Deil S. Wright

Circumventing the Glass Ceiling: Women Executives in American State Governments.

able. G ender issues are now and probably will remain for the foreseeable future highly significant aspects of both the theory and the practice of public administration (Hale and Kelly, 1989; Guy, 1992). One issue, equal female representation, has been particularly prominent in organizational studies in both the public and the private sectors. This article addresses gender representation at the top levels of administration in American state governments. Our focus on women agency heads in state governments, however, extends beyond mere representative proportions. We also explore (with survey data) several common and not-socommon characteristics of women and men who head the thousands of administrative agencies, large and small, of the 50 states.

GUBERNATORIAL INFLUENCE AND STATE BUREAUCRACY

Previous research has concentrated on differences in gubernatorial power across states. Relatively little research attention has been devoted to the sources of gubernatorial influence over state agencies. Based on data collected from state administrators in 1978, this study examines the effects of four sets of factors on the perceived influence of the governor over the state administrative apparatus. These sets are: formal powers of the governor, characteristics of the agencies, characteristics of the positions held by administrators, and personal characteristics of these officials. Results show that these factors account for nearly one-fourth of the variance in the influence of the governor over state agencies, as reported by agency heads.

Governors, Legislatures, and State Budgets across Time

Prior research by Abney and Lauth concluded that governors were losing ground to legislatures in shaping the state budget. Goodman examined Abney and Lauth’s explanations for this change and found empirical support for some but not others. This article’s findings reveal that governors, as a group, have not declined in budgetary influence, although some have gained and others lost during recent decades. The longitudinal analysis arrives at two major conclusions: (1) executive—legislative influence changes that take place stem primarily from political rather than structural changes, and (2) budgetary influence is not unidimensional as governors and legislatures compete in a non-zero-sum game in pursuit of different budgetary outcomes.

Exploring Explanations of State Agency Budgets: Institutional Budget Actors or Exogenous Environment?

Budgetary incrementalism argues that three institutional actorsagencies, executive budget offices, and legislative committeesdominate budget outcomes. The complexity and interdependency of public programs expands this expectation to include the influence of exogenous budget factors. Findings from a survey of state agency heads reveal that budget environments do influence state agency budget outcomes. However, the institutional budgetary participants, especially governors and legislatures, envisioned in classical incrementalism retain their principal and primary influence on state agency budgets. A significant departure from classical incrementalism is that agencies are not as influential as previously depicted.

Intergovernmental Relation (IGR) In Korea and Japan: Phases, Patterns, and Progress Toward Decentralization (Local Autonomy) in A Trans-Pacific Context

Institutional issues and organizational integrity have returned to the center of attention in several fields in the social sciences. Nowhere is this more evident than in the analysis of governmental structures and formal (legal) arrangements. One component of institutional analysis is the manner in which power, authority, tasks, functions, and services are divided (or shared) on an area basis. What are the assigned responsibilities of the central (national) governing entity and what are those of the regional (state/province/local) governmental jjurisdiction? In other words, how is authority divided on an area vs. functional basis? descriptions or definitions of this division of authority on an area basis have employed a variety of terms to guide analysis, interpretations, and advocacy. Examples of such terms or concepts are: Federalism (Elazar, 1987), Intergovernmental Relations (Anderson, 1960; Wright, 1988), Central-Local Relations (Horie and Nagata, 1999) Local Autonomy (Horie and Nishio, 1997) and Multi-Level Governance (Hooge and Marks, 2003). For purposes of this paper we have opted for the concept of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR). Among other issues addressed in the paper, the choice of this concept is elaborated and clarified. The central component of the paper, however, is a historical analysis of the phases of IGR in Korea and Japan. This approach to the study of IGR as phases (periods or eras) has established precedents (Elazar, 1990; Wright, 1988, 1997; Koike and Wright, 1998). This serial or sequential approach has also utility in a comparative sense (Koike and Wright, 1998; orie and Nishio, 1997). This paper extends prior analyses to development of IGR in Korea and Japan. Both nations have recently instituted various reforms involving IGR. It is appropriate and pertinent to examine these developments and to place them in a comparative context.

Policy Shifts in the Politics and Administration of Intergovernmental Relations, 1930s-1990s

Politics and administration were joined and inseparably bonded in intergovernmental relationships during the 1930s. From these early links emerged an administratively based and professionally managed grants economy. This grants economy dominated intergovernmental relations for three decades until a combination of conditions limited its further expansion. Over the past two decades there has been a significant shift toward regulatory federalism. This regulatory emphasis is expected to persist through the 1990s.

Intergovernmental Relations in Large Council-Manager Cities

In less than one generation, the term &dquo;intergovernmental relations&dquo; has been coined by academics and diffused among governmental officials. There is a permanent national commission, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, that incorporates the term in its title. In addition, there exists near the top echelons of policy-making, the Office of Intergovernmental Relations under the Vice President. Both agencies

Public Administration in the Fifty States: A Half-Century Administrative Revolution:

State and Local Government Review NEARLY A HALF CENTURY AGO, Robert S. Allen described state government as “the tawdriest, most incompetent, most stultifying unit in the nation’s political structure” (1949,vii). While Allen’s journalistic broadside against state government was aimed mainly at sordid politics and outdated political institutions, the states’ administrative failures did not escape his wrath. He charged that

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: Unique Features and Policy Orientation

The need for smoother functioning of our federal system has become particularly apparent over the last two or three decades. A number of significant changes have occurred in our society which will require continuing and far-reaching attention. The interrelation of Federal, State, and local governmental units brought about by growth has in turn created problems of its own. Our federal system has had to adjust in a manner undreamed of by our Founding Fathers.1

Strategies for Measuring Influence over State Agencies

In the summer 2006 edition of State Politics and Policy Quarterly, Michael Baranowski and Donald Gross examined two methods of measuring influence over state agency activities: freestanding versus paired comparison. Their analysis led them to conclude that the paired-comparison measures might be theoretically superior, but are often impractical. Using the American State Administrator Project (ASAP) surveys, we supplement Baranowski and Grosss analysis by identifying conditions that sometimes make freestanding instruments superior measures and, at other times, paired comparisons both superior and practical to use.