Decio Zylbersztajn

Strictly coordinated food-systems: exploring the limits of the Coasian firm

Firms are not islands but are linked together in patterns of co-operation and affiliation. Richardson, 1972 In the recent literature on supply chain management, vertical production systems are treated as independent entities operating under a given standard of coordination. If different production systems are not denominated firms, they are being treated as if they could be coordinated by some kind of agent holding sufficient hierarchical power. Moreover, different supply chains are presented as if they could compete with each other in the marketplace, inviting us to extend the concept of the typical firm. However, according to the Coase (1988) definition, “A firm consists of the system of relationships that comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur.” When we deal with supply chains, the entrepreneur may or may not exist. Can supply chains be studied as independent entities? If so, can we interfere in their organization? What parameters must be considered to bind our actions toward the design of efficient systems? Provided that theories are abstract constructions designed to explain empirical regularities, we are looking for a scientific explanation for the empirical architecture and dynamics of coordination of supply systems. In this paper, we are particularly interested in supply-chain ma agement, which implies conscious interference. Therefore, it becomes necessary to develop a

Papel dos contratos na coordenação agro-industrial: um olhar além dos mercados

Abstract: This essay departs from the question about the limited adop-tion of the contractual approach in the field of Agricultural Economics in Brazil. It discusses the relevance of the contractual approach to the theory of the firm, presents the evolution of the studies of coordination in food chains in Brazil and abroad, and concludes suggesting a research and educational agenda for applied Agricultural Economics. Key Words: transaction cost, agriculture contracts, firm theory JEL Classification: Q12, L22If an economist finds something – a business practice of some sort or ano-ther – that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. Ronald Coase Premio Nobel em Economia 1. Introducao A Economia aplicada a agricultura tem seu desenvolvimento relacio-nado a teoria da firma, em que pese a relevância dos temas macroeco-nomicos. Os estudos das relacoes de producao, sempre tiveram destaque na pesquisa e ensino no campo aplicado da Economia Agricola. O estudo da firma agricola tal como enfocada por Heady e Dillon (1961), exerceu influencia na academia, a partir da otica da funcao de producao, motivou relevante volume de pesquisa empirica focalizada no papel dos precos na alocacao eficiente dos recursos.Embora os estudos da firma como funcao de producao tenham caido em desuso, as aplicacoes empiricas da teoria da producao ao estudo da economia agricola foram, e ainda sao, direcionadas ao estudo do funcio-namento dos mercados e suas derivacoes. Politicas de preco, impactos de distorcoes do funcionamento livre do mercado sao a tonica da tradi-cional teoria, seja sob a otica da firma, ou sob a otica da demanda, que permite, a partir dos pressupostos dos mercados perfeitos, estudar os impactos de politicas publicas e intervencoes de diferentes naturezas. Os anos de pos-guerra foram caracterizados pela revisao do papel do Estado

Dynamics of Network Governance: A Contribution to the Study of Complex Forms

The focus of this paper is the architecture of complex forms of governance, specifically, the architecture of networks. A network is a complex form of organization designed to govern inter-firm transactions involving horizontal and vertical coordination. The agents choice among various institutional arrangements is affected by relation-specific investments, distributive mechanisms, and dynamic aspects based on relational contractual mechanisms, trust being a relevant variable. This paper investigates how horizontal and vertical coordination levels are connected. It recognizes that price incentives are important and introduces the effect of network externalities that also offer incentives. The paper presents a semiformal model that considers the existence of network externalities and applies a game approach to explain the choice among alternative strategies. The conceptual model is applied to two cases of network architecture in agro-industrial relations.

Agricultural and food economics - a new journal for a changing world

© A m Agricultural and Food Economics (AFE) is an on line peer-reviewed open-access journal supported by the Italian Association of Agricultural Economics (SIDEA) and published by SpringerOpen. This open access formula is an innovative and valuable opportunity for readers and authors who are interested in deepening their knowledge and keeping up to date on international agri-food policy and economic issues of the agricultural and food sector in a globalised world. In a fast-changing world, research in agri-food economics faces the important challenge of balancing the need of quickly publishing papers with that of following the rigorous scientific method. This e-journal tries to fill this gap by publishing peer-reviewed research articles that are open-access, and thus accessible to users immediately and free of charge for readers. AFE welcomes research articles from scholars and researchers from all over the world to publish problem-oriented, high quality and refereed papers. AFE seeks clearly written articles to promote insightful understanding of the current trends in the agri-food system. AFE publishes only original articles from a wide variety of economic perspectives that address current and relevant issues related to the agricultural and food system. Published papers focus on applied analysis, the discussion of innovative results, and relevant policy and managerial implications. Theoretical and methodological papers should be accessible to the journal’s variety of international readers. Qualitative papers and meta-analyses are welcome if they comply with the journal’s rigorous standards. Topics of specific interest of AFE include agricultural and food market analysis, agri-food firm management and marketing, organization of the agri-food chains, consumer behaviour, food quality and safety issues, economics of nutrition and food security, food and health economics, agri-food policy and trade, sustainable rural development, natural and marine resource economics, and land economics. Papers for publication in AFE are selected through a peer review process to ensure soundness, originality, relevance, and readability. AFE adopts a double-blind peer review process to ensure independent assessment of the papers. Each paper, with no exception, is reviewed by at least two referees of different nationalities. Manuscripts that are not within the scope of the journal may be returned to the authors without a formal review. The editorial board of AFE is composed, in addition to the editors in chief, by many internationally renowned economists that guarantee the high quality level of the papers published.

A Property Rights Approach to Strategy

This article is about how resources can be conceptualized as bundles of attributes for which one can assign economic property rights. Strategic considerations are deliberately incorporated into the analysis through the assessment of the activities of capture and protection of property rights, along with the examination of the institutional environment. These basic elements combine in order to design an approach to strategy. In developing this approach, the authors identify four key questions for structuring the strategy formulation process of the firm. The analytical framework is illustrated through a particular case: the collection of royalties on the genetically modified (GM) technology in soybean seeds.

Falta de garantias e falhas de coordenação: evidências do sistema agroindustrial da carne bovina

O papel das instituicoes formais e informais na economia das organizacoes e tradicionalmente analisado em termos dos mecanismos eficientes de governanca que minimizam os custos de transacao. Baseada numa perspectiva inversa, a presente pesquisa foca nas falhas de coordenacao e no problema da falta de garantias nas transacoes economicas. Especificamente, examina-se o conjunto de garantias que suportam a transacao entre pecuaristas e a industria frigorifica em Mato Grosso do Sul com foco nas ineficiencias do processo de comercializacao de gado para abate. Para a compreensao das falhas de coordenacao, propoe‑se um constructo teorico baseado em Barzel (1997), que relaciona direitos de propriedade, garantias e instituicoes. Esse modelo e testado empiricamente por meio do desenvolvimento de duas regressoes logisticas multiplas: i) modelo logit ordenado baseado na percepcao de risco dos pecuaristas e ii) modelo probit bivariado recursivo baseado na percepcao de risco dos pecuaristas e no papel das acoes coletivas. Os resultados apontam para a importância das instituicoes formais e das acoes coletivas como mecanismos geradores de garantias para a transacao e, consequentemente, para a minimizacao dos custos de transacao......The role of formal and informal institutions in the economy of organizations is traditionally analyzed in terms of efficient governance mechanisms which minimize transaction costs. Based on a different perspective, this paper focuses on coordination failures and the problem of lack of guarantees in sequential transactions. In particular, this research examines a bundle of guarantees which supports the transaction between producers and the meatpacking industry in the Mato Grosso do Sul state regarding the inefficiencies in the trading of ready-to-slaughter animals. A theoretical model based on Barzel (1997) involving property rights, guarantees and institutions is proposed for the understanding of coordination failures. This model is empirically tested with two multiple logistic regressions: i) an ordered logit model based on the producer’s risk perception and ii) a recursive bivariate probit model based on producer’s risk perception and on the role of collective action. The findings suggest that formal institutions and collective actions play a relevant role in providing guarantees and, thus, representing a source of transaction costs minimization.

Determinantes dos arranjos contratuais1: O caso da transação produtor-processador de carne bovina no Uruguai

What are the determinants of the commercial channel choice in the beef producers-processors transactions? The question refers to the coordination and production control problem associated to changes in consumer’s awareness of specific attributes in food products. Two contractual arrangements coexist in this transaction: direct-contracting and broker-induced transactions Transaction Cost Economic offers helpful insights to understand the reason for the development and adaptations of different contractual arrangement moved by transaction cost economizing perspective. The empirical analysis is focused in the Uruguayan beef agro-industrial system. Analysis integrates (i) institutional and organizational changes in the beef industry; (ii) based on the analysis of the transaction dimensions (frequency, asset specificity and uncertainty) we address hypothesis of the determinants of the contractual arrangement in the beef producers-processors transaction; and (iii) we run a statistical test of the hypotheses based on a logit model. We used a panel data with producers-processors transaction from Uruguayan Agricultural Bureau (77,000 transactions). We confirm the hypotheses of the determinants of the contractual arrangement choice. The probability of a transaction being aligned with the direct contractual arrangement increase in transaction with higher asset specificity (i.e., young steer), lower distance between the producer and the processor, and with higher frequency of transaction.

Determinantes da Escolha de Arranjos Institucionais: Evidências na Comercialização de Fertilizantes para Soja

Transactions among agribusiness agents are not exclusively carried out on the market, being also governed by alternative types of institutional arrangements, some of which determined upon contractual agreement. In the fertilizers sector, the companies intensified the offer of input packages to farmers, more specifically to soybean producers, object of this article. In order to acquire the fertilizers, these producers may choose to use their own financial resources, to obtain resources through financing with third parties, or they may recur to the said packages, which include soybean and financial resources in addition to the fertilizers, referred by the soybean producers to as “exchange”, since they acquire fertilizer paying with soybean for future delivery. Thus, the following questions motivate this work: What are the factors that determine the selection of the soybean producer between alternative arrangements for the acquisition of fertilizers? Two hundred interviews were conducted with soybean producers in the States of Goias and Mato Grosso. To conclude, packages or arrangements as bundling may be stimulated by reasons of efficiency, with transaction costs economy as one of these possible reasons. Risk aversion and trust leads to the use of the exchange arrangement. Finally, in relation to the scale, largest soybean producers use the arrangement exchange in a great deal, differently from what was expected.

Organização ética: um ensaio sobre comportamento e estrutura das organizações

The main objective of the essay is to discuss the theme of ethics and organizations under the lenses of the New Institutional Economics. Given the importance of ethics and social responsibility for organizations, the study suggests the risk associated to the benign approach of cooperation based on the assumption of absence of opportunism. Also discusses the problem of survival of the ethical corporation, in face of the existence of non-ethical behavior of the competition. The study concludes that internal organization should be architected to provide the incentives and align the behavior of stakeholders and stockholders. It also concludes that institutional evolution should affect the capacity for the socially responsible organization survive in the market place.

Explaining agro-industrial contract breaches: the case of Brazilian tomatoes processing industry

Three hundred small tomato growers located in Brazilian northeast states, supplied a processing industry. In view of the large number of contract hazards and weak enforcement of clauses, managers have decided to move to the Midwest, where a reduced number of larger farmers have been contracted. The industry blamed high transaction costs due to the weak mechanism of public enforcement of property rights. The industry blamed some farmers of selling the product at the market for fresh consumption. Also, farmers blamed the industry for taking advantage of asymmetric information related to quality. This study presents an analysis of contract architecture and an evaluation of effects of transaction costs related variables on the likelihood of contract breaches. A panel data study with 1,523 observations and limited dependent variable models has been formulated to test hypothesis based on transaction cost theory. Results show that opportunism and the absence of courts guarantees of property rights precluded the possibility of achieving a stable contract relationship in the region.