David Dignath

It Takes Two to Imitate Anticipation and Imitation in Social Interaction

Imitation is assumed to serve crucial functions in social interaction, such as empathy and learning, yet these functions apply only to the imitating observer. In the two experiments reported here, we revealed a distinct function of imitation for the action model: Anticipation of being imitated facilitates the production of overt motor actions. Specifically, anticipated motor responses of social counterparts serve as mental cues for the model to retrieve corresponding motor commands to orchestrate his or her own actions.

Representing the Hyphen in Action-Effect Associations: Automatic Acquisition and Bidirectional Retrieval of Action-Effect Intervals

We examined whether a temporal interval between an action and its sensory effect is integrated in the cognitive action structure in a bidirectional fashion. In 3 experiments, participants first experienced that actions produced specific acoustic effects (high and low tones) that occurred temporally delayed after their actions. In a following test phase, the tones that were presented as action effects in the previous phase were now presented as primes for the responses that had caused them previously and, critically, also as primes for the interval that previously separated action and effects. The tones were presented as go-signals in a free-choice test and as response-imperative stimuli in a forced-choice test. In the free choice test, participants were more likely to choose responses consistent with the previous pairing, but these responses were initiated slower than responses that were inconsistent with previous action-effect learning (Experiment 1). Effect-consistent responses were also initiated slower in the speeded forced-choice test (Experiment 2). These observations suggest that retrieval of a long action-effect interval slows down response initiation. In Experiment 3, response-contingent effects were presented with a long or short delay after a response. Reaction times in both, a forced-choice and free-choice setup, were faster in the short- than in the long-interval condition. We conclude that temporal information about the interval between actions and effects is integrated into a cognitive action structure and is automatically retrieved during response selection.

Thinking with portals: Revisiting kinematic cues to intention

What we intend to achieve with our actions affects the way we move our body. This has been repeatedly shown for both, movement-related intentions such as grasping and turning an object, and relatively high-level intentions such as the intention to collaborate or to compete with a social partner. The impact of an intermediate level of intentions - referring to action-contingent changes in the physical environment - is far less clear, however. We present three experiments that aim at scrutinizing this level of analysis by showing how such anticipated consequences affect movement trajectories. Participants steered a virtual avatar toward portals that displaced the avatar to a different but predictable location. Even though this displacement occurred only after the movement was completed, hand movements were clearly torn toward the anticipated final location of the avatar. These results show that properties of anticipated action consequences leave a fingerprint on movement trajectories and provide an opportunity to unite previous accounts on the relation of intentions and movements with general frameworks of action planning.

Cue-elicited food seeking is eliminated with aversive outcomes following outcome devaluation:

In outcome-selective Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT), stimuli that are predictive of specific outcomes prime instrumental responses that are associated with these outcomes. Previous human studies yielded mixed evidence in respect to whether the PIT effect is affected by a posttraining devaluation of an outcome, with the PIT effect being preserved after a devaluation of a primary reinforcer (food, drugs) but not following the devaluation of a secondary reinforcer (money). The present research examined whether outcome-selective transfer is eliminated when the devaluation of a primary (liquid) reinforcer is strong and aversive. Experiment 1 confirmed these expectations following a devaluation with bad tasting Tween 20. However, outcome-selective transfer was still observed when the earned (devalued) outcome was not consumed immediately after each test (Experiment 2). These results suggest that the capacity of a Pavlovian cue to motivate a specific response is affected by the incentive value of the shared outcome only when the devaluation yields an aversive outcome that is consumed immediately.

Flexible Conflict Management: Conflict Avoidance and Conflict Adjustment in Reactive Cognitive Control.

Conflict processing is assumed to serve two crucial, yet distinct functions: Regarding task performance, control is adjusted to overcome the conflict. Regarding task choice, control is harnessed to bias decision making away from the source of conflict. Despite recent theoretical progress, until now two lines of research addressed these conflict-management strategies independently of each other. In this research, we used a voluntary task-switching paradigm in combination with response interference tasks to study both strategies in concert. In Experiment 1, participants chose between two univalent tasks on each trial. Switch rates increased following conflict trials, indicating avoidance of conflict. Furthermore, congruency effects in reaction times and error rates were reduced following conflict trials, demonstrating conflict adjustment. In Experiment 2, we used bivalent instead of univalent stimuli. Conflict adjustment in task performance was unaffected by this manipulation, but conflict avoidance was not observed. Instead, task switches were reduced after conflict trials. In Experiment 3, we used tasks comprising univalent or bivalent stimuli. Only tasks with univalent revealed conflict avoidance, whereas conflict adjustment was found for all tasks. On the basis of established theories of cognitive control, an integrative process model is described that can account for flexible conflict management.

Honesty saves time (and justifications).

The study of active lying poses considerable methodological challenges, especially regarding suitable experimental designs to prompt dishonest responses. This aim is often achieved by instructing participants whether to lie or to be honest in a given situation (e.g., Spence et al., 2001; Walczyk et al., 2003). Shalvi and colleagues have recently promoted a striking alternative approach which allows studying spontaneous lies: the die under cup paradigm (Shalvi et al., 2011, 2012; cf. Fischbacher and Heusi, 2008). In this paradigm, participants roll a die, report the outcome anonymously, and receive payment depending on their roll. Though it is not possible to determine whether a given participant is lying or not, the distribution of outcomes indicates whether participants tend to report higher numbers than expected by chance. n nShalvi et al. (2012) modified this paradigm to investigate situational determinants of self-serving lies. In their Experiment 1, participants were to roll a die three times and to report the outcome of the first roll afterward. Importantly, they either worked at their own pace or had to complete the three rolls within 20 s (to induce time pressure). Participants were more honest in the self-paced condition than in the time pressure condition, which led the authors to suggest that lying is an initial, automatic tendency that is overcome only if sufficient time to deliberate is available and if unethical behavior cannot be justified. n nThese conclusions are surprising because a substantial body of research seems to suggest the very opposite: numerous studies found lying to be cognitively more demanding than responding honestly and, consequently, honesty is typically seen as a behavioral default (e.g., Spence et al., 2001, 2004; Walczyk et al., 2003, 2009; Debey et al., 2012). Further supporting this view, honest answers seem to be actively inhibited during lying (Spence et al., 2001; Nunez et al., 2005). These findings challenge the interpretations of Shalvi et al. (2012), and we propose that certain peculiarities of the die under cup paradigm are responsible for the diverging results. n nAs a central feature of the die under cup paradigm, participants can—in principle—generate their response before actually rolling the die. This procedure is markedly different from other approaches where an answers appropriateness and truthfulness depend on the specific question that is asked in a trial (e.g., Spence et al., 2001). Here, the answer can be generated only after the question is asked. These latter designs might thus be better suited to address the automaticity of lying because they tap directly onto the time it takes to generate dishonest and truthful responses. The die under cup paradigm, however, can be modified to address automaticity more directly as well. n nAccordingly, we varied the time available for reflection about the (dis)honesty of the reports on two levels: individual die rolls and blocks of rolls. The available time between individual die rolls and reports was manipulated by asking participants either to report the number immediately (immediate report condition) or after a short delay (delayed report condition). This delay was implemented by asking participants to report only after continuing to shake the cup (Figure u200b(Figure1A).1A). The time available at the level of blocks of rolls was manipulated by having participants run through each condition not only once but repeatedly before and after a short break. Each of these rolls is statistically independent of preceding and subsequent tosses, and hence has always the same expected value. Consequently, any above chance variation of reported numbers over time (i.e., before and after the break) must originate from the human observer. Thus, assessing the time course of reported outcomes provides a novel measure of dishonesty in addition to the mean outcome that has been used previously. n n n nFigure 1 n nDesign and results. (A) Procedure of the immediate (top) and the delayed report condition (bottom); the experimenter announced the current condition, and participants reported the outcome of three rolls of an eight-sided die. Both conditions were repeated ... n n n nThirty-two participants (mean age: 24.9 years) joined the game and were informed that they could earn up to 2.50€ depending on the total of 12 rolls with an eight-sided die. They started either with the immediate report condition or the delayed report condition (three rolls) and continued with the remaining condition (three rolls). Crucially, this sequence was repeated after a short break. We had to discard the data of four participants due to procedural errors, leaving data of 28 × 12 = 336 rolls. n nParticipants reported higher numbers in the delayed report condition than in the immediate report condition in the first experimental half, but not in the second half (see Figure u200bFigure1B).1B). This observation was confirmed by a 2 × 2 repeated-measures analysis of variance with the factors condition (immediate vs. delayed report) and experimental half (1st vs. 2nd) that was run on the mean outcomes. Most notably, the interaction of condition and experimental half was significant, F(1, 27) = 4.96, p = 0.034, η2p = 0.16, whereas neither main effect approached significance; condition: F(1, 27) = 2.20, p = 0.149, η2p = 0.08; experimental half: F < 1. Tested separately, only the mean outcome of the delayed report condition in the first half differed from chance level (4.5), t(27) = 2.28, p = 0.031, d = 0.43. n nThese results challenge the interpretations of Shalvi et al. (2012) and suggest spontaneous responses to be quite honest whereas only delayed responses foster self-serving behavior. On a larger timescale, however, time for reasoning (after the first experimental half) seems to counteract dishonest responses again. Thus, dishonest responses do not seem to be a truly automatic tendency but rather do they take more time and cognitive effort than truthful responses. In the light of previous research on lying (Spence et al., 2001; Walczyk et al., 2003) and on spontaneous tendencies to co-operate rather than compete with others (Rand et al., 2012), we thus believe that lying is currently best be seen not as “a dark side of human automatic tendencies” (Shalvi et al., 2012, p. 1269) but rather as the dark side of human deliberation.

Stimulus conflict triggers behavioral avoidance

According to a recent extension of the conflict-monitoring theory, conflict between two competing response tendencies is registered as an aversive event and triggers a motivation to avoid the source of conflict. In the present study, we tested this assumption. Over five experiments, we examined whether conflict is associated with an avoidance motivation and whether stimulus conflict or response conflict triggers an avoidance tendency. Participants first performed a color Stroop task. In a subsequent motivation test, participants responded to Stroop stimuli with approach- and avoidance-related lever movements. These results showed that Stroop-conflict stimuli increased the frequency of avoidance responses in a free-choice motivation test, and also increased the speed of avoidance relative to approach responses in a forced-choice test. High and low proportions of response conflict in the Stroop task had no effect on avoidance in the motivation test. Avoidance of conflict was, however, obtained even with new conflict stimuli that had not been presented before in a Stroop task, and when the Stroop task was replaced with an unrelated filler task. Taken together, these results suggest that stimulus conflict is sufficient to trigger avoidance.

Anticipation of delayed action-effects: learning when an effect occurs, without knowing what this effect will be

According to the ideomotor principle, behavior is controlled via a retrieval of the sensory consequences that will follow from the respective movement (“action-effects”). These consequences include not only what will happen, but also when something will happen. In fact, recollecting the temporal duration between response and effect takes time and prolongs the initiation of the response. We investigated the associative structure of action-effect learning with delayed effects and asked whether participants acquire integrated action-time-effect episodes that comprise a compound of all three elements or whether they acquire separate traces that connect actions to the time until an effect occurs and actions to the effects that follow them. In three experiments, results showed that participants retrieve temporal intervals that follow from their actions even when the identity of the effect could not be learned. Furthermore, retrieval of temporal intervals in isolation was not inferior to retrieval of temporal intervals that were consistently followed by predictable action-effects. More specifically, when tested under extinction, retrieval of action-time and action-identity associations seems to compete against each other, similar to overshadowing effects reported for stimulus–response conditioning. Together, these results suggest that people anticipate when the consequences of their action will occur, independently from what the consequences will be.

Phasic valence and arousal do not influence post-conflict adjustments in the Simon task

According to theoretical accounts of cognitive control, conflict between competing responses is monitored and triggers post conflict behavioural adjustments. Some models proposed that conflict is detected as an affective signal. While the conflict monitoring theory assumed that conflict is registered as a negative valence signal, the adaptation by binding model hypothesized that conflict provides a high arousal signal. The present research induced phasic affect in a Simon task with presentations of pleasant and unpleasant pictures that were high or low in arousal. If conflict is registered as an affective signal, the presentation of a corresponding affective signal should potentiate post conflict adjustments. Results did not support the hypothesis, and Bayesian analyses corroborated the conclusion that phasic affects do not influence post conflict behavioural adjustments in the Simon task.

Something in the Way She Moves-Movement Trajectories Reveal Dynamics of Self-Control

This study examined the dynamic impact of self-control conflict on action execution. We reasoned that the tug-of-war between antagonistic action tendencies is not ultimately solved before movement initiation but leaks into action execution. To this end, we measured mouse trajectories to quantify the dynamic competition between initial temptations and the struggle to overcome them. Participants moved the mouse cursor from a start location to one of two targets. Each target represented a gain or a loss of points. Although participants earned points on the majority of the trials, they also had to make movements to the loss target on some trials to prevent an even higher loss. Two experiments found that movement trajectories on these loss trials deviate toward the tempting stimulus: The way we move reveals self-control conflicts that have not been resolved prior to action execution.