Gerald Marwell

Economists free ride, does anyone else?: Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV

Abstract Eleven closely related experiments testing the free rider hypothesis under different conditions, and sampling various subpopulations, are reported. Results question the empirical validity and generality of a strong version of the hypothesis. Some reasons for its failure are discussed.

The critical mass in collective action : a micro-social theory

Preface Acknowledgements 1. The critical mass and the problem of collective action 2. Building blocks: goods, groups and processes 3. The paradox of group size 4. The dynamics of production functions 5. Social networks: density, centralization and cliques 6. Selectivity in social networks 7. Reach and selectivity as strategies of recruitment 8. Unfinished business References Name index Subject index.

Social Networks and Collective Action: A Theory of the Critical Mass. III

Most analyses of collective action agree that overcoming the freerider problem requires organizing potential contributors, thus making their decisions interdependent. The potential for organizing depends on the social ties in the group, particularly on the overall density or frequency of ties, on the extent to which they are centralized in a few individuals, and on the costs of communicating and coordinating actions through these ties. Mathematical analysis and computer simulations extend a formal microsocial theory of interdependent collective action to treat social networks and organization costs. As expected, the overall density of social ties in a group improves its prospects for collective action. More significant, because less expected, are the findings that show that the centralization of network ties always has a positive effect on collective action and that the negative effect of costs on collective action declines as the groups resource or interest heterogeneity increases. These nonobvious results are due to the powerful effects of selectivity, the organizers ability to concentrate organizing efforts on those individuals whose potential contributions are the largest.

A Theory of the Critical Mass

Collective action often depends on the social ties among members of a group. For example, it is widely agreed that participants in social movement organizations are usually recruited through preexisting social ties and that mobilization is more likely when the members of the beneficiary population are linked by social ties than when they are not (e.g. Tilly, 1978; Oberschall, 1973). In a recent paper (Maxwell, Oliver and Prahl, 1988) we have used formal theory and computer simulation to show how two fundamental aspects of the social networks of groups — their density and their level of centralization — positively affect the likelihood of collective action by those groups.2)

Whatever Happened to Critical Mass Theory? A Retrospective and Assessment

Between 1983 and 1993 the authors published a series of articles and a book promulgating and explicating “Critical Mass Theory,” a theory of public goods provision in groups. In this article we seek to trace the growth, change, or decline of the theory, primarily through an analysis of all journal citations of the theory. We find that the majority of citations are essentially gratuitous or pick a single point from the theory, which may or may not be central to the theory. However, we identify four lines of theorizing that creatively use substantial parts of Critical Mass Theory in their own development: (1) theories relevant to issues in communication studies such as interaction media and shared databases; (2) Macys work on adaptive learning models; (3) Heckathorns models of sanctioning systems; and (4) theories that are centrally concerned with issues of influence in collective goods processes. A few additional, less-developed lines of work are also discussed. None of this work identifies itself as being itself “Critical Mass Theory,” but many of the innovations and assertions of the theory are important bases for its development.

Withdrawal and reward reallocation as responses to inequity

Three experiments explored the effects of different magnitudes of reward inequity on behavior in a cooperative seeting. Pairs of subjects could work on either cooperative or individual tasks, where rewards for cooperation were greater but inequitable. One subject received either two, three, or five times as much as his partner. In the common part of each experiment, withdrawal from the cooperative to the lower paying individual task was the only rewarding alternative to cooperation and the attendant inequity. The results indicated that a substantial proportion of subjects will forego rewards to avoid inequitable conditions. Both the frequency and length of withdrawal increased with inequity magnitude. At least some withdrawal occurred in 40% of the pairs under large inequity, in 25% of the pairs under moderate inequity, and in 15% under small inequity. In the second part of the moderate inequity experiment, inequity was rectifiable by reward transfer. In half of the pairs subjects could give money to one another; in the other half subjects could take money. Most subjects eventually transferred sufficient amounts to produce partial or total equity. The mode of transfer (giving or taking) had little effect on the likelihood that equity and cooperation would be achieved. The availability of either means of transfer increased the likelihood of withdrawal during periods when no transfers were made.

Reach and selectivity as strategies of recruitment for collective action: A theory of the critical mass, V*

Theoretical investigation of a mathematical model of organizing for interdependent collective action compares the advantages of emphasizing reach, i.e. the sheer numbers recruited, to the advantages of emphasizing selectivity, i.e. the mean resources or interests of those recruited. The context is an accelerating production function in which each additional contribution has an increasing effect on the total payoff; this context is most likely at the beginning of an organizing drive. Both reach and selectivity are found to have thresholds which must be achieved before increases have any effect; these thresholds depend on the given levels of other parameters, and depending on conditions may be either discontinuous jumps or regions of steep but decelerating effects. Once the threshold region is surpassed, increasing either the reach or the selectivity for resources of recruitment has a constant positive effect, while the effect increasing the selectivity for interest becomes zero. The implications for real‐l...

Cooperation and interpersonal risk: Cross-cultural and cross-procedural generalizations☆

Abstract Marwell, Schmitt, and Shotolas (1971) finding that interpersonal risk may have a dramatic effect in disrupting ongoing cooperation was tested for generalizability in two ways. In Experiment I the original study was replicated using a different procedure and apparatus. Experiment II was a cross-cultural replication using Norwegian subjects. Results strongly support the generality of previous findings.

Party, Region and the Dimensions of Conflict in the House of Representatives, 1949–1954

Recent publications indicate a continuing interest among political scientists in both the aggregating of discrete acts of legislative behavior into underlying dimensions and the empirical specification of voting blocs. The latter interest is served by the former, as aggregation often producs sets of dimensions useful for descriptive purposes, as well as aiding other types of analysis. Recent studies include MacRaes work on the House of Representatives using various forms of scaling, Alkers paper on voting patterns in the sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations using factor analysis, and Grumms work on the Kansas legislature using another form of factor analysis (Q-technique).1 As these papers have described in some detail, the technique of factor analysis is particularly useful in producing empirical dimensions which are unitary, stable, exhaustive and parsimonious.2 This paper presents three such analyses-one each for the 81st, 82nd and 83rd

Attitudes toward Parental Use of Promised Rewards to Control Adolescent Behavior

For each of four different situations, subjects rated 16 techniques in terms of (1) their likelihood of using each technique to gain another persons compliance and (2) the likelihood that use of the technique would succeed in getting the other person to comply. These two ratings were compared for each of the 64 situation-technique pairs. One of these pairs, the use of promised rewards in a childrearing situation, is shown to be unique, in that a very large proportion of the subjects indicated they would not use the technique even though they thought it would be successful. The importance of this particular technique for childrearing is discussed.