Detlef F. Sprinz

Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes

Although past research has emphasized the importance of international regimes for international governance, systematic assessments of regime effects are missing. This article derives a standardized measurement concept for the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. It is based on a simultaneous evaluation of actual policy against a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum. Subsequently, the empirical feasibility of the measurement concept is demonstrated by way of two international treaties regulating transboundary air pollution in Europe. The results demonstrate that the regimes indeed show positive effects—but fall substantially short of the collective optima.

Analyzing the ecosystem carbon dynamics of four European coniferous forests using a biogeochemistry model

AbstractThis paper provides the first steps toward a regional-scale analysis of carbon (C) budgets. We explore the ability of the ecosystem model BIOME-BGC to estimate the daily and annual C dynamics of four European coniferous forests and shifts in these dynamics in response to changing environmental conditions. We estimate uncertainties in the model results that arise from incomplete knowledge of site management history (for example, successional stage of forest). These uncertainties are especially relevant in regional-scale simulations, because this type of information is difficult to obtain. Although the model predicted daily C and water fluxes reasonably well at all sites, it seemed to have a better predictive capacity for the photosynthesis-related processes than for respiration. Leaf area index (LAI) was modeled accurately at two sites but overestimated at two others (as a result of poor long-term climate drivers and uncertainties in model parameterization). The overestimation of LAI (and consequently gross photosynthetic production (GPP)), in combination with reasonable estimates of the daily net ecosystem productivity (NEP) of those forests, also illustrates the problem with modeled respiration. The model results suggest that all four European forests have been net sinks of C at the rate of 100–300 gC/m2/y and that this C sequestration capacity would be 30%–70% lower without increasing nitrogen (N) deposition and carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations. The magnitude of the forest responses was dependent not only on the rate of changes in environmental factors, but also on site-specific conditions such as climate and soil depth. We estimated that the modeled C exchange at the study sites was reduced by 50%–100% when model simulations were performed for climax forests rather than regrowing forests. The estimates of water fluxes were less sensitive to different initializations of state variables or environmental change scenarios than C fluxes.

The Oslo-Potsdam Solution to Measuring Regime Effectiveness: Critique, Response, and the Road Ahead

In international regimes research, one of the most important questions is how effective regimes are in delivering what they were established and designed to achieve. Perhaps the most explicit and rigorous formula for measuring regime effectiveness is the so-called Oslo-Potsdam solution. This formula has recently been criticized by Oran Young, himself one of the founding fathers of regime analysis. The present article reviews and responds to his critique and provides several extensions of the Oslo-Potsdam solution. Our response may be summarized in three points. First, we recognize that difficult problems remain unsolved. Second, we argue that for some of the most profound problems there is no escape; we need to engage in counterfactual reasoning, and we need some notion of the best solution achievable (such as the collective optimum). Finally, we would welcome efforts to further develop and refine the Oslo-Potsdam formula as well as alternative approaches.

Implementing Long-Term Climate Policy: Time Inconsistency, Domestic Politics, International Anarchy

As a quintessential long-term policy problem, climate change poses two major challenges. The first is to develop, under considerable uncertainty, a plan for allocating resources over time to achieve an effective policy response. The second is to implement this plan, once arrived at, consistently over time. We consider the second of these two challenges, arguing that it consists of three interrelated, commitment problemsthe time inconsistency problem, the domestic politics problem, and the anarchy problem. We discuss each of these commitment problems in some detail, explore how they relate to climate policy, and suggest institutional designs that may help limit their adverse impact. While each of these commitment problems is difficult to tackle on its own, climate change requires us to cope with all of them at once. This is likely one major reason why we have so far made only modest headway on this vital issue.

The Effect of Global Environmental Regimes: A Measurement Concept

The article outlines a method to measure the effect which international regimes have on solving global environmental problems such as global climate change. By using political-economic cost/benefit analysis, a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum (lower and upper bounds) are derived. By comparing the actual performance of a regime to these bounds, a simple coefficient of regime effectiveness can be computed. After theoretically deriving the various bounds, the authors discuss the determining factors and provide guidance on how such a research agenda could be pursued empirically. The authors conclude with suggestions to further refine the measurement concept and its merit for public policy.

When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work

Previous research has documented only a modest success rate for imposed sanctions. By contrast, the success rate is higher in cases that are settled at the threat stage. In this article, the authors provide new insights about the circumstances under which sanctions cause behavioral change only after being imposed. First, the target must initially underestimate the impact of sanctions, miscalculate the senders determination to impose them, or wrongly believe that sanctions will be imposed and maintained whether it yields or not. Second, the targets misperceptions must be corrected after sanctions are imposed. A game-theoretical model with incomplete information is used to develop and clarify the argument.

Methods for Long-Term Environmental Policy Challenges

This article provides a concise overview of methods for analyzing policy choices that have been used in the study of long-term environmental challenges. We open with an overview of the broad classes of methods used for long-term policy analysis, and subsequent sections will describe in depth three particular methods. They are: statistical models, such as employed in the debate on the environmental Kuznets curve, which infer past patterns from data and project them into the future; robust decision-making, a decision analytic framework that supports choices under deep uncertainty, and relates near-term policy interventions to different clusters of long-term environmental futures; and adaptive control and agent-based modeling, which provide an approach to simulation modeling that focuses on cooperation and conflict among multiple actors and their choice of strategies. While all three approaches can be used for various applications, this article focuses on the challenge of a potential transition to a low-carbon future to illustrate the strengths, weaknesses, and synergies among the respective methods. In the final section, we offer guidance for choosing among methods.

Why the United States did not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol: German, Norwegian, and US perspectives

According to two-level game theory, negotiators tailor agreements at the international level to be ratifiable at the domestic level. This did not happen in the Kyoto negotiations, however, in the US case. We interviewed 26 German, Norwegian, and US participants in and observers of the climate negotiations concerning their views on three explanations for why the United States did not become a party to Kyoto. Explanation 1 argues that Kyoto delegations mistakenly thought the Senate was bluffing when adopting Byrd–Hagel. Explanation 2 contends that Europeans preferred a more ambitious agreement without US participation to a less ambitious agreement with US participation. Finally, explanation 3 suggests that in Kyoto the Clinton–Gore administration gave up on Senate ratification, and essentially pushed for an agreement that would provide them a climate-friendly face. While all explanations received some support from interviewees, explanation 1 and (particularly) explanation 3 received considerably more support than explanation 2.

Regime Effectiveness and the Oslo-Potsdam Solution: A Rejoinder to Oran Young

Fromourpoint of view, the exchange has been very rewarding. In this rejoinder, we brie‘ ysummarize our own position and identify some remaining issues where ourviews seem to differ from Oran Young’ s.First, we are encouraged by Young’ s evaluation that there are some attrac-tive features about the Oslo-Potsdam solution— in particular that it offers a con-ceptual framework producing a single effectiveness score bounded between 0and 1 which permits comparisons across regimes.Second, Young is correct in pointing out that there are multiple alternativeprocedures for evaluating regime

US presidents and the failure to ratify multilateral environmental agreements

Whereas the US President signed the Kyoto Protocol, the failure of the US Congress to ratify it seriously hampered subsequent international climate cooperation. This recent US trend, of signing environmental treaties but failing to ratify them, could thwart attempts to come to a future climate agreement. Two complementary explanations of this trend are proposed. First, the political system of the US has distinct institutional features that make it difficult for presidents to predict whether the Senate will give its advice and consent to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and whether Congress will pass the required enabling legislation. Second, elected for a fixed term, US presidents might benefit politically from supporting MEAs even when knowing that legislative support is not forthcoming. Four policy implications are explored, concerning the scope for unilateral presidential action, the potential for bipartisan congressional support, the effectiveness of a treaty without the US, and the prospects for a deep, new climate treaty. Policy relevance Why does the failure of US ratification of multilateral environmental treaties occur? This article analyses the domestic political mechanisms involved in cases of failed US ratification. US non-participation in global environmental institutions often has serious ramifications. For example, it sharply limited Kyotos effectiveness and seriously hampered international climate negotiations for years. Although at COP 17 in Durban the parties agreed to negotiate a new agreement by 2015, a new global climate treaty may well trigger a situation resembling the one President Clinton faced in 1997 when he signed Kyoto but never obtained support for it in the Senate. US failure to ratify could thwart future climate agreements.