Daniele Albertazzi

The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own

For regionalist populists like the Lega Nord, participation in coalition at national level requires striking a delicate balance between being a party of government and a movement of opposition. The key to this is choosing the right ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ within government. In contrast to its previous time in power in 1994, in the second Berlusconi government (2001–05) the Lega cast itself as the Forza Italia leaders most faithful ally, while being seen to be in almost constant conflict with its fellow junior coalition partners: Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and the UDC. Indeed, as AN repositions itself within a respectable governmental ‘European’ Right, so the Lega appears ever more in a league of its own within the Italian centre-right. Based on exclusive recent interviews, this article examines the Legas relationship to its heartland and its positions on issues such as immigration, Europe, globalisation and constitutional reform. We argue that the party has transformed itself into an ‘institutionalised’ populist movement that has successfully walked the tightrope of being seen to have ‘one foot in and one foot out’ of government.

Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre

Ghiţa Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (1969: 1) began their classic edited collection on populism by paraphrasing Marx and Engel’s famous opening line: ‘A Spectre is haunting the world — populism’. However, it was not quite the entire world that was being haunted in the late 1960s. Looking through the case studies in Ionescu and Gellner’s book, we find chapters on North America, Latin America, Russia, Eastern Europe and Africa, but nothing on that part of the world in which most of the contributors lived and worked: Western Europe. By contrast, the present volume focuses exclusively on that area. This reflects the fact that while the likes of Ross Perot in the United States, Preston Manning in Canada and Pauline Hanson in Australia have all attracted sporadic attention as new populist leaders, the main area of sustained populist growth and success over the last fifteen years in established democracies has been Western Europe.

The Lega Nord Back in Government

Following the 2008 general election, the Italian regionalist populist party Lega Nord returned to government as part of a centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi. Since then, the party has been able to thrive thanks to its holding of key ministries and its consolidation of ‘issue ownership’ over its main themes of federal reform and immigration/law and order. In this period, it has also made major gains in the 2009 European Parliament and 2010 regional elections. This article analyses the Legas success since 2008 by considering the actions of the party (in particular the legislation it has sponsored and the narrative offered of its time in government) as well as the reactions of mid-ranking leaders and activists. The authors argue that, contrary to the expectations of scholars, populists serving as junior coalition partners are not necessarily destined to tame their rhetoric, face splits or see their electoral support decline. On the contrary, by focusing on selected themes and policies and adopting effective communication strategies, the Lega has continued to enjoy electoral success and seen its membership grow. The article concludes, therefore, that claims about populists being inherently unable to survive in government and enjoy success seem to have been premature.

Di lotta e di governo: The Lega Nord and Rifondazione Comunista in Office

Since 1994, Italian politics has seen a number of coalitions including parties whose identity has been strongly based on their ‘outsider’ status as uncompromising opposition movements which would not previously consider government participation. This article examines the contrasting experiences in office of two such parties: the regionalist populist Lega Nord (LN) and the radical left Rifondazione Comunista (RC). While the Lega confounded expectations not only simply by remaining in the centre-right coalition from 2001 to 2006, but by influencing policy, increasing its vote-share and maintaining its ‘outsider’ identity, RC was unable to match its fellow outsider’s success when it served in the centre-left government from 2006 to 2008. Looking at the experiences in office of the RC and the LN in terms of the three temporal divisions ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’, this article seeks to analyse and explain the differing experiences and effects of government on both parties.

The Lega dei Ticinesi: The Embodiment of Populism

This article views ‘populism’ as an ideology, the key features of which are identified and briefly discussed. Having assessed the extent to which such features match the profile of the Swiss Lega dei Ticinesi, the author concludes that this party should be seen as a paradigmatic embodiment of populism due to: a) the partys uneasiness with representative democracy; b) the crucial role played by the concept of the ‘people’ in its propaganda; c) the power of the leader within the organisation; and d) the partys chameleon-like tendency to borrow keywords and ideas from both sides of the political divide.

Addressing 'the People': A Comparative Study of the Lega Nord's and Lega dei Ticinesi's Political Rhetoric and Styles of Propaganda

In recent years two populist regionalist parties have emerged in the alpine region, the Lega dei Ticinesi (LDT) in Switzerland and the Lega Nord (LN) in Italy. However, while typical populist themes such as the constant attacks against professional politicians and appeals to the ‘people’ resonate in the rhetoric of both movements, what differentiates them is the style of their propaganda, as the LDTs paper, Il Mattino della Domenica, constantly strives to shock its readers in ways that are alien to the Italian leghisti. Following a discussion of the strength, organisation and rhetoric of the two parties, this articles addresses the reasons why they have adopted different strategies of communication by considering the parties’ constituencies, the nature of their media and the personalities of their leaders.

Switzerland: Yet Another Populist Paradise

Switzerland poses a significant challenge to the editors of this volume, as some of the country features that have often been seen as impediments to the growth of populism, and which are held to have distinguished Switzerland from its European neighbours, have evolved very considerably in the last few years.1 Basing itself on the definition of populism provided in the introduction to this book, this chapter analyses the structure and agency interplay which has facilitated the success of this ideology in the country.2 The chapter will, of course, discuss what is currently the largest western European populist party (in relation to national competitors), the Schweizerische Volkspartei/Union Democratique du Centre (SVP/UDC — Swiss People’s party). The SVP/UDC deserves special attention as it has radically affected Swiss political life over the last decade, rapidly doubling its national vote share (and government delegation) to become the country’s largest party. Moreover, it has shown an impressive ability to take control of the national political agenda. The SVP/UDC has resorted to a rhetoric that is typical of populist movements across Europe and which has not been toned down, I will argue, even after the party’s assumption of greater governmental responsibilities. Although discussing the SVP/UDC is thus useful (indeed inevitable) in this context, this chapter’s main aim is to identify the reasons why populism has been so successful in Switzerland, rather than providing a full and comprehensive study of the SVP/UDC (or other Swiss populist movements), that readers can find elsewhere.3

Reconciling ‘Voice’ and ‘Exit’: Swiss and Italian Populists in Power

This article focuses on the strategic communication of four populist parties which have served in national and/or sub-national governments during the last two decades: the Lega Nord (LN) and Forza Italia (FI) in Italy, as well as the Lega dei Ticinesi (LDT) and the Schweizerische Volkspartei/Union Démocratique du Centre (SVP/UDC) in Switzerland. The analysis identifies two strategies which have been adopted by these parties (i.e. the ‘opposition within government’ and ‘role playing’), as they try to maintain their identity and balance their recourse to ‘spectacular politics’ with the responsibilities of office. Unlike others, this study provides little support for the idea that government participation must bring with it the ‘moderation’ of populists, at least as far as their strategic communication is concerned.

The Parties of the Centre Right: Many Oppositions, One Leader

There are few political leaders in Europe who could afford to lose a second general election to the same opponent and still survive to lead their party into another contest. But, then, there are few contemporary leaders comparable to Silvio Berlusconi. Not only does he wield financial and media power which would be unimaginable (and perhaps unconstitutional) for a political leader in any other European democracy, but he has used this power to create a party, Forza Italia (FI), that has been constantly the most-voted in Italy since the collapse of the First Republic. Moreover, around this fulcrum, he has been able to construct a centre-right coalition that has successfully filled the huge political vacuum left by the demise of the old governing parties at the beginning of the 1990s.

Conclusion: Populism and Twenty-First Century Western European Democracy

Gerry Stoker concludes his recent book Why Politics Matters by affirming: ‘Achieving mass democracy was the great triumph of the twentieth century. Learning to live with it will be the great achievement of the twenty-first’ (Stoker, 2006: 206). Like Stoker, a whole series of scholars at the beginning of the new millennium have argued that the pillars of representative liberal democracy — in particular, parties and popular participation — are creaking (Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Diamond and Gunther, 2001; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002; Crouch, 2004). In fact, apart from the euphoric period surrounding the fall of the Berlin Wall and the seemingly inexorable move towards a united, peaceful, harmonious and liberal democratic Europe, there has long been a tendency to focus on the negative aspects of how Western European democracies function. Indeed, as we can see from even a brief glance at The Crisis of Democracy (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki, 1975), in the past the portents have been worse and the prophecies far gloomier. For example, in the opening paragraphs of that landmark volume, under the heading ‘The Current Pessimism about Democracy’, we find the comment by the former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt before leaving office that ‘Western Europe has only 20 or 30 more years of democracy left in it’ (ibid.: 2).