John Fender
University of Birmingham
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Featured researches published by John Fender.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | 1999
John Fender
Abstract A model of crime and punishment is developed where individuals who differ in their earnings abilities choose between work and crime, taking the probability and consequences of punishment into account. An aggregate relationship between the probability of punishment and the level of crime is derived. There is also a relationship between enforcement spending, the number of criminals and the number punished. In such an economy, the possibility of multiple equilibria and the effects of changes in enforcement spending and in inequality on the levels of crime and punishment are discussed; there is also discussion of social welfare and voting behavior.
The Economic Journal | 2011
Christopher J. Ellis; John Fender
We combine Acemoglu and Robinsons model of the economic origins of democracy with Lohmanns model of political mass protest. This allows us to analyse the economic causes of political regime change based on the microfoundations of revolution. We are able to derive conditions under which democracy arises peacefully, when it occurs only after a revolution and when oligarchy persists. We model these possibilities in a world of asymmetric information, where information cascades are possible, and where these cascades may involve errors in the sense that they make everyone worse off.
International Tax and Public Finance | 2006
Christopher J. Ellis; John Fender
We develop a Ramsey type model of economic growth in which the “Engine of Growth” is public capital accumulation. Public capital is a public good, and is financed by taxes on private output. The government may either use the taxes gathered to fund public capital accumulation or consume the resourses itself; that is engage in corruption. There is an irreducable level of endogenously determined corruption which constitutes rents for which potential governments compete. This competition takes the form of choosing a time path for public capital invesment, which implies time paths for output and household consumption. We study both the model’s steady state, and dynamical behavior along the saddle path. The predictions of our theory accord well with the existent empirical evidence on the relationships between the level and growth rate of output, corruption, public investment and fiscal transparency. Our analysis also provides a perspective on the transition experiences of several Eastern European economies. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006
Journal of International Money and Finance | 2000
John Fender; Chong K. Yip
Abstract This paper builds a two-country intertemporal macroeconomic model similar to one developed recently by Obstfeld and Rogoff. Imperfectly competitive producer/consumers maximize an intertemporal utility function with consumption, real money balances and output as arguments. We use the framework to examine both the short-run and steady-state effects of the imposition of a tariff in one of the countries. This results in a fall in the tariff imposers output in both the steady state and in the short run. A small tariff may make a country worse off (contrary to the usual result under perfect competition). Spillover effects are also considered.
Quarterly Journal of Economics | 1985
Christopher J. Ellis; John Fender
A model of a single-commodity, closed economy is constructed in which the commodity price is fixed and its market clears by quantity adjustment. The distinctive feature is that the real wage and employment are determined by bargaining between unions, representing workers and firms. There are several possible regimes, some with labor hoarding. The effects of changes in autonomous spending and the reservation wage on the endogenous variables of the model, including employment and the real wage are discussed. Some interesting possibilities emerge for the cyclical movement of productivity and the real wage.
Journal of International Economics | 1994
John Fender; Chong K. Yip
Abstract This paper constructs a two country macroeconomic model where prices are set by imperfectly competitive firms and wages by trade unions. Unemployment benefit is nominally rigid in at least one country. The effects of monetary expansion under both fixed and flexible exchange rates, and exchange rate changes under fixed rates, are considered. The results change significantly if it is assumed that in one country unemployment benefit is fully indexed.
The Economic Journal | 1987
Christopher J. Ellis; John Fender
An open macroeconomic model where wages and employment are determinedby bargaining between a representative firm and a representative union is developed. The model is characterized by a number of regimes; in each of these regimes the effects of changes in the termsof trade and in government expenditure on employment, the real wage and the balance of trade are analyzed. It is of particular interest that under certain circumstances real wage resistance is exhibited-- that is, in response to a terms of trade deterioration, the real wagemay not decline and may even increase. Copyright 1987 by Royal Economic Society.
Public Money & Management | 1999
Peter Watt; John Fender
Local government finance has recently been the subject of a review, three consultation papers, a White Paper and major reports from both the House of Lords and House of Commons. This article examines current and feasible changes to the system of local government finance with particular reference to the effects they have on marginal and average accountability. Council tax capping, council tax benefit subsidy limitation, business rates and capital expenditure are among the topics discussed.
Journal of Macroeconomics | 1993
John Fender; Chong K. Yip
Abstract A two-period model of a closed economy is presented. Output is produced and sold by imperfectly competitive firms whose production technology may exhibit increasing returns to scale. Trade unions determine the wage rate in each period. Consumers maximize an intertemporal utility function and possess perfect foresight. The effects of changes in the money supply are analyzed; an expansionary monetary policy will, in general, raise output, employment and welfare, although the magnitude of the impact depends on whether the policy is permanent or temporary.
The Manchester School | 2014
Christopher J. Ellis; John Fender
A model where a dictator decides on both the level of public-sector capital and whether to democratize is constructed. Under dictatorship the labor market is monopsonistic; democratization involves instituting a competitive labor market. Workers sometimes have a credible threat of revolution and this may affect the dictator’s investment decision; it may also induce democratization. The possibility of a “political development trap”, where the dictator stifles development to stay in power, emerges. The model is used, inter alia, to explain the effects of the 1832 Reform Act in the UK and the worldwide positive correlation between income and democracy.