Peter J. Carnevale

The influence of positive affect and visual access on the discovery of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation

The present study investigated the influence of positive affect and visual access on the process and outcome of negotiation in an integrative bargaining task. Visual access was crossed with positive affect in a 2 × 2 design. The results supported the hypotheses that positive affect would reduce the use of contentious tactics and would increase joint benefit, just as had been found for the presence of a barrier that eliminated visual access to the other negotiator (S. Lewis & W. Fry, 1977, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 20, 75–92). This latter finding was also replicated. Only when bargainers were face to face and not in a positive state was there heavy use of contentious tactics, reduced trade-offs, and fewer integrative solutions. This means that positive affect can overcome the competitive processes and poor outcomes normally observed in face-to-face integrative bargaining. The results are discussed in terms of the cognitive dynamics of negotiation.

Time Pressure and the Development of Integrative Agreements in Bilateral Negotiations

A laboratory experiment examined the effects of time pressure on the process and outcome of integrative bargaining. Time pressure was operationalized in terms of the amount of time available to negotiate. As hypothesized, high time pressure produced nonagreements and poor negotiation outcomes only when negotiators adopted an individualistic orientation; when negotiators adopted a cooperative orientation, they achieved high outcomes regardless of time pressure. In combination with an individualistic orientation, time pressure produced greater competitiveness, firm negotiator aspirations, and reduced information exchange. In combination with a cooperative orientation, time pressure produced greater cooperativeness and lower negotiator aspirations. The main findings were seen as consistent with Pruitts strategic-choice model of negotiation.

A Nasty but Effective Negotiation Strategy: Misrepresentation of a Common-Value Issue

Conflicts sometimes involve issues for which both parties want the same outcome, although frequently parties fail to recognize their shared interests. These common-value issues set the stage for a nasty misrepresentation strategy: feigning opposed interest on the common-value issue to gain an advantage on other issues. In a laboratory negotiation simulation, participants used misrepresentation in 28% of their negotiations. The strategy was more likely to occur when negotiators had individualistic motives and was less likely to occur when both parties realized their common interests. Use of the strategy led to favorable outcomes, and these were best predicted by negotiator aspirations, rather than perceptual accuracy. The authors discovered two forms of the strategy: misrepresentation by commission (the user actively misrepresented his or her common-value issue preferences) and misrepresentation by omission (the user concealed his or her common-value issue interests when the other person made a favorable offer).

Motivational Bases Of Information Processing and Strategy in Conflict and Negotiation

Publisher Summary The chapter reviews the settings and research paradigms to illustrate that in some conflicts and in some negotiation settings some motives are more likely to emerge than in other settings. It also reviews past research on cognitive and motivational processes in conflict and negotiation, and introduces defensiveness and naive realism as barriers to dispute resolution. The chapter discusses the antecedents and consequences of social and epistemic motivation, respectively, and considers their influence on information processing biases and strategic choice. It presents the motivated information processing model and discusses the possibility that motives change during the negotiation. The motivated information processing model captures the influence of many variables—situational features such as power differences or time pressure, and individual differences in social value, cultural background, or need for cognitive closure—on cognitive processes and economic and psychological outcomes in conflict and negotiation. The chapter closes with alternative models of information processing and strategic choice in conflict and negotiation.

Negotiation from a Near and Distant Time Perspective

Across 3 experiments, the authors examined the effects of temporal distance on negotiation behavior. They found that greater temporal distance from negotiation decreased preference for piecemeal, single-issue consideration over integrative, multi-issue consideration (Experiment 1). They also found that greater temporal distance from an event being negotiated increased interest in conceding on the lowest priority issue and decreased interest in conceding on the highest priority issue (Experiment 2). Lastly, they found increased temporal distance from an event being negotiated produced a greater proportion of multi-issue offers, a greater likelihood of conceding on the lowest priority issue in exchange for a concession on the highest priority issue, and greater individual and joint outcomes (Experiment 3). Implications for conflict resolution and construal level theory are discussed.

Looking Tough: The Negotiator Under Constituent Surveillance

Constituent surveillance encouraged the negotiators use of such competitive tactics as threats, positional commitments, and persuasive arguments. Negotiators apparently chose these tactics in order to look tough in the eyes of their constituent. These tactics resulted in diminished joint and individual outcomes. The results of the study suggest that constituents might fare better by not monitoring the behavior of their negotiators. Future research might profit by identifying the crucial intervening variables that account for the surveillance effects.

Gender effects in negotiation: Constituent surveilance and contentious behavior☆

Abstract This experiment examined the influence of constituent surveillance, constituent gender, and negotiator gender on negotiation behavior and outcome. (Constituents are the people represented by negotiators.) Surveillance by a male constituent made negotiators more contentious and produced relatively unequal final outcomes. Surveillance by a female constituent made negotiators less contentious and resulted in relatively equal final outcomes. These findings can be interpreted as negotiator efforts to impress a constituent who is watching by acting in accordance with sex-role stereotypes about how he or she would expect them to behave. In the absence of constituent surveillance, there was more contentious behavior with female than with male constituents, regardless of the sex of the negotiator. This suggests the existence of a unisex “chivalry” norm, involving greater concern for female than male outcomes. Male and female negotiators did not differ in behavior or outcome and did not react differently to constituent surveillance.

Group-Identity Completion and the Symbolic Value of Property

Building on symbolic self-completion theory, we conceptualize group identity as a goal toward which group members strive, using material symbols of that identity. We report four studies showing that the value placed on such material symbols (e.g., a building) depends on commitment to group identity, the extent to which a symbol can be used to represent in-group identity, and situational variability in goal strength induced through group-identity affirmation or threat. Our results suggest that property derives value from its capacity to serve as an effective means in the pursuit of group-identity goals. Implications for inter-group conflict are discussed.

Culture in the Mediation of International Disputes

Unlike most treatments of culturein internationaldiplomacy, this articlesuggests that culturecan play a positiverole in the mediation of international disputes. Cultural ties between the mediator and one or both of the disputants can facilitate mediation by, among other things, enhancing the mediator’s acceptability to the parties, and enhancingthe belief that the mediator can deliver concessionsand agreements. Moreover, a mediator who is closer to one side than the other can be effective in mediation, especially when the mediator acts in an even-handed manner. Data from laboratory research on mediation, as well as anecdotal evidence, support this view.

Time Pressure in Negotiation and Mediation

This chapter examines the role of time pressure in negotiation and mediation. Negotiation can be defined as discussion between two or more parties and joint decision making with the goal of reaching agreement. Mediation is a variation on negotiation in which one or more outsiders (“third parties”) assist the parties in their efforts to reach agreement.