Daniele Nosenzo
University of Nottingham
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Publication
Featured researches published by Daniele Nosenzo.
Economic Inquiry | 2012
Simon Gächter; Daniele Nosenzo; Elke Renner; Martin Sefton
We examine the characteristics of effective leaders in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We focus on two factors: the individual’s cooperativeness and the individual’s beliefs about the cooperativeness of others. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are cooperatively inclined. Partly this reflects a false consensus effect: cooperative leaders are more optimistic than non-cooperators about the cooperativeness of followers. However, cooperative leaders contribute more than non-cooperative leaders even after controlling for optimism. We conclude that differing leader contributions by differing types of leader in large part reflects social motivations.
Journal of the European Economic Association | 2013
Simon Gächter; Daniele Nosenzo; Martin Sefton
We compare social preference and social norm based explanations for peer effects in a three-person gift-exchange experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our baseline treatment we observe that the second agents effort is influenced by the effort choice of the first agent, even though there are no material spillovers between agents. This peer effect is predicted by the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model of social preferences. As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms compliance. A conditional logit investigation of the explanatory power of payoff inequality and elicited norms finds that the second agents effort is best explained by the social preferences model. In further experiments we find that the peer effects change as predicted by the social preferences model. Again, a conditional logit analysis favors an explanation based on social preferences, rather than social norms. Our results suggest that, in our context, the social preferences model provides a parsimonious explanation for the observed peer effect.
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics | 2012
Simon Gächter; Daniele Nosenzo; Martin Sefton
We investigate the effects of pay comparison information (i.e. information about what coworkers earn) and effort comparison information (information about how co-workers perform) in experimental firms composed of one employer and two employees. Exposure to pay comparison information in isolation from effort comparison information does not appear to affect reciprocity toward employers: in this case own wage is a powerful determinant of own effort, but co-worker wages have no effect. By contrast, we find that exposure to both pieces of social information systematically influences employees’ reciprocity. A generous wage offer is virtually ineffective if an employee is matched with a lazy co-worker who is also paid generously: in such circumstances the employee tends to expend low effort irrespective of her own wage. Reciprocity is more pronounced when the co-worker is hard-working, as effort is strongly and positively related to own wage in this case. Reciprocity is also pronounced when the employer pays unequal wages to the employees: in this case the co-worker’s effort decision is disregarded and effort decisions are again strongly and positively related to own wage. On average exposure to social information weakens reciprocity, though we find substantial heterogeneity in responses across individuals, and find that sometimes social information has beneficial effects. We suggest that group composition may be an important tool for harnessing the positive effects of social comparison processes.
Economic Inquiry | 2013
Daniele Nosenzo
Pay secrecy is often justified on the ground of concerns about the detrimental consequences of intra-firm pay comparisons for work morale and performance. Surprisingly, however, there isonly limited empirical evidence that the availability of pay comparison information is detrimental for effort provision. In this paper we study pay comparison effects in a gift-exchange game laboratory experiment where an employer is matched with two symmetric employees. We compare effort choices made by employees in a ‘pay secrecy’ treatment and in two ‘public wages’ treatments where employees are informed of the wage paid to the coworker. In one ‘public wages’ treatments the employer can choose both wages she pays to the employees, while in the other treatment the wage paid to one employee is regulated exogenously. We show that pay disclosure can be detrimental for effort provision if employees are treated unequally.
Journal of the Economic Science Association | 2017
Jonathan de Quidt; Francesco Fallucchi; Felix Kölle; Daniele Nosenzo; Simone Quercia
We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments, subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus/avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments, subjects only learn the success of their performance at the end of the task. We fail to observe a contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty contracts.
Archive | 2015
Enrique Fatas; Daniele Nosenzo; Martin Sefton; Daniel John Zizzo
We compare in a laboratory experiment two audit-based tax compliance mechanisms that collect fines from those found non-compliant. The mechanisms differ in the way fines are redistributed to individuals who were either not audited or audited and found to be compliant. The first, as is the case in most extant tax systems, does not discriminate between the un-audited and those found compliant. The second targets the redistribution in favor of those found compliant. We find that targeting increases compliance when paying taxes generates a social return. We do not find any increase in compliance in a control treatment where individuals audited and found compliant receive symbolic rewards. It is not the mere assigning of rewards, but the material incentives inherent in the rewards that improve compliance. We conclude that existing tax mechanisms have room for improvement by rewarding financially those audited and found compliant.
Journal of Public Economics | 2010
Simon Gächter; Daniele Nosenzo; Elke Renner; Martin Sefton
Experimental Economics | 2015
Daniele Nosenzo; Simone Quercia; Martin Sefton
Experimental Economics | 2013
Jon E. Anderson; Stephen V. Burks; Jeffrey P. Carpenter; Lorenz Götte; Karsten Maurer; Daniele Nosenzo; Ruth Potter; Kim Rocha; Aldo Rustichini
Archive | 2016
Johannes Abeler; Daniele Nosenzo; Collin Raymond