David I. Gilliland

Two sides to attitudinal commitment: The effect of calculative and loyalty commitment on enforcement mechanisms in distribution channels

Previous conceptualizations of attitudinal commitment are extended by considering two very different components of a manufacturers attachment to an independent channel intermediary. Relying on commitment theory, a model is developed that describes how attitudinal commitment may reside in either the instrumental or the social strain of a manufacturers relationship with its distributor. For each strain, the developmental role played by key facets of the channel setting—relative dependence, pledges, and trust—are shown. Furthermore, the nature of the attachment bond is posited to motivate very different governance mechanisms as the distribution agreement is enforced by either social or contractual means. Empirical support for the model demonstrates that an expanded view of attitudinal commitment is important in understanding the complex nature of attachment in channel relationships.

Adoption of electronic commerce tools in business procurement: enhanced buying center structure and processes

Modern procurement is being shifted from paper‐based, people‐intensive buying systems toward electronic‐based purchase procedures that rely on Internet communications and Web‐enhanced buying tools. Develops a typology of e‐commerce tools that have come to characterize cutting‐edge industrial procurement. E‐commerce aspects of purchasing are organized into communication and transaction tools that encompass both internal and external buying activities. Further, a model of the impact of e‐commerce on the structure and processes of an organization’s buying center is developed. The impact of the changing buying center on procurement outcomes in terms of efficiency and effectiveness is also analyzed. Finally, implications for business‐to‐business marketers and researchers are discussed.

When Do Firms Conform to Regulatory Control? The Effect of Control Processes on Compliance and Opportunism

The authors use social control theory to develop a conceptual model that addresses the effectiveness of regulatory agencies’ (e.g., Food and Drug Administration, Occupational Safety and Health Administration) field-level efforts to obtain conformance with product safety laws. Central to the model are the control processes agencies use when monitoring organizations and enforcing the safety rules. These approaches can be labeled formal control (e.g., rigid enforcement) and informal control (e.g., social instruction). The theoretical framework identifies an important antecedent of control and the relative effectiveness of controls alternative forms in gaining compliance and reducing opportunism. Furthermore, the model predicts that the regulated firms’ level of agreement with the safety rules moderates the relationships between control and firm responses. A local health departments administration of state food safety regulations provides the empirical context for testing the hypotheses. The results from a survey of 173 restaurants largely support the proposed model. The study findings inform a discussion of effective methods of administering product safety laws.

Toward a business-to-business channel incentives classification scheme

A recent focus on intermediary compensation underscores the need to organize the many complex incentives used by channel practitioners. Employing a grounded theory methodology, a channel incentives classification scheme is induced from 170 unique channel incentives used in 59 high technology suppliers’ channel programs. The incentives are organized into 16 subcategories and 5 major categories: Credible Channel Policies, Market Development Support, Supplemental Contact, High-Powered Incentives, and End-User Encouragements. Each incentive subcategory is discussed as a means of controlling reseller behaviors. Also, the conditions that give rise to the implementation of incentives are investigated through four testable research propositions.

e-Business technological innovations

Abstract Modern distribution is being shifted from paper-based, people-intensive marketing systems toward electronic-based procedures that rely on Internet communications and web-enhanced software tools. This article develops a typology of e-business technological innovations that have come to characterize cutting-edge distribution management. e-Business tools relevant to marketing channels are organized by the channel process flows that yield communication and transaction enhancements to distribution systems. Further, a model of the impact of e-business on channel performance is developed. The mediating role of channel structure on technologys impact on channel outcomes in terms of efficiency and effectiveness is also analyzed. Finally, implications of the e-business revolution for managers and researchers are discussed.

Channel incentives as unilateral and bilateral governance processes

Abstract The authors investigate channel incentives as extra-contractual governance processes that maintain and extend marketing channel relationships. More specifically, instrumental incentives are monetary-based payments made by a manufacturer in a unilateral channel arrangement to motivate distributor compliance, while equity incentives are bilateral expectations of fair treatment that motivate both parties to continue to cooperate with one another. A model of the antecedents and performance consequences of channel incentives is conceptualized and tested on 314 marketing channel relationships using a structural equation modeling methodology. The findings support the conceptual model and suggest that unique facets of the channel relationship explain the type of incentive mechanism in use.

Examining a Key Aspect of Agency-to-Business Relationships: The Effects of Regulatory Control on the Satisfaction of Regulated Firms

ABSTRACT This paper studies an overlooked, but highly important relationship, the relationship that exists between regulatory agencies (e.g., the EPA, OSHA, and the FDA) and the for-profit businesses they attempt to govern. Drawing on business-to-business control and satisfaction research, a framework is developed to understand how regulatory control influences the satisfaction levels of customer firms. Regulatory control is disaggregated into four distinct facets: the controlling agency, the rules and regulations of control, the processes used by the agency to apply the regulations, and sanctions. Each facet is hypothesized to have an effect on satisfaction. A regulators administration of state food safety regulations provides the empirical context for testing the hypotheses. Results from a survey of 173 restaurants provide empirical support for the conceptual model. Most importantly, the study finds that the informal control process increases customer satisfaction, while the formal control process decreases customer satisfaction. We discuss how these and other findings may contribute to more effective agency-to-business relationships and ongoing research.