Roger R. Reese

Motivations to Serve: The Soviet Soldier in the Second World War

This article argues that the willingness of the average Soviet citizen to serve in the armed forces in the Second World War, which enabled the Red Army and the Soviet Union to survive the calamities of 1941 and then defeat the German invasion, was based on the socialist ideals of the Stalinist state, a patriotic love for the historic Russian motherland that transcended politics, and a variety of other social and personal reasons, as well as fear of the consequences of draft evasion and desertion. Service, however, was not an endorsement of the oppression of the Stalinist state.

Lessons of the Winter War: A Study in the Military Effectiveness of the Red Army, 1939–1940

The Soviet war against Finland (1939–40) is generally seen as a fiasco because the U.S.S.R. failed to conquer and absorb Finland, as Joseph Stalin had planned; and the Finns inflicted losses on the Red Army that were far out of proportion to the small size of their army and their own casualties. Access to fresh sources, archival and memoir, suggest that although the Soviets fell short of their political goals and performed dismally in combat, the Red Army was far more militarily effective than was appreciated by the Soviet military and political leadership, the German armed forces high command, and contemporary observers.

The Russian Orthodox Church and ‘Patriotic’ Support for the Stalinist Regime during the Great Patriotic War

Abstract Soviet wartime propaganda and contemporary Russian work on the activities of the Orthodox Church during the war promote the Church’s claim that it was motivated by patriotism, a point it used to claim legitimacy in the USSR and now in contemporary Russia. In contrast, this paper argues that the hierarchs and laity of the Patriarchal Church were not essentially motivated by patriotism or the desire to show loyalty to the Soviet regime in 1941, but instead acted to use the war to achieve three goals: first and most important, to become relevant in the everyday life of the Soviet people by promoting Christian beliefs and values; second, to earn legitimacy in the eyes of anti-clerics and non-believers by lending moral and practical support to the war effort; and finally, to obtain legal standing by showing its trustworthiness and loyalty through displays of Russian (not Soviet) patriotism consonant with its historic role, all the while without endorsing communist ideology. The hierarchs orchestrated a campaign from the top down throughout the clerical hierarchy, to achieve the aforementioned goals whilst from below the faithful, independently of the hierarchs, used their local displays of patriotism as leverage to reopen local churches and to force the regime to respect their right to worship. The grassroots response by believers and parish clerics in support of the Church and its wartime activities represents primarily an endorsement of the Church, Christianity, Russian patriotism, and only secondarily, if at all, loyalty to the Stalinist regime.

Ten Jewish Red Army Veterans of the Great Patriotic War: In Search of the Mythical Representative Soldier’s Story

What constitutes a representative voice of soldiers at war can be a contentious issue, especially when dealing with a specifically identifiable group or subgroup. Based on interviews with veterans, this article argues that the oral testimony of Jewish soldiers in the Red Army is every bit as representative and useful as that of any other group of servicemen and servicewomen who served that army on the Eastern Front during the Second World War.

Red Army Handbook, 1939-1945 (review)

ried over into the U.S. edition. Had the book’s original editorial staff done a better job of checking the text they would have noted that the first chapter is titled “Making a Mark, 1874–1904,” and that his date of birth is also listed in the text and in a chronology at the end of the book. It is an unfortunate truism of modern publishing that editing has become a lost art, and no better example exists than this failure to catch such a preventable error. As a result, the incorrect date of Churchill’s birth has also been cited by Amazon.com (both U.S.A. and U.K.). That aside, the book is lavishly produced, with superb photographs (some in color), paintings, cartoons, and examples of Churchill’s writing. Given the limitations on its length to conform to the series, the author has done a remarkable job of condensing Churchill’s spectacular life into a wellwritten, concise portrait of one of history’s most remarkable men. Although it may not appeal to readers interested in a fuller portrait of Churchill, the book is nevertheless a useful addition to the vast Churchill literature.

Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905-1925 (review)

tionship between the opposing lines were shocked, and the division commander was sent home. Yet Keene extrapolates that this antipathy for the French and friendship for the Germans “created serious problems in the postwar Franco-American relationship.” While scholars of the era have long known that many American soldiers preferred German culture to French, Keene offers no evidence that Woodrow Wilson, who often ignored his own advisers at Versailles, was moved to oppose French treaty demands because of Doughboy sentiments. Indeed, Wilson’s views on the nature of the peace for which the U.S. fought were well established before a single American soldier set foot on French soil. Consequently, the more traditional method of examining and emphasizing the policies and motives of the various leaders and nations involved in postwar negotiations offers a far better explanation as to why American and French political leaders were so at odds over the nature of the peace. While Professor Keene’s larger purpose is far too grandiose, the book still has much to commend it. It is clearly written and magnificently researched. When Keene carefully interprets that research, her work makes a significant contribution to developing the complexity and utility of the old paradigm. While one cannot read this book in the hope that it provides a thorough view of the war as a whole, it provides important new insights into the nature of many of the citizen soldiers, and their impact on the American army and the federal government. In the book’s best passages, Keene’s Doughboys force the federal government to re-examine the relationship between itself and its citizen soldiers. The result was a more egalitarian army—at least for whites—and the Bonus Bill of 1924. That legislation established the federal government’s ongoing responsibility to the men whose military service interrupted their civilian lives. Still more significantly, Doughboy leadership, in the midst of a far more catastrophic conflict, would help expand that responsibility through the GI Bill. The author is quite correct in ending her work with the assertion that the GI Bill “played a key role in generating the unprecedented prosperity Americans enjoyed in the second half of the twentieth century.” Jennifer Keene’s book provides a unique and helpful view of part of the American experience in the Great War and its aftermath. Those who desire a comprehensive understanding of that war should read it as a supplement to the more traditional interpretations.