David E. Cunningham

It Takes Two A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome

Theories of conflict emphasize dyadic interaction, yet existing empirical studies of civil war focus largely on state attributes and pay little attention to nonstate antagonists. We recast civil war in a dyadic perspective, and consider how nonstate actor attributes and their relationship to the state influence conflict dynamics. We argue that strong rebels, who pose a military challenge to the government, are likely to lead to short wars and concessions. Conflicts where rebels seem weak can become prolonged if rebels can operate in the periphery so as to defy a government victory yet are not strong enough to extract concessions. Conflicts should be shorter when potential insurgents can rely on alternative political means to violence. We examine these hypotheses in a dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcomes, using new data on nonstate actors and conflict attributes, finding support for many of our conjectures.

Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups

Many rebel organizations receive significant assistance from external governments, yet the reasons why some rebels attract foreign support while others do not is poorly understood. We analyze factors determining external support for insurgent groups from a principal-agent perspective. We focus on both the supply side, that is, when states are willing to support insurgent groups in other states, and the demand side, that is, when groups are willing to accept such support, with the conditions that this may entail. We test our hypotheses using new disaggregated data on insurgent groups and foreign support. Our results indicate that external rebel support is influenced by characteristics of the rebel group as well as linkages between rebel groups and actors in other countries. More specifically, we find that external support is more likely for moderately strong groups where support is more likely to be offered and accepted, in the presence of transnational constituencies, international rivalries, and when the government receives foreign support.

Blocking resolution: How external states can prolong civil wars

What explains the effect of external intervention on the duration of civil war? The literature on intervention has made some progress in addressing this question, but it has been hindered by an assumption that states intervene in civil wars either to help one side win or to facilitate negotiations. Often, however, external states become involved in civil war to pursue an agenda which is separate from the goals of the internal combatants. When states intervene in this fashion, they make wars more difficult to resolve for two reasons. First, doing so introduces another actor that must approve any settlement to end the war. Second, external states generally have less incentive to negotiate than internal actors because they bear lower costs of fighting and they can anticipate gaining less benefit from negotiation than domestic insurgents. Through Cox regressions using data on the goals of all interventions in civil wars since World War II, this article shows that when states intervene with an independent agenda, they make wars substantially longer. The effect of independent interventions is much larger than that of external interventions generally, suggesting that the established finding that external interventions prolong civil war is driven by a subset of cases where states have intervened in conflicts to pursue independent goals.

Non-state actors in civil wars: A new dataset

This paper introduces the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA), which contains detailed information on the state–rebel group dyads included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Project Dyadic Dataset. Existing quantitative studies generally focus on characteristics of countries and conflicts to examine the duration, severity, outcome and recurrence of civil wars, in ways that often ignore the actors in civil wars. The NSA data provides additional information on the organizations involved in conflict dynamics. We describe the structure of the NSA data and the variables included, provide descriptive statistics of the indicators, and discuss areas for future research on non-state actors to enhance our understanding of conflict processes.

Meningeal carcinomatosis from transitional cell carcinoma of the bladder.

Response rates of over 50% can be achieved in patients with metastatic transitional cell carcinoma of the bladder treated with cisplatin‐based chemotherapy. With prolonged survival, intraparenchymal brain metastases may occur in as many as 12% of patients who received methotrexate, vinblastine, doxorubicin, and cisplatin (M‐VAC) chemotherapy. Meningeal carcinomatosis from urothelial cancer is rare, however. A 71‐year‐old man, with metastatic, transitional cell carcinoma of the bladder, attained an excellent partial response to M‐VAC chemotherapy. He subsequently presented with an acute confusional state 6 months after diagnosis. Head computed tomographic studies were nondiagnostic. Gadolinium‐enhanced magnetic resonance images (MRI), however, demonstrated multifocal 1‐cm nodules in the brain parenchyma and enhancement of the meninges. Meningeal carcinomatosis was confirmed by lumbar puncture. Records of 40 patients with advanced transitional cell carcinoma of the bladder treated with chemotherapy between 1977 and 1992 at a cancer center were reviewed retrospectively for the occurrence of documented meningeal carcinomatosis, intraparenchymal brain metastases, or both. Among 13 responders, only 1 other patient, a 64‐year‐old man, was identified who had minimal metastatic disease and attained a complete response to methotrexate and cisplatin. The patient relapsed 2 years after response, with cerebellar metastases and meningeal carcinomatosis. Central nervous system (CNS) metastases in patients with transitional cell carcinoma of the bladder are unusual. Although parenchymal brain metastases may be more common after prolonged remissions induced by combination chemotherapy, meningeal carcinomatosis remains uncommon. MRI may be a useful adjunct in the diagnosis of CNS metastases. A high index of clinical suspicion for the occurrence of CNS metastases from transitional cell carcinoma is encouraged.

Combining Civil and Interstate Wars

Quantitative studies of conflict analyze either civil or interstate war. While there may be observable differences between civil and interstate wars, theories of conflict focus on phenomena—such as information asymmetries, commitment problems, and issue divisibility—that should explain both conflicts within and between states. In analyses of conflict onset, duration, and outcome combining civil and interstate wars, we find most variables have similar effects on both “types” of war. We thus question whether there is any justification for separate study of war types.

Resolving Civil Wars before They Start: The UN Security Council and Conflict Prevention in Self-Determination Disputes

A large literature has demonstrated that international action can promote the resolution of civil wars. However, international actors do not wait until violence starts to seek to manage conflicts. This article considers the ways in which the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reduces the propensity for self-determination movements to escalate to civil war, through actions that directly pertain to the disputing actors or that indirectly shape actor incentives. It examines the relationship between the content of UNSC resolutions in all self-determination disputes from 1960 to 2005 and the onset of armed conflict in the disputes. The study finds that diplomatic actions that directly address disputes reduce the likelihood of armed conflict, and that military force and sanctions have more indirect preventive effects.

Words and deeds

Dissidents can choose among different tactics to redress political grievances, yet violent and nonviolent mobilization tend to be studied in isolation. We examine why some countries see the emergence of organized dissident activity over governmental claims, and why in some cases these organizational claims result in civil wars or nonviolent campaigns, while others see no large-scale collective action. We develop a two-stage theoretical framework examining the organized articulation of political grievance and then large-scale violent and nonviolent collective action. We test implications of this framework using new data on governmental incompatibilities in a random sample of 101 states from 1960 to 2012. We show that factors such as demography, economic development, and civil society have differential effects on these different stages and outcomes of mobilization. We demonstrate that the common finding that anocracies are more prone to civil war primarily stems from such regimes being more prone to see maximalist political demands that could lead to violent mobilization, depending on other factors conducive to creating focused military capacity. We find that non-democracy generally promotes nonviolent campaigns as anocracies and autocracies are both more likely to experience claims and more prone to nonviolent campaigns, conditional on claims.

Where, when, and how does the UN work to prevent civil war in self-determination disputes?:

The UN has placed rhetorical emphasis on the prevention of armed conflict before it starts and has taken selective action toward that end. What determines where the UN gets involved? We examine UN preventive actions by focusing on UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions in self-determination (SD) disputes. We argue that UN decisionmakers consider at least three factors when deciding where to target preventive action: the dispute’s conflict history, the potential for regional contagion, and the characteristics of the dispute. We further argue that the political dynamics of UNSC decisionmaking constrain the UN’s ability to pay attention to the third factor (the characteristics of the dispute). We test this argument using data on all UNSC resolutions comprising the authorization of diplomatic engagement, condemnation, the authorization of sanctions, and the deployment of force targeted toward SD disputes from 1960 to 2005. We find that the UN is much more likely to act in nonviolent disputes that have a history of violence and in disputes with a potential for regional contagion. The analysis shows that, while political barriers likely restrict the ability for the UNSC to act when dispute-level characteristics suggest armed conflict is more likely, the UN does act proactively to prevent violence, rather than just reactively responding to existing violence.

Integrating Conflict Event Data

The growing multitude of sophisticated event-level data collection enables novel analyses of conflict. Even when multiple event data sets are available, researchers tend to rely on only one. We instead advocate integrating information from multiple event data sets. The advantages include facilitating analysis of relationships between different types of conflict, providing more comprehensive empirical measurement, and evaluating the relative coverage and quality of data sets. Existing integration efforts have been performed manually, with significant limitations. Therefore, we introduce Matching Event Data by Location, Time and Type (MELTT)—an automated, transparent, reproducible methodology for integrating event data sets. For the cases of Nigeria 2011, South Sudan 2015, and Libya 2014, we show that using MELTT to integrate data from four leading conflict event data sets (Uppsala Conflict Data Project–Georeferenced Event Data, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, Social Conflict Analysis Database, and Global Terrorism Database) provides a more complete picture of conflict. We also apply multiple systems estimation to show that each of these data sets has substantial missingness in coverage.