David M. Messick

Sanctioning systems, decision frames, and cooperation

Three studies are used to examine how surveillance and sanctioning systems affect cooperative behavior in dilemma situations. The first two studies demonstrate that a weak sanctioning system results in less cooperation than no sanctioning system; furthermore, results from the second study suggest that sanctions affect the type of decision people perceive they are making, prompting them to see it as a business rather than an ethical decision. The results from these studies are used to develop a theoretical model that postulates that the relationship between sanctions and cooperation is due to both a signaling effect, in which sanctions influence the type of decision that is perceived to be made, and a processing effect, in which the decision processing, including whether or not the strength of the sanction is considered, depends on the decision frame evoked. A third study provides support for the processing-effect hypothesis.

A Conceptual Review of Decision Making in Social Dilemmas: Applying a Logic of Appropriateness

Despite decades of experimental social dilemma research, “theoretical integration has proven elusive” (Smithson & Foddy, 1999, p. 14). To advance a theory of decision making in social dilemmas, this article provides a conceptual review of the literature that applies a “logic of appropriateness” (March, 1994) framework. The appropriateness framework suggests that people making decisions ask themselves (explicitly or implicitly), “What does a person like me do in a situation like this?” This question identifies 3 significant factors: recognition and classification of the kind of situation encountered, the identity of the individual making the decision, and the application of rules or heuristics in guiding behavioral choice. In contrast with dominant rational choice models, the appropriateness framework proposed accommodates the inherently social nature of social dilemmas, and the role of rule and heuristic based processing. Implications for the interpretation of past findings and the direction of future research are discussed.

Why we are fairer than others

Subjects wrote lists of either fair or unfair things that they or others did. A pervasive tendency was found for subjects to associate themselves with fair behaviors and others with unfair behaviors. When different subjects rated samples of the written behaviors for fairness and frequency we found that fair behaviors were rated as more frequent than unfair behaviors and self-ascribed behaviors were rated as fairer than behaviors ascribed to others. These findings and others are shown to result from a tendency for subjects to perceive a stronger link between the fairness and frequency of their own behavior than between the fairness and frequency of the behavior of other people. A final analysis showed that the subcategories of unfair behavior that subjects associated with others were different from those associated with themselves.

Alternative logics for decision making in social settings

Abstract In this paper I discuss evidence that traditional, consequentialist models of decision making are inadequate to account for human decision making. The alternative model that I explore derives from March’s idea that decision processes involve perceptions of appropriateness, identity, and rule-based choice.

Negotiation as a social process

Introduction Negotiation in its Social Context - Roderick M Kramer and David M Messick Emerging Trends and Future Prospects PART ONE: NEW THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES Negotiator Cognition in Social Contexts - Introduction Social Context in Negotiation - Leigh Thompson, Erika Peterson and Laura Kray An Information-Processing Perspective Networks and Collective Scripts - Dean G Pruitt Paying Attention to Structure in Bargaining Theory Lets Make Some New Rules - Charles D Samuelson and David M Messick Social Factors that Make Freedom Unattractive Regression to the Mean, Expectation Inflation, and the Winners Curse in Organizational Contexts - J Richard Harrison and Max H Bazerman In Dubious Battle - Roderick M Kramer Heightened Accountability, Dysphoric Cognition and Self-Defeating Bargaining Behavior The Relational Contexts of Negotiation - Introduction Multi-Party Negotiation in its Social Context - Jeffrey T Polzer, Elizabeth A Mannix and Margaret A Neale Power and Emotional Processes in Negotiations - Edward J Lawler and Jeongkoo Yoon A Social Exchange Approach Joint Decision Making - Leonard Greenhalgh and Deborah I Chapman The Inseparability of Relationships and Negotiation Toward the Conflict - Robert J Robinson A Research Agenda for Emerging Organizational Challenges PART TWO: EXPERIMENTAL EXPLORATIONS Experimental Explorations - Introduction Time of Decision, Ethical Obligation and Causal Illusion - Michael W Morris, Damien L H Sim and Vittorio Girotto Temporal Cues and Social Heuristics in the Prisoners Dilemma Fairness versus Self-Interest - J Keith Murnighan and Madan M Pillutla Asymmetric Moral Imperatives in Ultimatum Bargaining Social Context in Tacit Bargaining Games - Richard Pl Larrick and Sally Blount Consequences for Perceptions of Affinity and Cooperative Behavior Why Ultimatums Fail - Roderick M Kramer, Pri Pradhan-Shah and Stephanie L Woerner Social Identity and Moralistic Aggression in Coercive Bargaining Property, Culture and Negotiation - Peter G Carnevale

SCARCITY OR ABUNDANCE CAUSED BY PEOPLE OR THE ENVIRONMENT AS DETERMINANTS OF BEHAVIOR IN THE RESOURCE DILEMMA

Abstract There is evidence that people respond differently to people-induced scarcities and abundances than to nature-induced ones. In a resource dilemma game, half of 72 subjects were confronted with a scarce remaining resource and the other half with an abundant one. Half of the subjects in each of these conditions learned that scarcity and abundance could be attributed to the members of their own group, while the other half believed that these circumstances were due to the environment. We found that subjects harvested more from the resource in abundance than in scarcity conditions. Furthermore, the difference in harvest size between scarcity and abundance conditions was greater in the environment condition than in the group condition. These results are contrasted to predictions derived from a rational economic analysis and a psychological model that accounts for the results is discussed.

Social Traps and Temporal Traps

A distinction is drawn between social traps-a noncorrespondence between individual and group outcomes -and temporal traps-a noncorrespondence between short-run and long-run outcomes to an individual. Most real-world social dilemmas involve both kinds of oppositions. An experiment is reported in which the two types of traps are separated Groups performed a resource maintainance task more poorly than did individuals, highlighting the importance of the purely social trap; but individuals failed to perform optimally, indicating that the temporal trap is also important.

Relative gain maximization in experimental games

Three experiments were conducted to demonstrate the role of relative gain (the difference between a subjects score and that of another subject) as opposed to individual gain maximization processes in experimental two-person, two-choice games. In addition to demonstrating that relative gain maximization is an important goal in such situations, it is also shown that the predominant component of this process is associated with the avoidance of outcomes in which the subject receives less than another subject.

Understanding the Influence of Environmental Standards on Judgments and Choices

This article offers a cognitive account of the means versus ends focus of environmental regulation. The first of two studies suggests that standards (the means) exert an influence on judgments of p...

An integrated model of perceived unfairness in organizations

Attitudes and behaviors of employees in organizations are influenced by fairness judgments employees make about organizations. A model is presented that proposes (i) when fairness becomes an issue to employees, (ii) how certain rules are chosen to evaluate a situation as fair or unfair, and (iii) the psychological and behavioral reactions that may result from judging something as unfair. The managerial implications of the model are discussed.