David C. Kang

Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks

lations theory is inductively derived from the European experience of the past four centuries, during which Europe was the locus and generator of war, innovation, and wealth. According to Kenneth Waltz, “The theory of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era. It would be . . . ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica. . . . A general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers.”1 If international relations theorists paid attention to other regions of the globe, it was to study subjects considered peripheral such as third world security or the behavior of small states.2 Accordingly, international relations scholarship has focused on explaining the European experience, including, for example, the causes of World Wars I and II, as well as the Cold War and U.S.-Soviet relations.3 Although this is still true, other parts of the world have become increasingly signiacant. Accordingly, knowledge of European Getting Asia Wrong

Bad Loans to Good Friends: Money Politics and the Developmental State in South Korea

Why has the literature on Asian development not addressed the issue of money politics in South Korea? How can we reconcile the view of an efficient developmental state in South Korea before 1997 with reports of massive corruption and inefficiency in that same country in 1998 and 1999? Politics is central to the answer. In this study I make two arguments. First, money politics was extensive in South Korea both during and after the high-growth era. Second, political—not economic—considerations dominated policymaking. This study explains both past and present and compares the patterns of money politics in the early post-independence era with those that arose after the democratic transition in 1987. While during the Park era a balance of power between businessmen and politicians kept corruption from spinning out of control, the transition to democracy altered the basic business-state relationship, allowing business to exert greater influence over policy decisions. The political hypothesis advanced in this study suggests a new direction for our research about the developmental state.

Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History

The balance of power is one of the most influential theoretical ideas in international relations, but it has not yet been tested systematically in international systems other than modern Europe and its global successor. This article is the product of a collective and multidisciplinary research effort to redress this deficiency. We report findings from eight new case studies on balancing and balancing failure in different international systems that comprise over 2000 years of international politics. Our findings are inconsistent with any theory that predicts a tendency of international systems toward balance. The factors that best account for variation between balance and hegemony within and across international systems lie outside all recent renditions of balance-of-power theory and indeed, international relations scholarship more generally. Our findings suggest a potentially productive way to reframe research on both the European and contemporary international systems.

Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations

In my article entitled “Getting Asia Wrong,” I make two major arguments.1 First, European-derived theories in general and realist theories in particular frequently have difaculty explaining Asian international relations. Second, international relations scholars need to be as careful about issues of empirical testing and theoretical rigor when studying Asia as they are when studying Europe. In a reply to my article, Amitav Acharya agrees with both of these claims while also critiquing my essay in arguing that shared norms and institutional linkages mitigate rivalry in Asia and that I am a historical determinist. Acharya, however, has misunderstood both international relations theory and the role of history. His response to my article provides me with an opportunity to clarify and brieoy expand on the major themes in “Getting Asia Wrong.” As Acharya’s reply exempliaes, most scholars not only dismiss the notion that the Asian experience might force a rethinking or modiacation of European-derived theories, but they also pay little attention to the historical Asian international system. Acharya writes, “Contrary to Kang’s argument, Asia’s future will not resemble its past” (p. 150). Acharya, however, has misunderstood my argument: To study the role of history is hardly to predict that it will replicate itself in the future. My main point is that there are good reasons to think that Asian states may not function like European states and that the study of Asia must begin with a discussion of some of Asia’s empirical anomalies and what might explain them. Acharya seems to argue that the only goal to which scholars who study Asia can aspire is to unquestioningly apply existing theory. In contrast, my goal is to expand international relations theory so that scholars can better identify factors that help to explain regional and temporal differences in how states think about and achieve security and how they conduct their international relations. Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles

Transaction Costs and Crony Capitalism in East Asia

Why did corruption and cronyism impede growth in some Asian countries but not in others? Building upon theoretical advances in the fields of rent-seeking, transaction costs, and the new institutional economics, this study finds that if there is a balance of power among a small and stable number of government and business actors, cronyism can actually reduce transaction costs and minimize deadweight losses; while either too few or too many actors leads to bandwagoning politics that increases deadweight losses from corruption. By examining corruption and cronyism through the lens of transaction costs, and showing why a particular set of government-business relations- although corrupt - also lowered transaction costs and made investment more credible while another set of relations did not, this study provides the outlines of a story that can both explain one aspect of corruption and also yields a theoretically-grounded causal mechanism that lets us distinguish between types of corruption.

Japanese colonialism and Korean development: A critique

Abstract New scholarship on economic development in Korea has focused on the beneficial effects of Japanese colonialism and on certain continuities between Koreas growth strategy before and after World War II. We challenge this new revisionism. The growth record under the Japanese occupation was more modest than is often thought, there are greater discontinuities than continuities between the colonial and postwar eras, and political independence was an important factor in subsequent growth. We trace the turning point in Koreas long-term growth to political, policy and institutional changes that occurred following the militarys seizure of power in 1961.

International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War

Ever since the first Korean war in 1950, scholars and policymakers have been predicting a second one, started by an invasion from the North. Whether seen as arising from preventive, preemptive, desperation, or simple aggressive motivations, the predominant perspective in the west sees North Korea as likely to instigate conflict. Yet for fifty years North Korea has not come close to starting a war. Why were so many scholars so consistently wrong about North Koreas intentions? Social scientists can learn as much from events that did not happen as from those that did. The case of North Korea provides a window with which to examine these theories of conflict initiation, and reveals how the assumptions underlying these theories can become mis-specified. Either scholars misunderstood the initial conditions, or they misunderstood the theory, and I show that scholars have made mistakes in both areas. Social science moves forward from clear statement of a theory, its causal logic, and its predictions. However, just as important is the rigorous assessment of a theory, especially if the predictions fail to materialize. North Korea never had the material capabilities to be a serious contender to the U.S.–ROK alliance, and it quickly fell further behind. The real question has not been whether North Korea would preempt as South Korea caught up, but instead why North Korea might fight as it fell further and further behind. The explanation for a half-century of stability and peace on the Korean peninsula is actually quite simple: deterrence works.

Between Balancing and Bandwagoning: South Korea's Response to China

Why has South Korea accommodated China, instead of fearing its growth and balancing against it? This article makes two central arguments. First, concepts of balancing and bandwagoning are fundamentally difficult to test, and to the extent that the theory can be tested, it appears to be wrong in the case of South Korea. In fact, we observe many cases in which rising powers are neither balanced nor “bandwagoned” but are simply accommodated with no fundamental change either way in military stance or alignment posture. Second, the factors that explain South Korean foreign policy orientation toward China are as much about interests as they are about material power. South Korea sees substantially more economic opportunity than military threat associated with Chinas rise; but even more importantly, South Korea evaluates Chinas goals as not directly threatening.

Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems: The Tribute System in Early Modern East Asia

The East Asian “tribute system” from 1368 to 1841 comprised an enduring, stable, and hierarchic system, with China clearly the hegemon, in which cultural achievement was as important as economic or military prowess. Most significant is the recognition that the Chinese tributary order was in fact a viable and recognized international system with military, cultural, and economic dimensions that all intersected to create a very interesting and stable security system. Recently it has become fashionable in historical circles to question the viability of the tributary system in part because scholars have become increasingly aware of the realties behind Chinese rhetoric. However, more nuanced studies and new interpretations only serve to underscore the centrality of the system for its participants. This paper demonstrates that there is a hierarchical relationship—generated by a common culture defined by a Confucian worldview—in place in the context of China and the East Asian states and helps clarify the distinction between an international system based on polarity and an international society based on culture.

The theoretical roots of hierarchy in international relations

The past fifteen years have seen arguments from all theoretical schools predicting that Asia will very soon be riven with conflict. Indeed, so common has been this pessimistic sentiment that it could properly be called the consensus view on Asian international relations. Whether based on balance of power theories that emphasise differential power in the region, based on a liberal argument about and a lack of institutions such as international organisations and democracy, or based on culturalist notions of historical animosities and unresolved grievances, the conventional wisdom and dominant prediction by both scholars and policymakers has been that post-Cold War Asia is an unstable place, and will be into the foreseeable future. Given the wide disparities in economic and military power among nations in the region, political systems that range from democratic to totalitarian, historical animosities, and the lack of international institutions, scholars concluded that Asia was ‘ripe for rivalry’. Most significantly, China’s dramatic economic modernisation has provoked widespread speculation that it may overturn the current regional order either intentionally or simply because its size provokes fear in its neighbours. Furthermore, these generally pessimistic views predicted a return of power politics, arms-racing, and potentially major conflict among Asian states, almost all of which had rapidly changing internal and external environments. Among the specific predictions were Japanese rearmament, increased Chinese adventurism as a result of its rising power and revisionist intentions,(Segal 1996), (Roy 1994a), (Kristof 1993), (Friedman and McCormick 2000), conflict or war over Taiwan, terrorist attacks from a rogue North Korea, conflict over the Spratley islands and other territorial issues, and arms-racing in Southeast Asia (Kupchan 1998). However, in recent years, scholars have begun to criticise the pessimistic prediction. These critiques have focused on pointing out numerous empirical problems with the pessimistic viewpoint. Most importantly, a number of scholars have pointed out that other Asian states do not appear to be