David W. Brady

Primary Elections and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary Electorate?

This article draws on a new dataset of House primary- and general-election outcomes (1956–98) to examine the relationship between primary elections and candidate ideology. We show that, like presidential candidates, congressional candidates face a strategic-positioning dilemma: should they align themselves with their general- or primary-election constituencies? Relative to general-election voters, primary voters favor more ideologically extreme candidates. We show that congressional candidates handle the dilemma by positioning themselves closer to the primary electorate. This article thus supports the idea that primaries pull candidates away from median district preferences.

Heterogeneity and Representation: The Senate and Free Trade

Theory: Constituent pressures on senators vary by party and heterogeneity of state. Studies of representation based on analysis of roll call voting which fail to take these factors into account will underestimate constituency influence and overemphasize the impact of party and interest group ratings. Hypotheses: (1) The greater the heterogeneity of the electorate, the less predictable will be the relationships between constituency characteristics and roll call votes. (2) The effects of some constituency characteristics on roll call votes are party-specific. Methods: Ordered probit analysis of Senate voting on international trade issues in 199394 was conducted for the whole Senate and for the Senate split into homogenous and heterogeneous states. Results: For homogenous states, general and party-specific constituency characteristics perform very well, while party and interest group ratings perform poorly. For heterogeneous states, general and party-specific constituency characteristics perform poorly, while party and interest group ratings perform well. These results indicate, first, that heterogeneity of state electorates and party strategies is an important factor in determining roll call votes and, second, that there is strong evidence of dyadic representation on roll call voting.

The Decline of Party in the U. S. House of Representatives, 1887-1968

In this paper the decline of party voting in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1887 to 1968 is analyzed. The levels of party voting (by Congress) are fitted to a regression line, with the results showing a high period of party voting (1890-1910), an intermediate period (1911-1940), and a low period (1941-1968). A model is developed to measure the effects on party voting of external variables-party homogeneity, party conflict, presidential partisanship, and turnover; and internal variables-centralized leadership and caucus strength. Both types of variables are shown to have some effect, but external-and particularly electoral-variables are more important. Since these variables are culled from contemporary research, the results demonstrate that contemporary hypotheses and findings regarding legislative parties are generalizable over time.

Party, Constituency, and Roll-Call Voting in the U. S. Senate

A longitudinal analysis of a 30-year period shows that the more heterogeneous a states population, the more likely it is to have simultaneously a Democratic and a Republican senator. A path analysis linking constituency, competitiveness, party, and roll-call variables is tested on data from the 1970 census and the 93rd Congress. Geographic heterogeneity is related to diversity in the reelection constituencies of senators representing the same state. Reelection constituency is, in turn, related to party control of a states Senate seats. While reelection constituency has a greater direct effect than geographic constituency on roll-call behavior, party has the largest direct effect. Constituency characteristics have a larger effect than party when direct and indirect effects are combined.

Electoral Systems and Institutional Choice A Case Study of the 1988 Korean Elections

This article shows how the ruling party of Korea, the DJP, chose and implemented a strategy to win the 13th National Assembly election of 1988 and explains why that strategy failed. In addition, this election is analyzed in a more general context. The authors find, for example that the preference of a party over electoral systems is determined by the spatial distribution of its votes and that the choice of an electoral system is the outcome of a bargaining process among the parties. In the context of democratization, the Korean experience shows that the democratic reform policies of an authoritarian government are shaped by the interplay between the ruling partys desire to create a political system wherein they maintain power and the constraints to create a system that would channel the oppositions activities into electoral or institutional outlets.

Critical Elections, Congressional Parties and Clusters of Policy Changes

Profound changes in American public policy have occurred only rarely and have been associated with ‘critical’ or ‘realigning’ elections in which ‘more or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of power within the community’. Since the appearance of V. O. Keys seminal articles on critical elections, an increasing number of political scientists have attributed great importance to such elections. Schatt-schneider views the structure of politics brought into being by critical elections as systems of action. Thus, during realignments, not only voting behavior but institutional roles and policy outputs undergo substantial change. Burnham, perhaps the most important analyst of realignment patterns, alleges the existence of an intimate relationship between realigning elections and ‘transformations in large clusters of policy’.

The Vanishing Marginals and Electoral Responsiveness

Nearly two decades ago researchers pointed out the sharp decline in marginal districts in elections for the US House of Representatives. That observation led to an outpouring of research describing the electoral changes, explaining their bases and speculating about their consequences for the larger political system. Recently Gary Jacobson has offered a major corrective to that line of research, arguing that ‘House incumbents are no safer now than they were in the 1950s; the marginals, properly defined, have not vanished; the swing ratio has diminished little, if at all; and competition for House seats held by incumbents has not declined’. While Jacobson advances an extremely provocative argument, there are complicating patterns in his evidence that support additional and/or different interpretations. We argue that the marginals, ‘properly defined’ have diminished, the swing ratio has declined, and party competition for House seats held by incumbents has lessened. While fears that the vanishing marginals phenomenon would lead to lower responsiveness on the part of ‘safe’ House incumbents have proved groundless, the collective composition of Congress does appear to be less responsive to changes in popular sentiments. Thus, the vanishing marginals have contributed to the occurrence of divided government in the United States and in all likelihood do have the effects on congressional leadership and policy-making that many analysts have claimed.

Toward a Diachronic Analysis of Congress

This article assesses the status of diachronic research on the United States Congress. A literature review reveals a lack of truly diachronic studies, but a wealth of insightful and useful historical and contemporary studies. Drawing on organization theory, a research approach designed to facilitate and improve diachronic analysis is put forward. A major focus of the approach is on the ways in which environmental factors—both fixed and variable—shape the operations and performance of Congress. In addition, problems and strategies in analyzing the impacts of Congress on the wider political system are examined. The concluding section presents a research agenda for political scientists interested in applying diachronic analysis to the study of Congress.

Party Identification, Retrospective Voting, and Moderating Elections in a Federal System: West Germany, 1961-1989

The hypotheses of retrospective voting and moderating elections rationalize some empirical regularities in U.S. presidential and congressional elections that posed a challenge for the party identification hypothesis. Here, these hypotheses are applied to the German federal system that is characterized by staggered national and Land (provincial) elections. They are tested using data on real GNP growth at the national and Land levels, party vote shares in national and Land elections, party seat shares in national and Land parliaments, and the party composition of national and Land governments over the time period 1961-1989. Perhaps surprisingly, all three hypotheses—party identification, retrospective voting, and moderating elections—find empirical support when applied to the German federal system. Although these hypotheses were formulated with reference to U.S. political institutions, they travel well—bar some modifications that take into account special features of the German political system.

A Comparative Approach to Legislative Organization: Careerism and Seniority in the United States and Japan

Theory: This paper provides a comparative study of legislative institutions in the United States and Japan. It explains the rise of committee-based legislative organizations as an institutional choice made by rational legislators deciding how best to regularize their career advancement subject to electoral and constitutional constraints. Hypotheses: We argue that the rise of careerism within a legislature leads to a regularized system of career advancement, or a seniority system. Furthermore, the details of this system depend on the heterogeneity of intra-party preferences and each countrys electoral and constitutional system. To the extent that parties can offer members electoral security and influence over policy, they will retain control over the policy-making process. Otherwise, control will devolve to smaller organizational units, such as committees. Methods: We develop a new measure of seniority within committees. We present statistical evidence linking a rise in average tenure within both legislatures to a regularization of careers, and detailing the nature of committee-based seniority in each country. Results: In the United States, single-member electoral districts, alternating party control, and a separation of powers system gave legislators an incentive to create committee-based policy jurisdictions. In Japan, multi-member districts, singleparty control, and a parliamentary system led to a unique two-tiered seniority system in which members rise first through committees and then through cabinet posts.