Charles G. McClintock

The ring measure of social values: a computerized procedure for assessing individual differences in information processing and social value orientation

Personality can be defined from a social standpoint as a more or less consistent system of orientations that influences an individuals decisions and behaviors regarding the allocation of resources to self and others. One of the more robust models for the measurement of an individuals interpersonal utilities is McClintocks social value approach (McClintock, 1972). In the present study, we evaluate the construct of social value by testing the hypothesis that the cognitive processing time of subjects should vary systematically as a function of the type of social value being expressed. Towards this end, the Ring Measure of Social Values (Liebrand, 1984) was administered to 61 male and 124 female subjects. As predicted, cooperators and competitors were observed to have longer response latencies than altruists and individualists. In addition, a Social Value by Outcome Structure interaction was observed, and explained by assuming that cooperators are more hesitant in making decisions involving negative outcomes for others, whereas competitors are more reluctant to assign positive outcomes to others. These research findings add further evidence regarding the validity to the construct of social value.

Cooperative and competitive behavior in mixed-motive games

are numerous: (a) the development of game theory as a formal model for human behavior; (b) the general theoretical and empirical concern with the process of decision-making which reflects the involvement of the social sciences in the problems of management, both civilian and military; (c) the recognition of the methodological importance of simulation as a way to study human behavior, particularly as regards this behavior in an organizational environment ; and (d) the greater theoretical concern in social psychology and related disciplines with the processes of cognition and

Development of competitive game behavior in children across two cultures.

Abstract An identical 2 × 3 design was investigated in the United States and in Belgium. Twenty-eight male dyads taken from the more intelligent part of each of three grade levels (second, fourth, and sixth) played a Maximizing Difference Game over 100 trials. One-half of the dyads were displayed both own and others cumulative score, the other half were only displayed own cumulative score. The results clearly indicate that: (a) The competitive choice is the dominant response and becomes even more dominant over trial blocks; (b) older children make more competitive responses than younger children in both cultures; (c) double score feedback yields more competitive responses in both cultures; (d) young American children make more competitive choices than young Belgians; at sixth grade, however, they are equally competitive.

Reward level and game playing behavior1

By their very structure, non-zero-sum games have given the psychological experimenter a valuable tool for the investigation of social interaction. Such games have been used primarily to examine cooperative and competitive behavior occurring between Ss in situations of social interdependence ( Gallo and McClintock, 1965). In the terminology of Zajonc (1965), cooperation involves a relation-

Equity and Social Exchange in Human Relationships

Publisher Summary Equity is used to define a set of organizational rules and procedures by which authority is legitimatized in bureaucracies. It is conceptualized in more abstract and functional terms by sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists. Dealing with equity and social exchange is far-ranging in scope. This chapter examines the current status of the theorizing in equity and social exchange in human relationships and point the way to future developments. A number of theorists have attempted to apply equity and social exchange conceptions to a wide variety of areas, including social interactions, close relationships, helpfulness, and work and pay in economic settings. It maintains that humans frequently consider fairness in their calculation of costs and benefits in their encounters with others. Human behavior reflects a moral order and cannot have a truly adequate social psychology unless one know what rules govern the judgments of fairness and the way these judgments affect social conduct. The theories of fairness apply only to the simplest form of human interdependence––the unilateral allocation of outcome. The overall structure and the ongoing processes that characterize human interdependence and exchange are also determined in the chapter.

Variations in preferences for individualistic, competitive, and cooperative outcomes as a function of age, game class, and task in nursery school children.

MCCLINTOCK, CHARLES G.; MosKowrrz, JOEL M.; and McCLINTOCK, EvIE. Variations in Preferences for Individualistic, Competitive, and Cooperative Outcomes as a Function of Age, Game Class, and Task in Nursery School Children. CmLD DEVELOPMENT, 1977, 48, 1080-1085. Variations in individualistic, cooperative, and competitive choice behaviors were observed at 2 age levels in nursery school children for 3 tasks: individualistic, coordinative, and conflictual. The results indicate that (a) nursery school children are primarily own-gain oriented, (b) there is no increment in cooperation in the coordinative task as a function of age, and (c) there is a sharp increment in competition in the competitive task as a function of age. Older childrens mothers expect less competitive behavior than younger childrens mothers. In fact, older nursery school children tend to compete more than younger ones.

Equity and Social Exchange

Publisher Summary This chapter describes equity in historical terms and indicates two major classes of distributional behaviors to which the term has been applied. It describes several alternative theoretical paradigms that have been elaborated to explain the functional bases of the exchange of resources between human actors. It discusses the role that equity plays within relationships of reciprocity or exchange. In sociology, the construct of equity has been used to justify the legitimization of authority in bureaucracies. In social psychology, a somewhat different and more specific definition of equity dominates most contemporary research and theory. Equity, in its most generic sense, refers to those decisions rules that humans employ to define how and when a just and fair distribution of valued resources obtains between actors. One dominant characteristic of equity is that what is considered equitable and fair not only changes continuously through time but also it often appears ambiguous at any given time.

Children's use of social comparison standards in judging performance and their effects on self-evaluation

Abstract The use of a standard of social comparison by children to evaluate their classroom performance has been cited as an important determinant of their perceptions of both success and failure and their overall level of ability. This study examined the effects of information about both childrens own outcomes and those of a peer on their self-evaluation. It was observed that (1) the number of children evaluating performance on a task in terms of own performance relative to anothers increased with age; (2) boys were more likely than girls to make such comparative evaluations; (3) cooperative vs competitive task instructions did not differentially influence the likelihood of comparative evaluations; and (4) across age levels, children who were outperformed and evaluated their performance comparatively rated their ability and effort significantly lower than those who were outperformed but did not evaluate their performance comparatively.

The Influence of Communication Upon Bargaining

Bargaining, the mutual attempt by interdependent actors to exercise influence over each other’s behaviors, occurs within a large number of animal species and across a wide range of settings. A variety of nonverbal and verbal forms of communication are employed to exercise such influence during a bargaining interaction. For example, bargaining as a nonverbal form of behavioral interaction can be observed between neighboring pairs of nest-building arctic snow buntings whose initial contacts consist of a stereotyped aerial ballet of aggressive approaches and fearful avoidances. These tacit moves and countermoves progressively produce a well-defined, mutually acceptable boundary between their nest sites thereby guaranteeing a peaceful future coexistence (Tinbergen, 1968). A verbal form of bargaining can be seen in the negotiations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that have taken place repeatedly over the control of nuclear arms. These less-successful instances of human bargaining have succeeded only, after some 25 years of symbolic manuevering, in forestalling the creation of arms that neither side wanted.

An apparatus for use in 2 by 2 game research

This article describes a solid state apparatus for use in 2 by 2 game research. There are two individual player’s boards and a control panel for E. Following E’s signal, each player chooses one of two responses. Their choices are immediately registered on E’s panel, but appear on each individual game board only after both have responded. Provisions are made for E to transmit false feedback.