David M. Glantz

Military training and education challenges in poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary

This article, the first of three on this vital issue, examines the military ramifications of NATO expansion in light of the educational and training needs of the armed forces of its three new prospective members. Given the decision to add Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to the alliance fold, a decision which was largely political in nature, it questions whether sufficient attention has been paid to military realities, and in particular, the intellectual dimension of future integration. It does so by detailing the intellectual state of the three armed forces as perceived by those who serve in them and by those who work daily on assisting in this important transformation. It concludes that the intellectual dimension has been largely ignored, to the potential detriment to NATOs future expansion or performance.

Soviet force structure in an era of reform

Abstract : Today the Soviets are confronted by changing conditions which impel them to alter their force structure. Purely military considerations, in particular the accelerating pace of technological change and the evolving battlefield environment, necessitate fundamental changes. For a decade the Soviets have gradually adjusted their force structure to accommodate these new realities, but today the existing force structure has evolved as far as it can. Clearly, new forms of forces are required which will permit further accommodation. The more flexible corps, brigade, and battalion structure can provide the vehicle for further change. The new defensiveness in Soviet military doctrine provides yet another motive for force structure changes. The current structure is inexorably linked with the former more offensive posture. The enunciation of new defensive precepts requires the creation of a less offensive looking force structure (or at least a force structure which Western observers are unfamiliar with). Although the Soviets have long-standing experience with the employment of corps and brigades, most Westerners are ignorant of it. The key issue in the future will be what form this new force structure will take and what its capabilities will be.

Spearhead of the attack: The role of the forward detachment in tactical maneuver

Abstract : The Soviets have long understood the prerequisites for achieving combat success at the operational and tactical levels of war. Among these prerequisites is the necessity for conducting efficient, rapid maneuver. Long- term Soviet belief in the utility of operational maneuver is well-documented in Soviet military works and, to an increasing degree, in Western analyses of Soviet operational techniques, Western appreciation of Soviet concern for tactical maneuver, however, is less mature. Most Western analyses portray Soviet tactical combat measures collectively as steamroller tactics, characterized by Soviet use of overwhelming, deeply echeloned concentrations of forces committed to combat in conjunction with massive amounts of fire support. Once this massive force has disrupted or destroyed enemy tactical defenses, then, and only then, do Soviet operational maneuver forces go into action, using maneuver to project forces deep into the enemy rear. This Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde characterization of Soviet offensive techniques postulates early reliance on concentrated forces attacking in basically linear fashion followed by wholesale reversion to artful, flexible operational maneuver. Centralized control, inflexibility, and commensurate de-emphasis of initiative characterize the early (penetration) phase. Understandably, most Westerners question whether the Soviet Army can adjust to meet the requirements of the exploitation phase. Keywords: Reprints.

Military training and education challenges in Poland, the Czech republic, and hungary: Conclusions and recommendations

This, the concluding portion of a three‐part assessment of the form and utility of US military assistance to the three new NATO members, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, articulates conclusions and offers recommendations for the future.

New from the Russian Archives

ABSTRACT Massive recent archival releases by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation promise to revolutionize the historiography of the Soviet-German War, 1941–1945. Hitherto, heavily censored Soviet books and articles concealed much of the detail concerning how and why the Red Army operated as it did during wartime. Although these sources revealed considerable detail concerning the Red Army’s wartime military successes, they contained precious little about less-successful or clearly unsuccessful operations or numbers and figures related to the strength and losses of Red Army forces. This forced historians studying the war to rely heavily on German source materials or to ‘read between the lines’ while interpreting existing Soviet books and articles about the war. As the details in the following article indicate, this situation has drastically changed for the better, while doing so necessitating a thorough re-evaluation of the performance of the Soviet Union’s Red Army during its so-called Great Patriotic War.

The Impact of Intelligence Provided to the Soviet Union by Richard Zorge on Soviet Force Deployments from the Far East to the West in 1941 and 1942

ABSTRACT Among the most controversial questions associated with the German-Soviet War (1941–1945) is the degree to which intelligence information received from his agents abroad influenced the decision making of Josef Stalin, the Chairman of the Soviet Council of People’s Commissars and soon Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, particularly during the summers of 1941 and 1942, when Adolf Hitler’s German Wehrmacht conducted its strategic offensives code-named Operations Barbarossa and Blau. This article assesses this question by assessing the impact of intelligence reports Stalin received from Richard Zorge (Sorge in German), a Soviet agent situated in Tokyo, Japan, prior to and during the Barbarossa invasion.

Stalin’s Strategic Intentions, 1941–1945: Soviet Military Operations as Indicators of Stalin’s Postwar Territorial Ambitions

One of the most controversial questions in regard to the Soviet Union’s conduct of the war against Hitler’s Nazi Germany (1941–1945) was the extent to which Joseph Stalin, the country’s ruler, conducted military operations designed to advance the country’s post-war political objectives. Historians, who have long debated this matter, have generally based their judgments on the reality of the post-war structure in Europe—specifically, the establishment of Communist puppet governments behind what Winston Churchill described as the ‘iron curtain’. Truth regarding Stalin’s political intent has generally eluded them because archival documents necessary to validate their conclusions have been unavailable. Now, however, the slow but steady opening of the Soviet Union’s (Russian) military archives provides fresh evidence upon which to judge Stalin’s wartime intent. This article surveys this evidence, principally wartime directives issued by the USSR’s State Defense Committee and Stavka (Supreme High Command), which indicate that Stalin did indeed orchestrate the Red Army’s military operations to secure distinct political objectives within and outside the borders of the pre-war Soviet Union. By no means definitive in its conclusions, the article summons further debate and discussion on this important historical matter.

World War II: Eastern Front

The Eastern Front of World War II—called the Great Patriotic War by Russians—refers to the Soviet–German War during which Hitlers Third German Reich attempted to defeat and subjugate Stalins Soviet Union. The war began on June 22, 1941, when Germanys Wehrmacht (armed forces) invaded the Soviet Union in accordance with Plan Barbarossa, a military operation designed to defeat the Soviet Unions Red Army, overthrow its communist government, and dismember and exploit its territories for the benefit of Germany. The war resulted from political and ideological competition between Nazi Germany and the communist Soviet Union. Keywords: twentieth century; Eastern Europe; Europe; military history; second world war

The Development of the Soviet and Russian Armies in Context, 1946–2008: A Chronological and Topical Outline

This chronological and topical outline describes the institutional and doctrinal evolution of the Soviet and Russian Armies from 1946 through 2009 within the broad context of vital political, economic, and social developments and a wide range of important international and national occurrences. Its intent is to foster further informed discussion of the subject. Each of the articles sub-sections portrays military developments in the Soviet or Russian Armies during one of the eight postwar periods Soviet and Russian military scholars, themselves, routinely identify as distinct stages in the development and evolution of their Armed Forces. Each of the periods, argue Russian commentators, is distinguishable by a wide range of characteristics, both internal and external, that prove unique to each period.

The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational Maps Part 1: The Fight for Stalingrad's Suburbs, Center City, and Factory Villages. 3 September–13 October 1942

This collection of archival documents and maps contains unprecedented information about the two-month struggle between the German Sixth Army and Soviet 62nd Army for possession of Stalingrad city and its infamous factory district. While revealing the complexity of the struggle, it also focuses on the momentous fighting that took place on Stalingrads “near” flanks and offers vivid evidence of how newly released archival materials will fundamentally alter previous perceptions about the fighting.