Victor D. Cha

Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula

ion address on January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush announced that as part of its post–September 11 security agenda, the United States would seek to prevent terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda from establishing links with three regimes—North Korea, Iraq, and Iran—that together form an “axis of evil.” These regimes, declared Bush, are intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with which to threaten the United States and its allies. Bush’s speech raises two dilemmas for the United States and its Asian allies regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). The arst involves understanding the signiacance of eighteen months of diplomatic initiatives by Pyongyang that began with the normalization of relations with the European Union, followed by a summit with the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) in June 2000, DPRK special envoy Gen. Myongnok Jo’s visit to Washington in August 2000, and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s trip to Pyongyang in October 2000. The juxtaposition of Bush’s declaration with these initiatives raises more questions than it answers about U.S. perceptions of North Korea’s intentions. Is the DPRK truly on the path to reform following the long period of uncertainty dating back to President Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994? Is North Korea’s current dictator, Kim Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula Victor D. Cha

What Do They Really Want?: Obama's North Korea Conundrum

We remained deadlocked over a particular clause in the document. Our counterparts across the table demanded language that we thought to be unacceptable. Yet, in an effort to move the already faltering negotiations forward, we agreed to send the language back to Washington overnight for approval. This was the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in September 2005. The talks had been suspended previously for well over a year, and the Bush administration, in its second term, was reengaging in a way that the first term had not. At issue was the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) demand that we put into writing a statement of U.S. non-hostile intent. The clause in question stipulated that the United States ‘‘has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.’’ To my surprise, the language came back the next morning having been approved in Washington. When we came back to the negotiation session at the Diaoyutai State Guest House with the accepted language, the Russians asked the Chinese chair for a recess from the deputy head of delegations drafting session. During the recess, they held a bilateral meeting with the North Koreans. In this meeting, they told the North, according to my Russian counterpart on their delegation, ‘‘The Americans are serious. You see this [clause]? This is called a negative security assurance. We tried to get this from them throughout the Cold War and were unsuccessful.’’

A North Korean Spring

Is revolution similar to the Arab Spring possible in North Korea? The answer from most scholars and intelligence analysts has been ‘‘no’’ that the Pyongyang regime’s stability in the aftermath of the events in the Middle East and North Africa is an ‘‘old question’’ that was answered in the 1990s when the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North Korea) faced the most critical test of its life, and survived. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the drastic cuts in patron aid from China, and the onset of famine that killed hundreds of thousands all constituted the ultimate test of DPRK stability, and the regime staggered on through it all. Thus, the assumption is that the Arab Spring has little relevance to the DPRK. The scholarly literature tends to support this assessment. Scholars like Georgetown University’s Daniel Byman have argued that Kim Jong-il has effectively ‘‘coup-proofed’’ himself through an elaborate system of patronage, bribery, and draconian rule. This may be true, but the phenomenal events that have taken place in the Middle East and North Africa have shown us two things. First, in spite of all of the reasons for thinking that things won’t change, they could, and quite suddenly. And second, the mere presence of variables that could spell the collapse of an authoritarian regime tells us nothing about when or if that collapse could happen. Among the ruins of collapsed dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, experts have picked out causes that have long existed, yet they cannot explain why they led to collapse in 2011 as opposed to years, or even decades, earlier. Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya had each been in power longer than Kim Jong-il in North Korea. Can we simply assume

Focus on the future, not the north

The U.S.‐ROK alliance is slowly but steadily approaching a pivotal reassessment. It is time to stop thinking about the alliance in ad hoc terms and start creating the vision for the future U.S. presence in Northeast Asia generally and in Korea specifically.

Realism, Liberalism, and the Durability of the U.S.-South Korean Alliance

Throughout the Cold War, a precarious but stable peace has existed on the Korean Peninsula. However, over the past five years, developments in North Korea (DPRK) have raised the possibility of a destabilizing change in the status quo for the first time since the end of hostilities in 1953. The Norths economy has registered negative growth rates for five consecutive years, and the general population faces near-famine conditions. Overseeing these dire conditions is a new leader whose intentions are even more opaque than those of his predecessor. The reclusive regime refuses to acknowledge global realities and continues to take provocative actions against the South. Moreover, it continues to develop an indigenous ballistic missile program, and it potentially possesses nuclear weapons capability. Given these conditions, it seems that a cohesive U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) relationship is more necessary than ever to deal with the Norths unpredictability, as well as prepare for the regimes possible implosion or explosion. In spite of these imperatives, however, growing tensions in the alliance have become apparent. While Seoul and Washington fully support efforts such as the Agreed Framework (AF) designed to curb the Norths nuclear weapons ambitions and cooperate in the Frameworks implementation, a by-product has been acute levels of distrust and alienation that test the resiliency of the alliance in the post-Cold War era. What are the causes for these difficulties in U.S.-ROK relations; how can they be resolved; and how can this case provide lessons for the successful

The Asian Games and Diplomacy in Asia: Korea–China–Russia

In this article, I will look at the impact of sport on relations between states. In particular, I will study the role that sport has played in enhancing (or damaging) diplomacy in international relations. I will look especially at the role that the Olympics and the Asian Olympics have played in promoting diplomatic breakthroughs between countries. My cases focus on the use of sports diplomacy to foster the end of the Cold War in Asia, studying the breakthroughs between Korea, China and Russia. I will then look at the Beijing Games of 2008 and Guangzhou Asian Games of 2010.

The Obama administration's policy toward East Asia

Abstract Conventional wisdom argues that President Obama inherited a U.S. reputation that was badly damaged around the world. While this may hold true in Europe, in Asia, where U.S. standing matters most, there was never such a precipitous decline. To Europeans, the Iraq War stirred moral outrage and rabid opposition. However, the situation in the Persian Gulf simply did not matter as much to Asians. There were pockets within Asia that were critical of U.S. actions, but this was overshadowed by an overwhelming support for values such as democracy and human rights. Evidence shows that even vis-a-vis China, U.S. standing has not faced a significant decline in the region. The result is that Asians continue to perceive the United States as the closest thing to an honest broker in the region, as evidenced by positive reactions to the leadership role that the United States took in response to the 2004 tsunami. Representing 60 percent of the worlds population, compared to Europes seven percent, Asian views are...

Japan's Grand Strategy on the Korean Peninsula: Optimistic Realism

Korea is one of the most complex, critical, and yet understudied of Japans foreign policy relationships. While much attention in US policy and academic circles has focused on Japans future relations with China as the key variable for regional stability in the twenty first century, an integral part of the security dynamic in East Asia has been driven by the Japan–Korea axis. In the late-nineteenth century and early twentieth century, two major power wars in Asia (i.e., Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese) had this relationship as a proximate cause. During the cold war, the Japan–Republic of Korea (ROK) axis facilitated the American presence as an Asia-Pacific power and security guarantor. And in the post-cold war era, outcomes in the Japan–Korea (united or still divided) relationship are critical to the shape of future balance of power dynamics in the region and with it, the future American security presence. How then should we be thinking about future Japanese relations with the Korean peninsula? What are Tokyos hopes and concerns with regard to Korea? How do they view the prospect of a united Korea? Is there a Japanese ‘grand strategy’ regarding the peninsula?

Winning is Not Enough: Sport and Politics in East Asia and Beyond

Avery Brundage, once head of the International Olympic Committee, described politics as ‘a savage monster’ always trying to disrupt sport. But Brundage was defending the decision not to withhold the 1936 Olympic Games from Nazi Germany. Thus, defending the sanctity of sport can itself be political. Sport is especially political in Asia. In the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Chinese ran a gauntlet of political causes ranging from corporate boycotts of the Games over Chinas policies in Darfur to an Olympic torch procession attacked by demonstrators in London, Paris, San Francisco and Seoul. By comparison, London had virtually no politics associated with it – unless you read deep political messages in the story of Mary Poppins or the reunion of the Spice Girls. This article makes three key points. First, the Olympics and international sport for that matter are intensely political. Second, sport is most intensely political in this region of the world. Third, the lessons we learn about the politics of sport have relevance for Russias hosting of the 2014 Sochi Winter Games in the form of an inescapable dilemma that illiberal regimes bring upon themselves, called the Olympic ‘Catch-22’.

Land of the Morning Calm: Korea and American Security.

The author traces the economic and political development of the Korean peninsula, and discusses Koreas future role and the implications for US foreign policy.