Andreas B. Eder

When Do Motor Behaviors (Mis)Match Affective Stimuli? An Evaluative Coding View of Approach and Avoidance Reactions.

Affective-mapping effects between affective stimuli and lever movements are critically dependent upon the evaluative meaning of the response labels that are used in the task instructions. In Experiments 1 and 2, affective-mapping effects predicted by specific-muscle-activation and distance-regulation accounts were replicated when the standard response labels towards and away were used but were reversed when identical lever movements were labeled downwards and upwards. In Experiment 3, affective-mapping effects were produced with affectively labeled right and left lever movements that are intrinsically unrelated to approach and avoidance. Experiments 4 and 5 revealed that affective-mapping effects are not mediated by memory retrieval processes and depend on the execution of affectively coded responses. The results support the assumption that evaluative implications of action instructions assign affective codes to motor responses on a representational level that interact with stimulus evaluations on a response selection stage.

Priming of semantic classifications by novel subliminal prime words.

Four experiments demonstrate category congruency priming by subliminal prime words that were never seen as targets in a valence-classification task (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) and a gender-classification task (Experiment 3). In Experiment 1, overlap in terms of word fragments of one or more letters between primes and targets of different valences was larger than between primes and targets of the same valence. In Experiments 2 and 3, the sets of prime words and target words were completely disjoint in terms of used letters. In Experiment 4, pictures served as targets. The observed subliminal priming effects for novel primes cannot be driven by partial analysis of primes at the word-fragment level; they suggest instead that primes were processed semantically as whole words contingent upon prime duration.

Approach–Avoidance Motivation and Emotion: Convergence and Divergence

In this concluding piece, we identify and discuss various aspects of convergence and, to a lesser degree, divergence in the ideas expressed in the contributions to this special section. These contributions emphatically illustrate that approach–avoidance motivation is integral to the scientific study of emotion. It is our hope that the articles herein will facilitate cross-talk among researchers and research traditions, and will lead to a more thorough understanding of the role of approach–avoidance motivation in emotion.

Automatic response activation in sequential affective priming: an ERP study

Affective priming effects denote faster responses when two successively presented affective stimuli match in valence than when they mismatch. Two mechanisms have been proposed for their explanation: (i) Priming of affective information within a semantic network or distributed memory system (semantic priming). (ii) Automatic activation of the evaluative response through the affective prime (response priming). In this experiment, we sought more direct evidence for prime-induced response activations with measurement of the lateralized readiness potential (LRP). Onset of the stimulus-locked LRP was earlier in affectively congruent trials than in incongruent trials. In addition, priming modulated the LRP-amplitude of slow responses, indicating greater activation of the incorrect response hand in affectively incongruent trials. Onset of the response-locked LRP and peak latency of the P300 component were not modulated by priming but the amplitude of the N400 component was. In combination, these results suggest that both, semantic priming and response priming constitute affective priming effects in the evaluative categorization task.

How distinctive is affective processing? On the implications of using cognitive paradigms to study affect and emotion

Influential theories on affect and emotion propose a fundamental differentiation between emotion and cognition, and research paradigms designed to test them focus on differences rather than similarities between affective and cognitive processes. This research orientation is increasingly challenged by the widespread and successful use of cognitive research paradigms in the study of affect and emotion—a challenge with far-reaching implications. Where and on what basis should theorists draw the line between cognition and emotion, and when is it useful to do so? Should researchers build more global, integrative models of cognition and emotion, or should they rely on local, content-specific models that draw attention to a differentiation between affective and cognitive processes? This special issue compiles different viewpoints on fundamental issues in the relationship between affect and cognition.

Priming of semantic classifications: Late and response related, or earlier and more central?

Priming of semantic classifications may occur because of response-related priming or because of priming at a more central locus. To separate these two possibilities, we randomly intermixed adjectives and first names, using a response window procedure. Participants decided whether the adjectives were positively or negatively valenced and whether the names were male or female. Each of these kinds of targets was preceded by adjective or name primes associated with responses that either matched or mismatched the correct response to the target. Results showed that priming of semantic classification involves two components: a major response-related one, modulated by prime visibility and prime—target repetition, and a smaller component with a more central locus that is less susceptible to context effects.

Common valence coding in action and evaluation: Affective blindness towards response-compatible stimuli

A common coding account of bidirectional evaluation–behaviour interactions proposes that evaluative attributes of stimuli and responses are coded in a common representational format. This assumption was tested in two experiments that required evaluations of positive and negative stimuli during the generation of a positively or negatively charged motor response. The results of both experiments revealed a reduced evaluative sensitivity (d′) towards response-compatible stimulus valences. This action–valence blindness supports the notion of a common valence coding in action and evaluation.

The structure of affective action representations: temporal binding of affective response codes.

Two experiments examined the hypothesis that preparing an action with a specific affective connotation involves the binding of this action to an affective code reflecting this connotation. This integration into an action plan should lead to a temporary occupation of the affective code, which should impair the concurrent representation of affectively congruent events, such as the planning of another action with the same valence. This hypothesis was tested with a dual-task setup that required a speeded choice between approach- and avoidance-type lever movements after having planned and before having executed an evaluative button press. In line with the code-occupation hypothesis, slower lever movements were observed when the lever movement was affectively compatible with the prepared evaluative button press than when the two actions were affectively incompatible. Lever movements related to approach and avoidance and evaluative button presses thus seem to share a code that represents affective meaning. A model of affective action control that is based on the theory of event coding is discussed.

Directive and incentive functions of affective action consequences: an ideomotor approach

Five experiments examined whether affective consequences become associated with the responses producing them and whether anticipations of positive and negative action outcomes influence action control differently. In a learning phase, one response produced pleasant and another response unpleasant visual effects. In a subsequent test phase, the same actions were carried out in response to a neutral feature of affective stimuli. Results showed that responses were faster when the irrelevant valence of the response cue matched the valence of the response outcome, but only when the responses still produced outcomes. These results suggest that affective action consequences have a directive function in that they facilitate the selection of the associated response over other responses, even when the response outcome is unpleasant (Experiment 4A). Results of another experiment showed that affective action consequences can also have an incentive function in that responses with pleasant outcomes are generally facilitated relative to responses with unpleasant outcomes. However, this motivational effect was seen only in a free-choice test (Experiment 5). The results suggest that behavioral impulses induced by ideomotor processes are constrained by the motivational evaluation of the anticipated action outcome. A model that integrates motivational factors into ideomotor theory is presented.

Representing the Hyphen in Action-Effect Associations: Automatic Acquisition and Bidirectional Retrieval of Action-Effect Intervals

We examined whether a temporal interval between an action and its sensory effect is integrated in the cognitive action structure in a bidirectional fashion. In 3 experiments, participants first experienced that actions produced specific acoustic effects (high and low tones) that occurred temporally delayed after their actions. In a following test phase, the tones that were presented as action effects in the previous phase were now presented as primes for the responses that had caused them previously and, critically, also as primes for the interval that previously separated action and effects. The tones were presented as go-signals in a free-choice test and as response-imperative stimuli in a forced-choice test. In the free choice test, participants were more likely to choose responses consistent with the previous pairing, but these responses were initiated slower than responses that were inconsistent with previous action-effect learning (Experiment 1). Effect-consistent responses were also initiated slower in the speeded forced-choice test (Experiment 2). These observations suggest that retrieval of a long action-effect interval slows down response initiation. In Experiment 3, response-contingent effects were presented with a long or short delay after a response. Reaction times in both, a forced-choice and free-choice setup, were faster in the short- than in the long-interval condition. We conclude that temporal information about the interval between actions and effects is integrated into a cognitive action structure and is automatically retrieved during response selection.