David Stephen Zweig

China's global hunt for energy

AN UNPRECEDENTED need for resources is now driving Chinas foreign policy. A booming domestic economy, rapid urbanization, increased export processing, and the Chinese peoples voracious appetite for cars are increasing the countrys demand for oil and natural gas, in dustrial and construction materials, foreign capital and technology. Twenty years ago, China was East Asias largest oil exporter. Now it is the worlds second-largest importer; last year, it alone accounted for 31 percent of global growth in oil demand. Now that China is the work shop of the world, its hunger for electricity and industrial resources has soared. Chinas combined share ofthe worlds consumption ofaluminum, copper, nickel, and iron ore more than doubled within only ten years, from 7 percent in 1ggo to 15 percent in 2oO; it has now reached about 20 percent and is likely to double again by the end of the decade. Despite calls by Prime Minister WenJiabao and other politicians to cut consumption of energy and other resources, there is little sign of this appetite abating. Justin Yifu Lin, director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University, in Beijing, says the countrys economy could grow at 9 percent per year for the next 20 years. These new needs already have serious implications for Chinas foreign policy. Beijings access to foreign resources is necessary both for

Redefining the Brain Drain: China's ‘Diaspora Option’

For many years, Chinas government worried about the ‘brain drain’. But beginning in 1992, China began to encourage students settled abroad to return for short visits and en-gage in various programmes on the Chinese mainland. Then, in 2001, the government adopted a new policy, encouraging overseas mainlanders to contribute to Chinas modernisation, even if they stayed abroad, and outlining various ways they could help China. This policy mirrors the strategies of other countries who encourage ‘brain circulation’ and develop a ‘diaspora option’ in order to overcome the loss of talented people. But what forms does this assistance take? Why do people contribute to Chinas modernisation while remaining abroad? What are the characteristics of those who ‘serve China’, as compared to those who do not? We employ data from a survey in Silicon Valley, as well as two Web-based surveys carried out in Canada and the US with mainland Chinese academics to answer these questions.

Globalization and Transnational Human Capital: Overseas and Returnee Scholars to China

As societies internationalize, the demand for, and the value of, various goods and services increase. Individuals who possess new ideas, technologies and information that abets globalization become imbued with “transnational human capital,” making them more valuable to these societies. This report looks at this issue from five perspectives. First, it shows that Chinas education and employment system is now highly internationalized. Secondly, since even Chinese scholars sent by the government rely heavily on foreign funds to complete their studies, China is benefiting from foreign capital invested in the cohort of returnees. Thirdly, the report shows that foreign PhDs are worth more than domestic PhDs in terms of peoples perceptions, technology transfer and in their ability to bring benefits to their universities. Finally, returnees in high tech zones, compared to people in the zones who had not been overseas, were more likely to be importing technology and capital, to feel that their skills were in great demand within society, and to be using that technology to target the domestic market.

Rewards of technology: Explaining China’s reverse migration

China rewards Mainlanders with technology who return to China. Among entrepreneurs and scientists, technology is generating today’s reverse migration as the rewards for bringing back technology are significant. Many returnees do not bring the latest international technology; technology that is new for China suffices to create a comparative advantage in the domestic market, making the transfer of technology a key strategy for becoming a successful reverse migrant. This article shows statistically that those who said that they had returned because they possessed a new technology (55% of our sample) were less likely to have a new international technology than a technology that was new only for China.La Chine récompense les Chinois continentaux qui retoument au pays avec des moyens techniques. Les récompenses pour avoir rapporté des éléments technologiques étant significatives, c’est la technologie qui favorise la migration de retour actuelle chez les entrepreneurs et les scientifiques. Nombreux sont les rapatriés qui ne rapportent pas le dernier cri international en technologie; il suffit de revenir avec des moyens techniques qui sont inconnus en Chine pour créer un avantage comparé dans le marché intérieur. Ainsi, le transfert de technologies constitue une strategie privilégiée dans la réussite des rapatriés. Nos statistiques indiquent que chez ceux qui étaient retournés au pays parce qu¡ls y introduisaient une nouvelle technologie (soit 55% de notre échantillon), il était moins probable pour eux d’avoir de nouveaux moyens techniques intemationaux que de moyens techniques qui représentaient une nouveauté en Chine seulement.

Agrarian radicalism in China, 1968-1981

Preface Introduction: Dilemmas of the Postrevolutionary Struggle 1. Agrarian Radicalism Defined: Theoretical Perspectives and Developmental Strategies 2. Policy Winds and Agrarian Radicalism 3. Periodization of Agrarian Radicalism 4. The Local Response 5. Brigades and Higher Stages of Socialism 6. Restricting Private Plots 7. Resource Expropriation and Equalization 8. The Making of a New Rural Order Conclusion: The Failure of Agrarian Radicalism Abbreviations Appendix: Types of Private Plots Notes Selected Bibliography Index

From Village to City: Reforming Urban-Rural Relations in China

This paper documents the increased urban-rural interaction in China and argues that the new developmental strategy apparently has helped narrow the urban-rural gap. Income differentials between peasants and workers have declined. Direct commercial interaction between peasants and rural factories and urban residents and urban factories have increased dramatically, and peasants have begun to play a significant role in developing the previously moribund urban service sector. Since 1984, rural surplus labor, previously hidden by the over employment of the rural collective sector, has begun to stream into Chinas urban centers, particularly the new small towns springing up in the countryside. At the same time, peasants are precipitating an increase in Chinas medium-size cities as well. Moreover, the creation of a vigorous rural economy, with its increased demand for consumer and producer goods and the closer integration of the urban and rural sectors, has generated strong pressures for the liberalization and decentralization of the urban economy.

Internationalizing China's Countryside: The Political Economy of Exports from Rural Industry

The 10 years of the “open policy” changed China dramatically. After it decided to join the world economy by expanding its exports and importing technology, funds and management skills to bring to fruition the historic goal of modernizing China, it opened itself as well to new forces in the international system. But while most studies of Chinas growing foreign trade sector emphasize its impact on Chinas trading partners and the international economy, few studies have addressed the domestic impact of this decision to open up parts of the domestic economy to foreign trade and shift into a more “export-led” pattern of economic development.

Prosperity and Conflict in Post-Mao Rural China

In 1980 the Peoples Daily reported that 200 million Chinese peasants were living below the poverty line, while in 1982 Vicepremier Wan Li admitted the “for many years in the past, more than 150 million peasants had not solved the problem of not having enough to eat.” To enrich the rural economy, Party leaders called on peasants to pursue numerous private roads to prosperity. The new policy, highlighted by the phrase “permit some peasants to get rich first” ( rang yixie nongmin xian fuqilai ), allows households who are more industrious, more innovative and, of course, those with better personal and economic ties, to utilize their skills, personal relationships, excess labour power, and comparative advantages to accrue wealth quickly.

Elections, Democratic Values, and Economic Development in Rural China

This paper assesses several assumptions underlying the promotion of democracy and good governance in rural China. We draw on a 1999 survey of 120 villages in four counties, two in Anhui and two in Heilongjiang provinces (sample of 2,997 households, including villagers, cadres and entrepreneurs). First, we look at how institutionalized ‘democratic procedures’, such as secret ballots, multi-candidate elections, public nominations, and village contracts, are in these villages. Then we analyze villager views on economic development and democracy, finding that villagers want more democracy, even if the economy is doing well. Third, we assess their views on the election process; do they see elections as efficacious, fair, and competitive, or do they feel that the local power elite manipulate outcomes? Fourth, we found that the richest people are less supportive of democracy, with the most democratic being middle-income households. Finally, elections have increased local elite turnover, cadres understand this, and therefore, democracy does lead to good governance.

Opposition to Change in Rural China: The System of Responsibility and People's Communes

Since the second rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping in July 1977, the Chinese countryside has been undergoing gradual but consistent change. By 1983, it stood on the verge of major structural reform, highlighted by the reemergence of family farming and the dismantling of the commune system. Although support for these reforms is extensive, serious opposition and differences of opinion exist as well. This article will explore the motivations of those who resist these changes and the problems that have arisen during the implementation of the present policy. It will also suggest the likely path of future reforms in rural China.