David Pion-Berlin

To Prosecute or to Pardon? Human Rights Decisions in the Latin American Southern Cone

This paper examines why human rights trials against military offenders were held in Argentina and not elsewhere. Although nearly all South American countries were afflicted by state repression and terror during the decade of the 1 970s, Argentina remains the only nation that has indicted and prosecuted military officers for their role in repression. The trials of the former members of the military juntas that ruled Argentina between 1976 and 1982 engendered intense curiosity and scrutiny in the international community. Not since the Nuremburg trials of the nazi criminals of World War II had a trial of this nature anywhere in the world captured so much public attention. Given the extent of the atrocities committed by the previous military government, such proceedings certainly seemed warranted. Yet, despite terrible anguish suffered under repressive military rule, neither Uruguay nor Chile has conducted similar trials. Arguably, all the Southern Cone democratic presidents who assumed power after the transition were justified in investigating and prosecuting those military officers who had abused their authority by committing human rights crimes while in office. Although the scope and severity of the crimes varied, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay easily qualified as consistent, gross human rights-offending regimes. Countless reports issued by internationally respected agencies such as Amnesty International, The OAS Human Rights Commission, and Americas Watch testified to that

Civilian Praetorianism and Military Shirking During Constitutional Crises in Latin America

Civilian Praetorianism and Military Shirking During Constitutional Crises in Latin America David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas Since the end of the Cold War, an elected civilian leader in Latin America is more likely to be displaced from office prior to the end of his constitutional term by mass mobiliza- tion than by a military coup. As Arturo Valenzuela has observed, thirteen of the fifteen nonconstitutional transfers of power in the region between 1990 and 2004 have been the result of civilian coups rather than military actions. 1 This phenomenon has occurred in Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador, while attempts in Peru and Venezuela have failed. Civilian coups are not confined only to Latin America; they have occurred in the Philippines, where “people power” displaced both dictators and elected presidents; in Ukraine with the “Orange” Revolution; and in Georgia with the “Rose” Revolution. In each case, a civilian elected leader was ejected from power by the mass action of civilian, rather than military, sectors of society. This article focuses on military responses (or the lack thereof) to mass protests against elected governments during moments of constitutional crisis in democratic states. These crises occur when opposition forces decide that merely changing gov- ernment policy is not enough; that what is required is a change in government itself. This may involve violent or nonviolent mechanisms, but the universe of cases ex- amined here is delimited by the opposition’s goals—changing governments outside the normal democratic processes established by the constitution rather than altering government policy. The cases draw on the Latin American experience with democra- tization both because the third wave of democracy struck the region earlier than most and because states in the region have had a long experience with military intervention in politics. At first glance what appears to have changed about contemporary politics in Latin America is the unusual lack of military intervention in moments of social contestation that might have produced a coup d’etat in previous eras. Samuel Huntington once argued that in praetorian societies, students riot, workers strike, and militaries coup. 2 The absence of military protagonism amidst social upheaval could certainly be viewed positively, as a confirmation of increasing civilian control over the armed forces in many new democracies. However, security forces play an important role in these civilian versus civilian contests. They make decisions about whether to support or withhold support from elected leaders. In nine of the thirteen cases examined from Latin America since 1990, militaries have refused presidential orders to intervene against civilian opposition forces during such crises and instead have remained quartered. 3 In a more

Of Victims and Executioners: Argentine State Terror, 1975–1979

Scholars have found that state terror has been employed frequently against subdued, if not fully compliant, populations. Scholars have argued that regimes may attack groups whose characteristics seem incongruent with their own ideological agendas. Having fully internalized a set of doctrines, and being prone to exaggerate the extent and depth of the security threats facing them, authoritarian regimes may provoke long periods of unrestrained, disproportionate and unnecessary state terror. Drawing from the recent scholarly attempts to stipulate the conditions associated with the appearance of state terror, we delineate two major ideologies which have guided the Argentine military to perpetrate state terror as standard policy. In national security and free market ideologies, we claim, the Argentine rulers of the Proceso period found the rationale for making the disappearance of real and perceived adversaries a daily governmental routine. Combined, these ideologies provided motives to sustain high levels of repression and guidelines to select its victims. We examine social characteristics of the victims of Argentine state terror and analyze organizational and legal forms of coercion to reveal patterns that are consistent with ideological predispositions. We then demonstrate that individuals suffered a greater probability of victimization if they were members of particular trade unions perceived by the government to have obstructed its achievement of economic and security goals. These and other trends lead us to conclude that ideology was a motivating force behind the infamous Argentine “Dirty War.”

Civil-military relations in Latin America : new analytical perspectives

The armed forces may no longer rule nations throughout Latin America, but they continue to influence democratic governments across the region. In nine original, thought-provoking essays, this book offers fresh theoretical insights into the dilemmas facing Latin American politicians as they struggle to gain full control over their military institutions. Latin America has changed in profound ways since the end of the Cold War, the re-emergence of democracy, and the ascendancy of free-market economies and trade blocs. The contributors to this volume recognize the necessity of finding intellectual approaches that speak to these transformations. They utilize a wide range of contemporary models to analyze recent political and economic reform in nations throughout Latin America, presenting case studies on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and Venezuela. Bridging the gap between Latin American studies and political science, these essays not only explore the forces that shape civil-military relations in Latin America but also address larger questions of political development and democratization in the region.

Defense Organization and Civil—Military Relations in Latin America

This study examines how defense institutions and personnel are formally organized in Latin America. In a region long plagued by praetorian armies, it is especially important that organizational designs ensure that civilians maintain institutional control over armed forces. For this to occur, it is argued that those designs must incorporate certain principles: (a) enhance the civilian presence in key defense institutions, (b) empower defense ministries, (c) lower the militarys vertical authority along the chain of command, and (d) unify civilian power while dividing military power. Based on an examination of legal documents and other data for sixteen Latin American democracies, findings show three general organizational patterns: an ideal—typical defense structure that achieves all four objectives, a second best defense structure that still leaves too much military power unified, and a dual command structure that is least desirable for weakening the defense ministry while coalescing military might high up the ladder of influence.

Issues, Threats, and Institutions: Explaining OAS Responses to Democratic Dilemmas in Latin America

Over time, the Organization of American States has become institutionally and normatively more capable of defending democracy in the region. Yet the OAS is as selective in its interventions on behalf of democratic promotion today as it was in the early 1990s. To explain this puzzle, this study disaggregates democratic dilemmas according to issue areas, threats, and contingencies. It finds that the OAS responds more forcefully when the problem presents a clear and present danger both to the offending state and to other members. As threats become weaker or more ambiguous, the OAS tends to act more timidly, unless domestic constituencies cry out for its assistance or the United States puts its full weight behind the effort. Case study capsules provide empirical evidence to illustrate these arguments.

Between Confrontation and Accommodation: Military and Government Policy in Democratic Argentina

After a prolonged period of authoritarian rule, the rebirth of democracy in Latin America has prompted a resurgent interest in civilian control of the armed forces. Few disagree that political leaders will be unable to consolidate their democratic gains without resolving ‘la cuestion militar’. Given the history of military political intervention in the region, scholars have long expressed scepticism over whether governments can ever fully subject the armed forces to their political will. Recently, the terms on which power has been transferred from military to civilian hands and developments subsequent to the transfer have prompted an even greater anxiety about the future of some of these new and fragile democracies.

Tipping the Civil-Military Balance Institutions and Human Rights Policy in Democratic Argentina and Chile

Human rights issues topped the agenda for many democratic presidents who followed repressive military regimes in Latin America. Traditional approaches assume that the military is powerful enough to suppress human rights initiatives. Transitions approaches closely link success or failure to military power at the time of regime change. Evidence shows not only that there were instances of policy success but also that these are not fully explained by the transitional balance of power. The authors argue that policy outcomes are inextricably tied to levels of institutional concentration and autonomy in the executive branch. Human rights gains occur when policy-making authority is centered in a few hands and where the president can use institutional channels suitably closed to military influence. Low levels of concentration and autonomy result in policy setbacks; mixed levels lead to moderate success. The authors test the model with a comparative case study of governments in Argentina and Chile.

The National Security Doctrine, Military Threat Perception, and the “Dirty War” in Argentina

It has been taken for granted that Latin American military governments of recent decades have been under the strong influence of the National Security Doctrine. However, no systematic assessment has been made about the degree to which the doctrine directly or indirectly has shaped military perceptions. This study focuses on the Argentine military government of 1976-1981, and on its identification of threats to national security, its strategies to overcome those threats, and whether these fit within the parameters of the NSD. Through content analysis of military speeches, interviews, and private memos, it is found that members of the government perceived their adversaries in vague, operational terms; that they focused on subjective agents to the exclusion of underlying objective conditions; and that they failed to appreciate the importance of political solutions to national security problems. Together, these views find only partial support within the NSD. It is concluded that the military practiced selective vision, magnifying certain elements of the NSD while losing sight of the rest, and that this selective vision was reinforced by the disjointed character of the doctrine itself.

The Pinochet Case and Human Rights Progress in Chile: Was Europe a Catalyst, Cause or Inconsequential?

This article assesses the impact, if any, of Spanish and British Court rulings on the Pinochet case on human rights progress in Chilean courts. Chilean judges chafe at the notion that foreign courts exerted any influence on them, arguing that, based solely on Chilean law and the evidence already before them, they were empowered to strip Pinochet of his immunity, and proceeded to do so. Human rights critics allege that the courts had been thoroughly immobilised by the authoritarian legacy to which they were enjoined. No progress at all would have occurred were it not for the dramatic verdicts handed down in British courts. The author contends that change was underfoot in Chile prior to Pinochets arrest in London, but that Europe set Chile on a faster and steeper trajectory toward justice than would have been possible otherwise. It did so by shaming the Chilean Government into pressuring its own high courts to deliver a modicum of justice to the victims of Pinochet.