David Kinsella

No Rest for the Democratic Peace

Proponents of the democratic peace are accustomed to criticism. Early refutations of the research programs findings focused on questions of measurement and statistical inference. Skepticism about such matters has not fully subsided, but many more now accept the democratic peace as an empirical regularity. The aim of recent complaints has shifted to democratic peace theory. The typical approach has been to highlight select historical events that appear anomalous in light of the theory and the causal mechanisms it identifies. Sebastian Rosatos (2003) is one such critique, noteworthy for the range of causal propositions held up for scrutiny and the unequivocal rejection of them all. But Rosato fails to appreciate the dyadic logic central to democratic peace theory, and much of his criticism is therefore misdirected. Those cases that remain unexplained by the theory are not especially problematic for this progressively evolving research program.

Defence spending and economic performance in the United States: A causal analysis

The causal relationship between defence spending and economic performance in the United States from 1943 to 1989 is investigated using vector autoregression. The evidence indicates that there is no substantial relationship, in either causal direction, between defence spending and the price level, the unemployment rate, or the interest rate. Nor does there appear to be any substantial lagged relationship between defence spending and output. There may be a more immediate causal relationship between defence spending and output, i.e., one which operates on a quarterly or monthly basis, but the existence and direction(s) of such a relationship cannot be determined using annual data. In short, those arguments which link defence spending to poor economic performance receive little empirical support.

Arms Transfer Dependence and Foreign Policy Conflict

There are both military and political dimensions to arms transfers, and their effects on state behavior may not be the same. In this article I examine the degree to which arms transfers and arms transfer dependence interact to affect foreign policy conflict. I hypothesize that, as a transfer of military capability, weapons shipments increase the tendency of the recipient to strike a conflictual posture in its foreign policy, while arms transfer dependence restrains that tendency. An arms recipient faces the possibility that weapons shipments will be curtailed during periods of regional crisis and hostility, and when a state is dependent on one or a few major suppliers for the bulk of its imported weaponry, the costs associated with supply restrictions increases. This should encourage restraint on the part of states otherwise emboldened by arms acquisitions. My analysis treats conflictual behavior as a multiplicative function of arms transfers and arms transfer dependence. Parameter estimates are derived from time series data for nine states engaged in enduring rivalries during the Cold War. For some of these states, there is evidence that arms shipments encouraged more conflictual foreign policies; but there is also evidence that this propensity was tempered by the degree of arms transfer dependence. The model is non-linear, so the precise effects of dependence vary depending on context - i.e. the states current level of arms importation and dependence - but realistic predictions involve changes in foreign policy conflict equal to 5-25% of their mean levels during the period.

The black market in small arms: Examining a social network

In recent years, researchers have increasingly turned their attention to the proliferation of small arms, a transnational trade amounting to over

Nested rivalries: Superpower competition, arms transfers, and regional conflict, 1950–1990

7 billion in value during 2002. Small arms are difficult to track and are not the stuff of military parades, but they are immensely destructive. As much as

Symbols of Statehood: Military Industrialization and Public Discourse in India

1 billion worth enters the black market annually. I argue that the illicit trade in small arms should be understood not as a market but as a network, one that shares some important properties with networked forms of organization studied by sociologists. I then employ quantitative methods developed for the study of social networks in an effort to show the basic structure of illegal small arms transfers to Africa. The analysis draws from my Illicit Arms Transfers dataset still in development, so the results make use of the most rudimentary information being collected. They are suggestive, however, and the analytical approach promises to shed considerable light on a corner of the global arms trade that is of great interest to the research and activist communities, and of great consequence to those in war-torn regions of the world.

Rivalry, Reaction, and Weapons Proliferation: A Time-Series Analysis of Global Arms Transfers

Interstate rivalries in the Third World cannot be fully understood apart from the global context in which they evolve and endure. This study examines the link between the superpowers’ Cold War competition and regional rivalry by focusing specifically on arms‐transfer relationships. Poisson regression analysis highlights the interrelationships between superpower competition, arms transfers, and regional rivalry in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Horn of Africa from 1950 to 1990. Many of the observed patterns are consistent with a realist explanation of interstate alignment and conflict, but a more holistic theory is required to detail the mechanisms by which Third World rivalries are nested in great power competition.

The impact of superpower arms transfers on conflict in the Middle East

This article examines the forces driving the pursuit of military production capacity in India, including those behind the Indian nuclear and space programmes. We are mainly interested in whether symbolic motivations regularly find expression in the public discourse. We review all articles on the subject of weapons development and production appearing in India Today from May 1977 to April 1999. There are three closely interrelated yet distinguishable concerns in the public discourse that we consider symbolic: that military industrialization is a means of asserting Indias autonomy in international affairs, that it is a means of establishing Indias international status and prestige, and that it serves to enhance Indias self-image. We contend that the symbolic motivations are a prominent force behind the military industrialization process in India. The precise form that symbolic motivations take vary—some statements seem to have more symbolic content than others—but, as a whole, such references are not rare or isolated. Our findings suggest that symbolism can be an important component of the quest for an indigenous arms-production capacity, and perhaps other elements of statebuilding as well.

The Long and the Short of an Arms Race

This article analyzes the competitive dynamics in global arms transfers from 1951 to 1995. I discuss the enduring forces behind the proliferation of military capability during the Cold War and other historical periods, and then consider the competitive dynamics characteristic of the superpower rivalry itself. The process of military-technological advance, along with the dynamics of enduring interstate rivalry, lead us to expect certain patterns in quantitative data representing arms-transfer levels over time. Concepts in time-series analysis—cointegration and error correction—are helpful for understanding competitive arms-transfer policies during the Cold War, and I apply the relevant analytical tools to test for the hypothesized patterns in the empirical data. American and Russian, as well as NATO and Warsaw Pact, arms transfers are examined at three levels of regional aggregation: the Third World as a whole, the Middle East security complex, and the Persian Gulf subcomplex. The evidence shows that arms transfers by the Cold War rivals moved together in patterns consistent with competitive policy making in an environment of military-technological change, and that one or both sides adjusted their supply policies to correct for deviations from a moving equilibrium. This describes an action-reaction process, but a loosely coupled one deriving from military-technological uncertainties, the complexities of regional security dynamics, and the multidimensional character of the Cold War competition.

Coercing Climate Action

I explore the relationship between superpower arms transfers and the Arab‐Israeli rivalry. My empirical analysis suggests that Soviet arms transfers to the Middle East, more than American transfers, have exacerbated interstate rivalry in the region. It also suggests that Soviet arms transfers, again more than American transfers, have encouraged compensatory arming by the other superpower. These conclusions derive from the results of cross‐correlation analysis, Granger‐causality tests, and variance decompositions, and are quite robust. While my findings paint a rather unflattering portrait of the effects of superpower involvement in the region, they do constitute grounds for optimism in light of current developments.