David G. Haglund

The new geopolitics of minerals: An inquiry into the changing international significance of strategic minerals;☆

Abstract This article explores changes in the international political significance of ‘strategic minerals’ over the past half-century. The method of analysis is comparative-historical, or ‘diachronic’, and the major issues examined are: (1) minerals as a cause of international conflict; (2) minerals as a factor contributing to the military potential of states; and (3) the question of mineral scarcity. In addition to the above issues, the author analyses two central concepts, ‘geopolitics’ and ‘strategic minerals’. He concludes that while it does make sense to speak of a ‘new geopolitics of minerals’ in the post-1973 era, there are nevertheless important ways in which recent strategic-minerals issues resemble those of the earlier period under examination, the interwar years (and, in particular, the 1930s). What does not seem to have changed in respect of strategic minerals since the 1930s is that access to them continues ultimately to be a function of political processes, and therefore the access question remains what it was, a matter of geopolitical concern. Where there have been differences in the relevance of strategic minerals, these have mainly consisted in: (a) the declining importance of minerals as a major contributory factor in the breakdown of world order; (b) the lessening of what had formerly been a deterministic equation between mineral possession and military potential; and (c) the increased salience in the post-1973 era of the perception that access will be affected by the growing scarcity of minerals, whether due to the actual depletion of reserves or politically induced supply disruptions.

What Good Is Strategic Culture

Oscar Wilde famously referred to fox-hunting as the “unspeakable in pursuit of the inedible.” With apologies to Wilde, those of us bounding off over conceptual hedges in quest of strategic culture might be called the unintelligible in pursuit of the incomprehensible. For no matter how achingly compelling is the need to render our concepts sharp “tools” for analysis, we unfailingly get entangled in constant wrangling over their very definition, with the result being that the passage of time often results in spreading confusion instead of enlightenment. This is so, notwithstanding the expressed hope of many that the same passage of time might reasonably be expected to generate a “literature” capable of penetrating and dispelling the conceptual fog, by speaking definitional truth to us.

‘Let's Call the Whole Thing Off’? Security Culture as Strategic Culture

Scholars interested in contemporary security and defence policy, in Europe as elsewhere, often seek refuge in conceptual havens, and the articles in this special issue are no exceptions. One of those sheltering spots has been dubbed security culture, while another fashionable resting place carries the label, ‘strategic culture’. This article argues that attempts to draw a distinction between the two categories are superfluous, not to say meaningless, and that insofar as what we should call our concept, it really is a case of Tweedledum and Tweedledee. More important is the task of attempting to abstract policy significance from the complexity and definitional vagueness of the more ‘senior’ of the two concepts, namely strategic culture. This complexity and vagueness to the contrary notwithstanding, this article claims that strategic culture can be of some analytical use in highlighting the ways in which both context and character have played, and continue to play, a part in shaping states’ orientation toward security and defence policy.

Strategic minerals: A conceptual analysis

Abstract ‘Strategic minerals’ is an ambiguous term. The objective of this article is to explore the major and competing usages of this essentially contested concept, with particular attention being paid to the relevant usages for both scholarly and policy-making purposes. The author examines two opposing definitional tendencies, which he labels ‘restrictionist’ and ‘broad-interpretationist’, and concludes that despite great merit in the arguments of those who would restrict the usage of the term strategic minerals, the concept itself will continue to be interpreted differently by minerals analysts.

INTRODUCTION: France's ‘return’ to NATO: implications for transatlantic relations

Abstract The paper looks at Frances return to NATO, looking at the impact of its ongoing reintegration in the alliances military structure from a strategic, a political and an operational perspective. We address three main questions: (1) How will Frances reintegration affect other NATO countries? This question will be answered from the perspectives of Canada, the UK, Germany and the United States; (2) How will France cope with the transition? French experts will assess the French debate on NATO, the operational dimension of Frances reintegration of the command structure and Frances role in transatlantic relations; (3) How will the decision affect the future prospects for allied action? This question will be addressed by looking at the nuclear dimension of NATO, burden-sharing, NATOs transformation and the impact of Frances reintegration on European defence.

Has Québec Become a Northern Mexico? Public Opinion and America's “Long War”

In contrast with Mexico, a consistent pattern of anti-Americanism has never been present in Québec, but there has been an ostensible upsurge in anti-American sentiment recently. This article asks whether Québec has become a “northern Mexico” with respect to societal attitudes displayed toward the United States. To answer this, we first explore the argument that Mexico is effectively an axiomatically anti-American land. We then examine public opinion in Québec, with a view to contrasting it with Mexican views, especially on the all-important question of the use of force in international politics. We argue that Quebeckers show themselves to be more supportive than Mexicans of the idea that the “international community” in certain instances does have both a right and a duty to intervene in the domestic affairs of states.

Building a new global order : emerging trends in international security

The end of the Cold War era has not brought greater security to the world community. Although the likelihood of a global strategic nuclear war has been reduced significantly, we have already witnessed the impact of other challenges to international peace. The Gulf War raised the spectre of expanding regional conflicts adopting the means and methods of the previous superpower confrontation. The disintegration of the Horn of Africa, the Civil War in the Balkans, and the resurgence of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia all reveal the continuing power of historic ethnic, religious, and national rivalries, and the seeming inability of the international community to deal effectively with these tragedies. Weapons technologies, modern telecommunications and transportation, demographic changes and resource imbalances, and the globalization of production together raise enormous challenges as we move into the 21st century. Are the international institutions with which we have lived since the end of the Second World War up to the task? This book addresses many of these basic and profound issues.

Sympathy for the devil: Myths of neoclassical realism in Canadian foreign policy

INTRODUCTION An impartial observer might be excused for concluding that when it comes to matters theoretical in international relations (IR), realism does not enjoy a very happy life in Canada. Notwithstanding its oft-proclaimed status as IR’s “dominant paradigm,” realism finds itself all too frequently being denounced as the closest thing to devil worship in this country’s graduate and undergraduate classrooms – and does so because of its postulated, yet seldom demonstrated, proclivity for tending to the interests of the powerful and wealthy states.1 Indeed, many assume that realist theory is very distant from Canada’s own international experience as a small or middle power, whether in respect of its record as erstwhile champion of UN peacekeeping, or of the long string of declaratory policies that have regularly flowed out of Ottawa over the decades, each one imbued with a headier spirit of apparent altruism than the one before it. What Finley Peter Dunne’s fictional “Mr. Dooley” had to say about America a century ago could apply in spades to the Canada of more recent times: “We’re a gr-reat people. We ar-re that. An’ th’ best iv it is, we know we ar-re.”2 To say the least, those who would dare to theorize about such a people from a realist starting point have an arduous journey ahead of them. That kind of voyage, however, is not the one we propose to undertake in this article. Rather than applying ourselves to the Herculean (or foolhardy) task of “building” a realist theory applicable to Canada, we are going to confine ourselves to two more modest aims: first, we will identify some of the obstacles likely to be confronted by those who would try to utilize realism as an overarching framework in Canadian foreign policy; and secondly, we will illustrate the manner in which, surprisingly, certain realist “myths” have established a beachhead of sorts in both the making and analysis of Canadian foreign policy, though no one wishes to label them as such.

The ‘Germany Lobby’ and US Foreign Policy: What, if Anything, Does It Tell Us about the Debate over the ‘Israel Lobby’?

This article seeks to shed some comparative light on the recent debate over the influence on US foreign policy of what has been termed the ‘Israel Lobby’. The authors highlight an earlier debate, similar in some ways, that took place a century ago in America, concerning the mooted influence of German-Americans upon US policy toward the European balance of power. They conclude that while the ‘lobbying’ associated with diasporas is certainly an intriguing aspect of American policy discussions, the experience of what they call the ‘Germany Lobby’ stands as a reminder of the need for caution in ascribing causal significance to ethnic pressure politics.

Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture

Introduction. 1. Convention force posture and alliance behavior 2. Constructing NATOs conventional force posture, 1949-1952 3. The New Look and NATOs conventional force posture, 1953-1955 4. NATO retreats from massive retaliation, 1956-1960 5. To the adoption of flexible response, 1961-1968 6. Implementing flexible response, 1969-1989 7. Explaining the evolution of NATOs conventional force posture, 1949-1989 Epilogue: the transformation of NATOs conventional force posture.