David Coen

The evolution of the large firm as a political actor in the European Union

The establishment of the European single market, the Maastricht accords and the development of a pan-European firm have all contributed to the creation of a European political marketplace with a myriad of access points. Why the large firm has changed its locus of political activity towards the European Union (EU), and what form this new political action has taken are the focus of this article. Based on a study of ninety-four of Europes largest firms, this article outlines how firms, as individual actors, have come to play such a prominent role in the EU policy process, and assesses their current lobbying preferences for political channels to the EU. In recognizing the political sophistication of firms, the article concludes that firms are now able to recognize and construct strategic alliances with rival firms and countervailing interests to create European identities and facilitate access to new European policy forums.

Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation: European Networks of Regulatory Agencies

European networks of regulators in industries such as telecommunications, securities, energy and transport have been cited as important examples of the growth of network governance in Europe. Using a principal-agent perspective as a starting point, the article examines why a double delegation to networks of regulators has taken place. It looks at how and why the European Commission, national governments and independent regulatory agencies have driven the creation of networks, their institutional character and their implications for regulatory governance in Europe. It argues that problems of co-ordination were the main factor advanced to justify establishing networks of regulators. The new networks have been given a wide range of tasks and broad membership, but enjoy few formal powers or resources. They are highly dependent on the European Commission and face rivals for the task of co-ordinating European regulators. Thus in institutional terms the spread of network governance has in fact been limited.

Empirical and theoretical studies in EU lobbying

Abstract The volume offers an analysis of large N empirical studies of interest groups in Europe. It calls for a shift from exploratory or descriptive interest studies to more confirmatory theory testing. Recognizing the continued European economic integration, globalization and the changing role of the state, we observed significant adaptations in interest mobilization and strategic behaviour. The various papers assess the logic of collective and direct action, the logic of access and influence, the logic of venue shopping and alliance building. Specifically, the volume notes the emergence of élite pluralism in EU institutions, the pump priming of political action by EU institutions, and the growing political sophistication of private and public interests in a complex multi-level venue environment.

Reshaping european regulatory space: An evolutionary analysis

The article examines European institutions for implementing EU regulation. It assesses their development using seven different models that have been introduced or discussed for organising implementation. It argues that the development of European regulatory space has followed an evolutionary pattern involving gradual reshaping through a series of steps, with previous stages influencing later stages and institutions being built on existing structures. Despite pressures and frequent discussions of comprehensive change, existing organisations have managed to limit and shape reforms. The result has been institutional ‘layering’ and ‘conversion’ instead of streamlining, and a gradual strengthening of networks of national independent regulatory agencies. The analysis therefore suggests that evolutionary analysis based on historical institutionalist approaches seems highly appropriate to the EU. Equally, it shows how even if there are strong demand-side pressures for centralisation of regulation, existing institutional arrangements and organisations limit and shape the supply of new institutions, so that debates about radical change coexist with a fragmented, cluttered and complex European regulatory space.

Insider and Outsider Lobbying of the European Commission

We propose an informational model of lobbying to understand macro-characteristics of lobbying systems. We are particularly interested in the number of lobbyists in a system, and the distinction between insider and outsider lobbyists. Empirically, we seek to explain the post-Maastricht lobbying boom in the European Union and the concomitant establishment of European Commission forums for interest representation. Using a simple model of informational lobbying with many lobbyists, we show that there is a relationship between lobbying costs, the number of lobbyists, and the informational content of lobbying messages. In conclusion, we propose three different categories of lobbying systems.

Lobbying activity and fora creation in the EU: empirically exploring the nature of the policy good

Abstract This paper presents a quantitative look at lobbying activity and the emergence of institutional fora in the European Union (EU). Specifically, the paper explores why the number of interest representatives differs across policy domains, and why we find institutionalized fora for interest representation for some policy issues but not others. Building on a strategic lobbying model, the paper shows empirically that Commission activity influences interest group activity, and that increased activity leads to the creation of fora. This conforms to our assertion that the creation of lobbying insiders is a reaction to lobbying overload. We also find that distributive policy domains have fewer lobbying groups than regulatory policy domains. This is unsurprising, considering that regulation is the area of greatest EU policy output. Conversely, lower levels of lobbying activity in distributive policy domains indicate that these are still highly intergovernmental and encourage multi-level venue shopping.

Chameleon pluralism in the EU: an empirical study of the European Commission interest group density and diversity across policy domains

This paper contributes to the discussion surrounding interest groups in the European Commission. We inspect the Commissions lobbying register and assess the density and diversity of the interest group population per policy domain. The results suggest that while at the system level élite pluralism with its preponderance of business interests is a credible hypothesis, this is not the case at the sub-system level, where chameleon pluralism better conceptualizes variation of the interest group populations as a function of the age of the Directorate General (DG), capacity of the DG, nature of the policy domain, and involvement of member states. Bridging theoretical considerations on input/output legitimacy with informational approaches, we argue that different policy domains demand different types of legitimacy that are supported by the provision of different types of information (technical/political).

Refining regulatory regimes

With regulation seeking to foster competition at the same time as also having to protect essential services, the authors investigate regulatory styles, costs of new regulatory functions and how firms in the new regulatory landscape access and influence regulatory authorities. The authors consider how EU pressures may hinder or help the functioning of new regulatory markets and the establishment of business–regulator relationships, as well as the broader policy implications for these new regulatory environments. The book also determines how regulatory authorities emerge and evolve under different state traditions and assesses, over time, the degree to which there is potential for convergence, divergence and continued differences as regulatory functions mature.

The European Business Lobby

Lobbying is a familiar if not always welcome reality in politics and many now recognise that companies have a legitimate role to play in the public policy process. But how firms set about exerting influence – and what works best – is still something of a mystery. In particular, few empirical studies have examined how firms have tackled the fast-changing Brussels maze. Based on interviews and a survey, this article outlines how firms have come to play a prominent role in the European Union’s policy process and how their approach to influencing EU policy has developed. It then analyzes which methods they think are most effective – and most cost-effective. The author concludes by assessing the extent to which building strategic alliances with rival firms and public interest groups facilitates their own direct lobbying at the European Commission forums, and vice-versa.

Corporate Political Strategy and Global Policy: A Case Study of the Transaltantic Business Dialogue

Transatlantic business Dialogue (TABD) set up in 1995 as joint initiative of the European Commission and US State Deptartment, has evolved into a business-government policy-making body. The TABD brings together 112 top American and European chiefs executives to co-ordinate business responses to international trade, standards and regulation questions. The TABDs ability to co-ordinate quick and focused policy responses and its removal of the need for potential intergovernmental bargening has been an appealing feature for CEOs and governemnt officials. However, for all of its policy- making advantages, question marks have been raised about the accountability, representativeness and legitimacy of big-business forums.