Derek Laing

Involuntary layoffs in a model with asymmetric information concerning worker ability

This paper examines the contract between a risk-neutral firm and its risk-averse employees, assuming that worker ability is privately learned by the firm after a period of employment. Employers in an external spot labour market attempt to infer worker quality from the observable actions taken by the firm (such as the number of workers it lays off). The threat of spot market raids distorts the optimal contract. Layoffs may be involuntary and can exceed efficient levels. A seniority layoff rule may be included in the contract to avoid the adverse selection problems that arise if layoffs are conducted on the basis of ability.

DECENTRALIZED EXCHANGE AND FACTOR PAYMENTS: A MULTIPLE-MATCHING APPROACH

The emergence of fiat money is studied in an environment in which exchange is organized around trading posts where many producers and shoppers are matched in a dynamic monopolistically competitive framework. Each household consumes a bundle of commodities and has a preference for consumption variety. Within this multiple matching structure we determine the endogenous organization of exchange between firms and shoppers and the means of factor payment (remuneration) as well as the price at which these trades occur. Although each household contacts many sellers, the specialization of tastes implies that the variety of the consumption basket under barter mediated exchange is sparser than that obtained under monetary exchange. We verify that the endogenous linkage of factor payments with the medium of exchange can lead to a monetary equilibrium outcome where only fiat money trades for goods, an ex-ante feature of cash-in-advance models. We also examine the long-run effects of money growth on the equilibrium pattern of exchange. A primary finding, consistent with documented hyperinflationary episodes, is that a sufficiently rapid expansion of money supply and inflation leads to the gradual emergence of barter. Under these circumstances sellers will accept both goods and cash payments whereas workers receive part of their remuneration in goods.

The Macroeconomic Consequences of Anticipated Price Reform

This paper uses a two-period model to examine the macroeconomic consequences of anticipated price liberalization. In the first period prices are controlled, there is excess demand for goods and consumers must engage in costly queuing to make purchases. In the second period prices are freed, eliminating the need for queues. We establish the possibility of multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria and examine the effects of contingent policy rules. The framework enables us to examine a number of issues of importance, such as the problem of the monetary overhang, the relevance of budgetary policies and the effects of foreign aid. Copyright 1998 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..