Mark Thatcher

Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions

The article summarises the analytical frameworks, questions, and empirical findings of the volume. It defines the key concepts used. It then sets out the principal-agent framework that explains delegation to NMIs through functional logics for principals. It sets out alternative explanations based on sociological and historical institutionalism. Thereafter, it relates the empirical findings of the volume to these wider debates about delegation. It argues that although functional demands for delegation can almost always be identified, purely functional accounts of delegation to NMIs are inadequate. Explaining the decision to delegate and the institutional forms of that delegation involves including and specifying interests, policy learning/institutional isomorphism and institutional inheritances. Delegation has also had major consequences on the distribution of power, policy making processes and substantive policy choices, both through its direct effects, and via feedback effects. Finally, delegation has raised questions about the legitimacy and accountability of NMIs.

Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Pressures, Functions and Contextual Mediation

Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) have spread across many domains in Western Europe. The article examines selected examples in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. A functionalist analysis of the pressures on elected officials and the functions that IRAs perform provide a valuable starting point for analysis. Nevertheless, it confronts cross-national and cross-domain variations in the timing of the creation of IRAs, their spread and their institutional forms. In order to offer a fuller account, contextual factors that mediate pressures must be considered. These factors include learning and institutional isomorphism; state traditions and structures; political leadership; state reforms. Finally, IRAs have had far-reaching consequences that have often been unanticipated at the time of their creation.

Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation: European Networks of Regulatory Agencies

European networks of regulators in industries such as telecommunications, securities, energy and transport have been cited as important examples of the growth of network governance in Europe. Using a principal-agent perspective as a starting point, the article examines why a double delegation to networks of regulators has taken place. It looks at how and why the European Commission, national governments and independent regulatory agencies have driven the creation of networks, their institutional character and their implications for regulatory governance in Europe. It argues that problems of co-ordination were the main factor advanced to justify establishing networks of regulators. The new networks have been given a wide range of tasks and broad membership, but enjoy few formal powers or resources. They are highly dependent on the European Commission and face rivals for the task of co-ordinating European regulators. Thus in institutional terms the spread of network governance has in fact been limited.

Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe

Three aspects of the life of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) after delegation are examined: their independence from elected officials, their relationship with regulatees; their decision-making processes. The article suggests that IRAs enjoy considerable insulation from elected politicians in terms of party politicization and tenure. The evidence for relations between IRAs and business regulatees is more mixed: the two have been relatively separate in terms of the professional origins and destinations of senior IRA staff and, in some countries, there has been considerable legal conflict between them. However, in an important and visible field such as merger control, IRAs have undertaken little activity. The greatest changes introduced by IRAs have been in decision-making processes, which they have opened up, in contrast to closed processes before delegation.

Reshaping european regulatory space: An evolutionary analysis

The article examines European institutions for implementing EU regulation. It assesses their development using seven different models that have been introduced or discussed for organising implementation. It argues that the development of European regulatory space has followed an evolutionary pattern involving gradual reshaping through a series of steps, with previous stages influencing later stages and institutions being built on existing structures. Despite pressures and frequent discussions of comprehensive change, existing organisations have managed to limit and shape reforms. The result has been institutional ‘layering’ and ‘conversion’ instead of streamlining, and a gradual strengthening of networks of national independent regulatory agencies. The analysis therefore suggests that evolutionary analysis based on historical institutionalist approaches seems highly appropriate to the EU. Equally, it shows how even if there are strong demand-side pressures for centralisation of regulation, existing institutional arrangements and organisations limit and shape the supply of new institutions, so that debates about radical change coexist with a fragmented, cluttered and complex European regulatory space.

The Politics of Telecommunications

INTRODUCTION 1. National Institutions, Differences, Stability and Change 2THE ROOTS OF HISTORY: TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE BEFORE 1969 3 TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES FOR CHANGE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 4 PRESSURES FOR CHANGE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S PART TWO INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY MAKING 1969-1979 5THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE 1969-1979: DIVERGENCE, REFORM AND STANDSTILL 6 POLICY MAKING IN THE 1970S: CONSTRAINTS IN BRITAIN, BOLDNESS IN FRANCE PART THREE INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY MAKING 1980-1996 7 THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1980-1997: NATIONAL CHANGE, DIVERGENCE AND DIFFERENCES 8THE IMPACTS OF INSTITUTIONAL DIVERGENCE: THE NETWORK OPERATORS IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE DURING THE 1980S 9 COMPETITION IN NETWORK OPERATION 1990-1996: DIFFERING NATIONAL PATHS AWAY FROM MONOPOLY 10 POLICY MAKING IN A NEW FIELD OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ADVANCED NETWORKS AND SERVICES AND CUSTOMER PREMISES EQUIPMENT FROM THE LATE 1970S TO THE MID-1990S PART FOUR ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 11 ECONOMIC OUTCOMES IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE 1970-1997: CONVERGENCE DESPITE INSTITUTIONAL DIVERGENCE PART FIVE CONCLUSIONS 12 CONCLUSION: NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, POLICY AND CHANGE

Winners and Losers in Europeanisation: Reforming the National Regulation of Telecommunications

member states. Some actors are winners: pressures generated by European integration are congruent with their existing strategies, or they can adapt to these pressures. Europe supplies resources that aid the strategies of these actors, notably by providing a source of legitimation for changes that they desire for non-EU reasons. In contrast, other actors, whose strategies and objectives are hindered by European integration and who lose resources, find themselves disadvantaged and are losers from Europeanisation. This article analyses how Europeanisation creates winners and losers within national policy arenas. Studies of Europeanisation have focused on the extent of pressures from EU decision-making on member states (the ‘goodness of fit’), the mechanisms whereby Europeanisation operates and the national characteristics that mediate EU pressures. There is an implicit assumption that the lower the ‘goodness of fit’ between the EU and national levels, the greater the imposition on actors. While ‘goodness of fit’ is a crucial first step, the extent of imposition and the resources that European integration may bring to actors domestically must be considered. The analysis therefore starts with ‘goodness of fit’, but thereafter asks three other questions in order to identify winners and losers. Were the pressures from European integration similar to the preferences of actors, or did they differ and hence represent an imposition on certain actors, and if so on which? Which actors were able to re-orient their strategies to make them compatible with pressures from integration and which were not? What resources did Europe bring to actors in domestic battles, notably in terms of legitimation? National institutional change in telecommunications is taken as a case study. Modification of institutions is often highly contested, and certainly has been in telecommunications. Not only is the sector economically and politically vital, but also the period from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s Winners and Losers in Europeanisation: Reforming the National Regulation of Telecommunications

The Commission and national governments as partners: EC regulatory expansion in telecommunications 1979–2000

General integrationist models underline conflicts between the Commission and national governments. They cite telecommunications as an exemplar of the Commission imposing its choices on unwilling member states. However, a close examination of the development of substantive EC regulation in telecommunications shows that the Commission and national governments acted in partnership. Major conflicts concerned constitutional issues rather than substantive ones. How and why the partnership came to exist is analysed using a principal-agent framework. The article argues that formal and informal institutional controls made the Commission very sensitive to the preferences of national governments in substantive EC telecommunications regulation, resulting in partnership in developing substantive EC regulation. Four processes wherebysuch controls operated were: the participation of national governments at all stages of decision-making; incrementalism; compromises and linkages; national discretion in implementation. In contrast, effective controls and processes did not apply to constitutional issues, leading to conflict rather than co-operation between the Commission and governments.

The creation of European regulatory agencies and its limits: a comparative analysis of European delegation

Agency creation at the European Union (EU) level differs from that at the national one. European regulatory agencies (ERAs) have limited formal powers and separation from other actors, resembling networks rather than stand-alone agencies. ERAs for economic regulation have been created later and in smaller numbers than for social regulation. Using a historical rational analysis, this paper argues that past delegations to other non-majoritarian institutions at the EU and national levels condition the creation of European agencies. The Commission has defended its existing role and powers, accepting ERAs when they aid its strategy to increase its own reach and ensuring that it has many controls over them. When member states have created independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), those IRAs have defended their autonomy and resisted strong ERAs. Formalized EU networks of IRAs have hindered the establishment of powerful ERAs and when created, ERAs have involved layering and conversion of those networks. Hence formal delegation to ERAs has been limited and uneven.

Varieties of capitalism in an internationalized world: domestic institutional change in European telecommunications

This article examines how internationalization affects domestic decisions about the reform of market institutions. A developing literature argues that nations maintain different “varieties of capitalism” in the face of economic globalization because of diverse domestic settings. However, in an internationalized world, powerful forces for change applying across border scan affect decision making within domestic arenas. The article therefore analyzes how three factors (transnational technological and economic developments, overseas reforms, and European regulation) affected institutional reform in a selected case study of telecommunications regulation in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy between the 1960s and 2002. The author argues that when different forms of internationalization are strong and combined, they can overwhelm institutional inertia and the effects of different national settings to result in rapid change and cross-national convergence in market institutions. Hence different varieties of capitalism may endure only when international pressures are low and/or for limited periods of time.