Dean G. Pruitt

Strategic Choice in Negotiation

Four basic negotiating strategies are analyzed along with the outcomes they encourage and the determinants of their use. Guidelines for influencing the strategic choice of ones bargaining partners are also presented with an emphasis on techniques for encouraging ones adversaries to move away from contentious behavior and toward problem solving.

The Mediation Process The Effects of Mediator Bias and Disputant Power

This study examined the impact of mediator bias and disputant power over the mediator on acceptance of the mediator and mediator influence. Disputants who perceived the mediator as biased against their side were less accepting of the mediator and less influenced by the mediator than disputants who perceived the mediator as neutral. Disputants with high power over the mediator were more accepting of the mediator but tended to be less influenced by the mediator than disputants with low power. Disputants with high power also used less contentious tactics and reported that they were less concerned about appearing strong to the mediator than disputants with low power. 7here were no interactions between mediator bias and disputant power.

Components of group risk taking

Abstract In a partial replication of an earlier study by Wallach and Kogan, group risk taking was examined under conditions of discussion and information exchange. Group size was also manipulated. Unlike the earlier findings, a risky shift occurred in the information exchange condition, where the subjects only revealed to one another the contents of their prior decisions. A stronger risky shift was found when discussion was permitted. Risky shift was more pronounced the larger the size of the group. The extent of risky shift on a decision problem was found to be positively related to the initial level of risk on that problem. The results appear to support Browns “value of risk” theory of group risk taking more closely than any other theory.

Accountability to constituents: A two-edged sword.

Abstract Expectation of cooperative future interaction with the other negotiator (ECFI) was crossed with accountability to constituents. Accountability produced contentious behavior and it reduced joint benefit when ECFI was absent, but it increased joint benefit when ECFI was present. The results can be construed as supporting a dual-concern model, suggesting that behavior is a function of both a concern for personal goals and a concern for the relationship with the other party.

The effect of time pressure, time elapsed, and the opponent's concession rate on behavior in negotiation ☆

Abstract Eighty students were run in a laboratory paradigm of negotiation resembling that employed by Siegel and Fouraker. On the first trial, increased time pressure resulted in less ambitious goals, lower levels of demand, and less bluffing. Level of demand and amount of bluffing were reduced over subsequent trials, but goals remained unchanged. Neither time pressure nor the other negotiators rate of concession affected the rate of change in demand or bluffing over trials. Several items of evidence suggest the presence of substantial wishful thinking about the other negotiators goals.

The risky shift in group betting

Abstract : Two experiments were performed, involving a similar method. Experiment 1 showed for the first time that group discussion can produce a shift toward greater risk in choices among bets. A risky shift was found in two dimensions of risk taking: probability preferences and stake preferences. This finding made it possible to use bets in the second experiment. In Experiment 11, no risky shift was found in a group decision where the members of the group had engaged in past discussions about other issues but were not permitted to discuss or exchange information about the current issue. This result casts doubt on the diffusion of responsibility theory about the risky shift. (Author)

Long-Term Success in Mediation*

This article reports the results of a study of the antecedents of long-term success in community mediation. Seventy-three mediation sessions were recorded and content analyzed. The participants were interviewed at two points: immediately after mediation and 4 to 8 months later. No relationship was found between the quality of the agreements—i.e., the extent to which they solved immediate problems- and long-term success as measured by compliance, improved relations between the parties, and the absence of new problems. On the other hand, joint problem solving by the disputants was related to complainant perceptions of improved relations with the other party. Also respondent perceptions that the mediation had been fair and that all the problems had come out were related to all aspects of long-term success in the eyes of the complainant. The latter results support a procedural justice analysis of mediation and underline the importance of mediator attention to the respondent.

Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks

Readiness theory, an adaptation of ripeness theory, helps to resolve some problems with the latter set of ideas. Readiness theory holds that all kinds of progress toward conflict resolution result from the existence, on both sides, of: motivational ripeness (motivation to achieve de-escalation) and optimism about finding a mutually acceptable agreement. The motivational ripeness that led to the Oslo agreements resulted from the circumstances that obtained in the Middle East just prior to the talks. But optimism mainly developed during the talks themselves, by a circular process that involved: a steady growth in working trust, a perception that the other side was represented by a valid spokesman, and perceived common ground. Given the high level of motivational ripeness on both sides, good offices by a small country – Norway – were exactly what was needed. The critical elements of the Norwegian intervention were: assurance of absolute secrecy, provision of facilities that encouraged intimacy between the delegates, and arranging for meetings over a long enough period of time for the components of optimism to emerge and a possible agreement to be developed. Another source of the Oslo breakthrough was the existence of several critical bridge people prior to the emergence of the motivationally ripe moment.

Looking Tough: The Negotiator Under Constituent Surveillance

Constituent surveillance encouraged the negotiators use of such competitive tactics as threats, positional commitments, and persuasive arguments. Negotiators apparently chose these tactics in order to look tough in the eyes of their constituent. These tactics resulted in diminished joint and individual outcomes. The results of the study suggest that constituents might fare better by not monitoring the behavior of their negotiators. Future research might profit by identifying the crucial intervening variables that account for the surveillance effects.

The effects of mutual concern on joint welfare

Abstract Previous studies attempting to assess the impact of concern for an opponent bargainers welfare (orientation) upon the integrativeness of the agreements reached have produced differing conclusions. The design of an earlier experiment by Kelley and Schenitzki was replicated using a different negotiation method and task. Participants took the role of either the buyer or the seller in a two-party negotiation. Bargainers received instructions emphasizing either a Team Orientation (i.e., concern for mutual profit) or an Individualistic Orientation (i.e., concern for only ones own profit) and bargained under either a Free Communication or a Restricted Communication condition. The Team Orientation produced more integrative agreements (i.e., higher joint outcomes) than the Individualistic Orientation, regardless of the communication condition. Process data suggested that distinct processes may promote the development of integrative solutions in the two communication conditions.