Duncan McDonnell

The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own

For regionalist populists like the Lega Nord, participation in coalition at national level requires striking a delicate balance between being a party of government and a movement of opposition. The key to this is choosing the right ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ within government. In contrast to its previous time in power in 1994, in the second Berlusconi government (2001–05) the Lega cast itself as the Forza Italia leaders most faithful ally, while being seen to be in almost constant conflict with its fellow junior coalition partners: Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and the UDC. Indeed, as AN repositions itself within a respectable governmental ‘European’ Right, so the Lega appears ever more in a league of its own within the Italian centre-right. Based on exclusive recent interviews, this article examines the Legas relationship to its heartland and its positions on issues such as immigration, Europe, globalisation and constitutional reform. We argue that the party has transformed itself into an ‘institutionalised’ populist movement that has successfully walked the tightrope of being seen to have ‘one foot in and one foot out’ of government.

Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre

Ghiţa Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (1969: 1) began their classic edited collection on populism by paraphrasing Marx and Engel’s famous opening line: ‘A Spectre is haunting the world — populism’. However, it was not quite the entire world that was being haunted in the late 1960s. Looking through the case studies in Ionescu and Gellner’s book, we find chapters on North America, Latin America, Russia, Eastern Europe and Africa, but nothing on that part of the world in which most of the contributors lived and worked: Western Europe. By contrast, the present volume focuses exclusively on that area. This reflects the fact that while the likes of Ross Perot in the United States, Preston Manning in Canada and Pauline Hanson in Australia have all attracted sporadic attention as new populist leaders, the main area of sustained populist growth and success over the last fifteen years in established democracies has been Western Europe.

A Weekend in Padania: Regionalist Populism and the Lega Nord

This article argues that the Lega Nord is best understood, first and foremost, as a regionalist populist party. Following a brief discussion of the importance of the territorial reference in explaining the Lega, the article examines its populist discourse using material from the partys newspaper La Padania over the three days in June 2005 around the annual Lega rally in Pontida.

Silvio Berlusconi's Personal Parties: From Forza Italia to the Popolo Della Libertà

Despite the electoral success of Silvio Berlusconis two political parties, little theoretical and empirical work has been done on Forza Italia (FI) and the Popolo Della Libertà (PDL – People of Freedom). This article aims to fill these gaps. Following a short overview of the history of FI and the PDL, it discusses how scholars have conceived of Forza Italia. Building on the criteria of Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner for the definition of a political party, a first operational definition is then offered of the term most used to classify FI and the PDL: the ‘personal party’. On the basis of this, the article considers whether the PDL is another personal party akin to Forza Italia. This is done, first, by briefly considering the party statute and communications and, second, by examining the views expressed in interviews conducted across Italy with PDL elected representatives and ordinary party members.

The Lega Nord Back in Government

Following the 2008 general election, the Italian regionalist populist party Lega Nord returned to government as part of a centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi. Since then, the party has been able to thrive thanks to its holding of key ministries and its consolidation of ‘issue ownership’ over its main themes of federal reform and immigration/law and order. In this period, it has also made major gains in the 2009 European Parliament and 2010 regional elections. This article analyses the Legas success since 2008 by considering the actions of the party (in particular the legislation it has sponsored and the narrative offered of its time in government) as well as the reactions of mid-ranking leaders and activists. The authors argue that, contrary to the expectations of scholars, populists serving as junior coalition partners are not necessarily destined to tame their rhetoric, face splits or see their electoral support decline. On the contrary, by focusing on selected themes and policies and adopting effective communication strategies, the Lega has continued to enjoy electoral success and seen its membership grow. The article concludes, therefore, that claims about populists being inherently unable to survive in government and enjoy success seem to have been premature.

Outsider parties in government in Western Europe

Over the past two decades, a growing number of ‘outsider parties’ have entered governing centre-left and centre-right coalitions across Western Europe. In this introduction, we first define outsider parties as those which — even when their vote-share would have enabled it — have gone through a period of not being ‘coalitionable’, whether of their own volition or that of other parties in the system. Based on the articles in this issue, we then discuss the problems which outsider parties encounter when entering government and suggest some reasons for the success and failure of these parties in office. Finally, we propose a number of avenues for further research, in particular that of examining differences between the first and subsequent experiences of office for such parties.

Di lotta e di governo: The Lega Nord and Rifondazione Comunista in Office

Since 1994, Italian politics has seen a number of coalitions including parties whose identity has been strongly based on their ‘outsider’ status as uncompromising opposition movements which would not previously consider government participation. This article examines the contrasting experiences in office of two such parties: the regionalist populist Lega Nord (LN) and the radical left Rifondazione Comunista (RC). While the Lega confounded expectations not only simply by remaining in the centre-right coalition from 2001 to 2006, but by influencing policy, increasing its vote-share and maintaining its ‘outsider’ identity, RC was unable to match its fellow outsider’s success when it served in the centre-left government from 2006 to 2008. Looking at the experiences in office of the RC and the LN in terms of the three temporal divisions ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’, this article seeks to analyse and explain the differing experiences and effects of government on both parties.

Populist Leaders and Coterie Charisma

Is the relationship between populist leaders and those in their parties always charismatic? Although many scholars of populism assume this, the attribution of ‘charisma’ is invariably based on how leaders present themselves rather than how purported followers within parties perceive them. In line with the literature on charisma, this article takes the latter approach, using interviews conducted between 2009 and 2011 with 111 elected representatives and grassroots members (i.e. ‘the coterie’) to examine how three European populist leaders regularly termed ‘charismatic’ – Silvio Berlusconi, Christoph Blocher and Umberto Bossi – were viewed within their parties. The article finds evidence of three different leadership types, with Bossi very clearly satisfying the conditions for coterie charisma, Berlusconi largely (but not entirely) fulfilling them, and Blocher only partially doing so. Finally, it presents new data showing the very damaging effects of Bossi’s subsequent downfall on his party’s organisation.

Right-wing populist party supporters: dissatisfied but not direct democrats

Right-wing populist parties tend to combine criticism of how liberal democracy functions with calls for greater direct democracy. But do their voters share that support for direct democracy? In this article, survey data is used to examine, first, whether right-wing populist candidates in Australia, Canada and New Zealand were more supportive of direct democracy than candidates of other parties. Second, the views of right-wing populist voters about the functioning of democracy and direct democracy are investigated. While right-wing populist candidates turned out to be far more likely to support direct democracy, right-wing populist supporters did not mirror the candidates. Although these were among the most dissatisfied with how democracy worked, they did not necessarily favour referendums more than other voters. The findings have implications both for how we conceive of the relationship between populism and direct democracy and the remedies proposed for redressing populist discontent.

The Parties of the Centre Right: Many Oppositions, One Leader

There are few political leaders in Europe who could afford to lose a second general election to the same opponent and still survive to lead their party into another contest. But, then, there are few contemporary leaders comparable to Silvio Berlusconi. Not only does he wield financial and media power which would be unimaginable (and perhaps unconstitutional) for a political leader in any other European democracy, but he has used this power to create a party, Forza Italia (FI), that has been constantly the most-voted in Italy since the collapse of the First Republic. Moreover, around this fulcrum, he has been able to construct a centre-right coalition that has successfully filled the huge political vacuum left by the demise of the old governing parties at the beginning of the 1990s.