Deborah Welch Larson

The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Whereas the study of elite political belief systems such as the operational code continues to be popular in political science, social psychologists have neglected belief systems in favor of schemas. This article compares and contrasts belief systems and schemas. Whereas both constructs are cognitive, structured, and vary with expertise, schemas are at a higher level of generality and are more closely related to complex cognitive processes. The article discusses the potential advantages of using schemas to analyze various topics in foreign policymaking, such as information processing, memory biases, and the effects of expertise.

Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy

Why did Soviet foreign policy change during 1985–1991 from viewing conflict between capitalism and socialism as inevitable to favoring cooperation between states in solving global problems? Neither materialist analyses nor ideational accounts explain why Gorbachev adopted the radical new thinking instead of more conventional reform alternatives. We argue that the new thinking offered a means to enhance Soviet status despite retrenchment and accommodation of the West. By promoting principles underlying a new world order, the Soviet Union could achieve greatness based on the exercise of soft power. This explanation draws on social identity theory, which maintains that people are motivated for their social group to have a distinctive, positive identity. Lower status groups may enhance their perceived standing by finding a new domain for comparison or reevaluating an undesirable trait.

Status in world politics

Part I. Introduction: 1. Status and world order Deborah Welch Larson, T. V. Paul and William C. Wohlforth Part II. Admission into the Great-Power Club: 2. Managing rising powers: the role of status concerns Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko 3. Status considerations in international politics and the rise of regional powers Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, J. Patrick Rhamey, Jr, Ryan G. Baird and Keith A. Grant 4. Status is cultural: Durkheimian Poles and Weberian Russians seek great-power status Iver B. Neumann Part III. Status Signaling: 5. Status dilemmas and interstate conflict William C. Wohlforth 6. Status signaling, multiple audiences, and Chinas blue-water naval ambition Xiaoyu Pu and Randall L. Schweller Part IV. International Institutions and Status: 7. Status accommodation through institutional means: Indias rise and the global order T. V. Paul and Mahesh Shankar 8. Setting status in stone: the negotiation of international institutional privileges Vincent Pouliot Part V. Status, Authority, and Structure: 9. Status conflict, hierarchies, and interpretation dilemmas William R. Thompson 10. Status, authority, and the end of the American century David A. Lake Part VI. Conclusions: 11. Why status matters in world politics Anne L. Clunan.

Crisis prevention and the Austrian State Treaty

Much has been written about how the United States and the Soviet Union have managed crises since World War II, avoiding dangerous escalation and war; little on how the two superpowers have avoided confrontations. In part scholarly neglect of the question of crisis avoidance reflects the acute suspicion and hostility of the cold war. When U.S.-Soviet rivalry was perceived as a struggle between incompatible ideologies and ways of life, it was unthinkable that the superpowers might have any common interests, much less that they could collaborate, even tacitly, to control the conflict in their relationship.

Status in World Politics: Status and World Order

Can the international order be modified to incorporate a greater role for rising or more assertive powers such as China, Russia, India, Brazil, and Turkey? While the rise and decline of major powers cannot be forecast with precision, there is scant uncertainty about the core expectation that relative economic and military clout will shift away from the states that created and have upheld the current international order – the United States and its close allies – in favor of states heretofore thought of as outsiders or as minor players in that order. On the surface, accommodating this shift would appear simple: adjust voting rules in international organizations to reflect new distributions of bargaining power, alter spheres of influence to reflect new military capabilities and interests, and allocate new rights and responsibilities as the situation dictates. After all, nuclear-armed major powers, most of which are democratic, are not going to contest global leadership by resorting to arms. Surely the leaders of modern states in a globalized world will not forgo the massive gains of multilateral institutionalized cooperation over some squabble about the shape of the table and who gets to sit at its head. Or will they? The ongoing scholarly and public discussion reveals a level of anxiety about rising powers and world order that is hard to explain if people only care about economic prosperity and basic national security. Yet most of what political scientists claim to know about the rise and decline of powers rests precisely on that assumption. The discourse on changing power balances mixes concern over pragmatic adjustments of security- and material welfare-maximizing actors with a vaguer apprehension about clashing national claims to greatness and precedence. To an important degree, the worry is about the search for higher status by emerging powers and the conflict this quest may generate with reigning major power actors. Why do rising powers seek status? What are the mechanisms of status adjustment and accommodation and what are the conditions for use of one rather than another? Can the status aspirations of the rising powers be accommodated without violence, and if so, how?

Trust and Missed Opportunities in International Relations

With the end of the Cold War, we must wonder whether there were missed opportunities to regulate the arms race and global competition, which nearly bankrupted the United States and contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. A missed opportunity for agreement is a situation where there was at least one alternative that the parties to a conflict preferred or would have preferred to nonagreement. Hard-core Realists argue that states compete for territory, arms, and influence because they have conflicting national interests. Soft-core Realists maintain that such conflicts are effects of international anarchy and uncertainty, and that states can cooperate contingent on reciprocity. I argue that states often fail to cooperate even when they have compatible preferences because policy-makers make incorrect inferences about the opponents motives and intentions, a process that can be illuminated by social psychology. I present three alternative explanations of trust and distrust in international relations-rational choice, domestic structures, and social psychology. If policy-makers are prudent, they will assess the others interests in observing an agreement as well as its reputation. Often, domestic political structures encourage leaders to promote distrust of an external enemy to legitimize their internal rule or foreign policy. Finally, distrust may lead policy-makers to dismiss the other sides cooperative signals or proposals. Distrust can be overcome by making a series of step-by-step agreements in which each side can test the others good faith at limited cost, or through unilateral concessions as part of a consistent policy.

Exchange and Reciprocity in International Negotiations

Although international relations often involves a trade of favors or services, political scientists have not often used exchange theory. Social exchange is motivated by the prospect of mutual gain. The exercise of power entails exchange of needed resources for compliance with the influencers wishes. The timing of repayment and explicitness of obligation are important dimensions of exchange that vary by issue area and relationship. In sequential exchange, the party that moves first risks being exploited and must therefore trust the other. The parties to an exchange may either leave open or specify what the other should do in return. Reciprocity refers to exchanges which are mutual and perceived by the parties as fair. It is difficult to determine whether exchanges are reciprocal without a common measure of value. Norms and customary expectations determine what is considered fair when there is no standardized measure of value. In negotiations, there are several competing principles of justice. Reciprocity requires that concessions be matched; it does not mean that their magnitude must be equal.

The Political psychology of the Gulf War : leaders, publics, and the process of conflict

Part 1 The Origins of the Gulf War: Introduction, Stanley A. Renshon Patterns Forged in Time - Middle Eastern Mind-Sets and the Gulf War, L. Carl Brown Commentary on Part 1, Dankwart A. Rustow. Part 2 Leaders, Leadership and Decision-Making: President Bush Goes to War - A Psychological Interpretation from a Distance, Stephen J. Wayne The Defining Moment of Saddams Life - A Political Psychology Perspective on the Leadership and Decision-Making of Saddam Hussein During the Gulf Crisis, Jerrold M. Post Skilled Judgement, and the Lack Thereof, in the Gulf War - A Preliminary Psychological Model with Some Applications, Stanley A. Renshon Commentary on Part 2, David G. Winter. Part 3 The Conflict Process: Threat-Based Strategies of Conflict Management - Why Did They Fail in the Gulf?, Janice Gross Stein The War of Images - Strategic Communication in the Gulf Conflict, Jarol B. Manheim Commentary on Part 3, Robert Jervis. Part 4 Mass Publics: Arab Public Opinion and the Gulf War, Shibley Telhami American Public Opinion and the Gulf War, John Mueller The Political and Psychological Impact of the Gulf War on the Israeli Public, Asher Arian and Carol Gordon Commentary on Part 4, Herbert C. Kelman. Part 5 The Consequences of Conflict: Leaders and Publics in the Middle East - Shattering the Organising Myths of Arab Society, Marvin Zonis The Gulf Wars Possible Impact on the International System, Alexander L. George Commentary on Part 5, Dankwart A. Rustow. Part 6 Epilogue: The Gulf War Revisited - Consequences, Controversies and Interpretations, Stanley A. Renshon.

Outsourced Diplomacy: The Obama Administration and the Ukraine Crisis

The Obama administration was not involved in the EU’s negotiations of an Association Agreement with Ukraine, which Russian president Putin perceived as infringing on Russia’s sphere of influence. In response to the Russian takeover of Crimea, the Obama administration led the EU in imposing sanctions and isolating Russia. But the United States, viewing the crisis as a largely European problem, outsourced diplomatic responsibility for working out a solution to the prolonged conflict in eastern Ukraine to the EU, particularly Germany.

Status in World Politics: International Institutions and Status

Part I. Introduction: 1. Status and world order Deborah Welch Larson, T. V. Paul and William C. Wohlforth Part II. Admission into the Great-Power Club: 2. Managing rising powers: the role of status concerns Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko 3. Status considerations in international politics and the rise of regional powers Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, J. Patrick Rhamey, Jr, Ryan G. Baird and Keith A. Grant 4. Status is cultural: Durkheimian Poles and Weberian Russians seek great-power status Iver B. Neumann Part III. Status Signaling: 5. Status dilemmas and interstate conflict William C. Wohlforth 6. Status signaling, multiple audiences, and Chinas blue-water naval ambition Xiaoyu Pu and Randall L. Schweller Part IV. International Institutions and Status: 7. Status accommodation through institutional means: Indias rise and the global order T. V. Paul and Mahesh Shankar 8. Setting status in stone: the negotiation of international institutional privileges Vincent Pouliot Part V. Status, Authority, and Structure: 9. Status conflict, hierarchies, and interpretation dilemmas William R. Thompson 10. Status, authority, and the end of the American century David A. Lake Part VI. Conclusions: 11. Why status matters in world politics Anne L. Clunan.