Elke Renner

The Long-Run Benefits of Punishment

Experiments have shown that punishment enhances socially beneficial cooperation but that the costs of punishment outweigh the gains from cooperation. This challenges evolutionary models of altruistic cooperation and punishment, which predict that punishment will be beneficial. We compared 10- and 50-period cooperation experiments. With the longer time horizon, punishment is unambiguously beneficial.

The moonlighting game: An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution

We introduce the moonlighting game. Player A can take money from or pass money to player B, who can either return money or punish player A. One-shot experiments were performed on this game. Treatments were conducted with and without making non-binding agreements beforehand. The results refute the concept of rationality and support the impact of reciprocity and retribution, where retribution is more compelling than reciprocity. The equal division principle is the dominant fairness norm. Deviating norms are not a product of not knowing which norm to apply, but rather to avoid cognitive dissonance in advance.

Who Makes a Good Leader? Cooperativeness, Optimism, and Leading‐By‐Example

We examine the characteristics of effective leaders in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We focus on two factors: the individual’s cooperativeness and the individual’s beliefs about the cooperativeness of others. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are cooperatively inclined. Partly this reflects a false consensus effect: cooperative leaders are more optimistic than non-cooperators about the cooperativeness of followers. However, cooperative leaders contribute more than non-cooperative leaders even after controlling for optimism. We conclude that differing leader contributions by differing types of leader in large part reflects social motivations.

Interest Rates in Group Lending: A Behavioural Investigation

Microfinance institutions (MFIs) serve more than 5 million households in developing countries. A crucial variable for MFI schemes is the interest rate to be charged from borrowers. This paper studies the behavioural impacts of the repayment burden on repayment performance. In a laboratory experiment, we vary the amount a borrower group has to repay and study how this affects free-riding behaviour. We can identify two counteracting effects: a higher repayment burden intensifies the incentives to free-ride as shirking saves more money. On the other hand, high-interest loans are less tolerant towards defaulters, which exerts a disciplining effect. Copyright 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Experimentelle Didaktik in wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Studiengängen

Der Einsatz von Experimenten als didaktisches Instrument in der Lehre ist noch wenig verbreitet, obwohl die Erfahrungsberichte der Dozenten, die solche Experimente in ihre Veranstaltungen integrieren, uberaus positiv sind. An der Wissenschaftlichen Hochschule fur Unternehmensfuhrung (WHU) in Koblenz bietet der Lehrstuhl fur Organisationstheorie (Prof. Dr. Peter-J. Jost) seit dem Sommersemester 1999 einen experimentellen Kurs an, in dem alle okonomischen Theorien und Konzepte, die vermittelt werden, zuerst durch ein Experiment simuliert werden. Der Artikel zeigt auf, wie Experimente als didaktisches Instrument in wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Studiengangen eingesetzt werden konnen. Um einen Eindruck zu vermitteln, wie ein solches Horsaal-Experiment gestaltet sein kann, stellen wir ein einfaches Experiment vor, zu dem wir eine ausfuhrliche Anleitung und alle notwendigen Entscheidungsblatter fur die direkte Umsetzung in der Vorlesung im Anhang bereitstellen. Der Beitrag zeigt Kosten und Nutzen der experimentellen Didaktik auf und gibt Hinweise zu den Einsatzmoglichkeiten von Experimenten in der Lehre.