-Institutional Interpretation

How should one define the American system of government? Sometimes, especially among non-American scholars, it is taken for granted that the American is a presidential system, or that it is the archetype of presidentialism. At other times, especially among American scholars, it is taken for granted that it incarnates the separation of power system envisioned by Madison. An historical-institutional analysis shows that both interpretations are unsatisfactory. The American system is better defined as a system of separated government which experienced different institutional pre-eminances during its two centuries of democratic history. The very same Constitution allowed a long period of congressional and then of presidential pre-eminence, recently tamed by a regime of divided government.