David R. Schmitt
University of Washington
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Featured researches published by David R. Schmitt.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology | 1972
David R. Schmitt; Gerald Marwell
Three experiments explored the effects of different magnitudes of reward inequity on behavior in a cooperative seeting. Pairs of subjects could work on either cooperative or individual tasks, where rewards for cooperation were greater but inequitable. One subject received either two, three, or five times as much as his partner. In the common part of each experiment, withdrawal from the cooperative to the lower paying individual task was the only rewarding alternative to cooperation and the attendant inequity. The results indicated that a substantial proportion of subjects will forego rewards to avoid inequitable conditions. Both the frequency and length of withdrawal increased with inequity magnitude. At least some withdrawal occurred in 40% of the pairs under large inequity, in 25% of the pairs under moderate inequity, and in 15% under small inequity. In the second part of the moderate inequity experiment, inequity was rectifiable by reward transfer. In half of the pairs subjects could give money to one another; in the other half subjects could take money. Most subjects eventually transferred sufficient amounts to produce partial or total equity. The mode of transfer (giving or taking) had little effect on the likelihood that equity and cooperation would be achieved. The availability of either means of transfer increased the likelihood of withdrawal during periods when no transfers were made.
American Behavioral Scientist | 1981
David R. Schmitt
Consider the following problem: A small number of people are given a task to perform, and rewards are available to motivate their behavior. How should the rewards be dispensed to produce the best total effort? The choice is between cooperation where everyone receives a similar reward when a performance standard has been met and competition where only the best performers are rewarded. In a variety of settings, most often academic class-
Psychological Reports | 1973
W. Andrew Harrell; David R. Schmitt
In a laboratory setting 14 undergraduate Ss earned money by pulling a panel-mounted knob. In addition, Ss could avoid or escape an aversive tone by either pressing a button with a force of 1.5 lb (a non-aggressive response) or by hitting a padded cushion with a force of 20 lb (an aggressive response). Half of the Ss worked alone; half in the presence of a confederate who worked on a similar task and made no aggressive responses. Higher rates and magnitudes of punching were shown by Ss with an audience. This social facilitating effect of an audience on physical aggression tended to decline over time. Comparison of rates of aggressive and non-aggressive responses suggests that the former are more sensitive to social facilitation.
Behavior Analyst | 1986
David R. Schmitt
Conclusions drawn from research in the social sciences comparing the quality or quantity of performance under cooperation and competiton stress the advantages of cooperation. This generalization may be premature, however, because of the paucity of experimental analyses investigating variations in competitive conditions. Neglected in particular have been variables that affect reinforcement conditions among competitors. These include performance differences, the basis of reinforcement, reinforcer distribution, and stimuli that indicate the performances of other competitors. These variables provide the basis for a behavioral interpretation of performance under competition. The result is a clearer understanding of the options that are available in instituting competitive contingencies and the areas in which experimental analyses are needed.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology | 1972
Gerald Marwell; David R. Schmitt
Abstract Marwell, Schmitt, and Shotolas (1971) finding that interpersonal risk may have a dramatic effect in disrupting ongoing cooperation was tested for generalizability in two ways. In Experiment I the original study was replicated using a different procedure and apparatus. Experiment II was a cross-cultural replication using Norwegian subjects. Results strongly support the generality of previous findings.
Behavior Analyst | 1998
David R. Schmitt
The traditional text and lecture format has remained the norm in introductory college courses despite evidence, such as the personalized system of instruction, that other practices could improve what is learned and retained. The growth of distance learning provides new opportunities to implement effective teaching practices. Unfortunately, an adequate comparison of various teaching practices is not possible (even with regard to the teaching of behavior analysis). Few practices have been assessed with respect to course-end effects (final exam performance), and longer term effects remain almost wholly unexplored. Studies of the retention of academic materials, the practice required for mastery or fluency, and the relation between verbal repertoires and correspondent everyday behaviors suggest course outcomes more modest than those hoped for earlier. Suggestions for changing current practices have little credibility until the size of the gap between present and possible learning outcomes is much better known, and the personal, social, and economic consequences of bridging that gap (or not) are assessed.
Psychological Reports | 1971
David R. Schmitt
The study explored the effects of supplementary reinforcement on 1 of 2 tasks as an element determining task choice. In an experimental setting work on the lower paying of 2 concurrent operants received additional reinforcement on either a fixed or variable interval schedule. A wide range of addition magnitudes were studied under each schedule. The results from 8 Ss working for a number of hours on either a fixed or variable interval schedule indicated that addition magnitude significantly affected task choice only when additions were available at unequal intervals. Under this schedule the higher the additions the greater the time spent on the lower paying task. The fixed interval schedule produced a small amount of time on the lower paying task regardless of addition magnitude. The results extend and replicate previous research on the effects of schedules of monetary penalties on task choice in a similar setting. Comparison of the results from the 2 studies suggests that additions and penalties when applied to opposing tasks in a concurrent setting have similar effects on patterns of task choice.
Behavior Analyst | 2001
David R. Schmitt
Although the elements of a fully stated rule (discriminative stimulus [SD], some behavior, and a consequence) can occur nearly contemporaneously with the statement of the rule, there is often a delay between the rule statement and the SD. The effects of this delay on rule following have not been studied in behavior analysis, but they have been investigated in rule-like settings in the areas of prospective memory (remembering to do something in the future) and goal pursuit. Discriminative events for some behavior can be event based (a specific setting stimulus) or time based. The latter are more demanding with respect to intention following and show age-related deficits. Studies suggest that the specificity with which the components of a rule (termed intention) are stated has a substantial effect on intention following, with more detailed specifications increasing following. Reminders of an intention, too, are most effective when they refer specifically to both the behavior and its occasion. Covert review and written notes are two effective strategies for remembering everyday intentions, but people who use notes appear not to be able to switch quickly to covert review. By focusing on aspects of the setting and rule structure, research on prospective memory and goal pursuit expands the agenda for a more complete explanation of rule effects.
Psychological Reports | 1972
David R. Schmitt; Gerald Marwell
When work on a cooperative task rather than a lower paying individual one entailed risk that Ss could take each others earnings, Ss who were rewarded in points having no intrinsic value behaved very differently from Ss studied previously who earned money contingent on their responses. Pairs working for money typically ceased cooperating when risk was introduced while those working for points tended to continue cooperating. Use of points both reduced the disruptive effects of taking and led occasionally to periods of inactivity. Comparing these results and previous findings, there may be differences among tasks in the effects of various types of rewards.
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior | 1974
David R. Schmitt