Don Fallis

Indicators of accuracy for answers to ready reference questions on the internet

The Internet is increasingly being used as a source of reference information. Internet users need to be able to distinguish accurate information from inaccurate information. Toward this end, information professionals have published checklists for evaluating information. However, such checklists can be effective only if the proposed indicators of accuracy really do indicate accuracy. This study implements a technique for testing such indicators of accuracy and uses it to test indicators of accuracy for answers to ready reference questions. Many of the commonly proposed indicators of accuracy (e.g., that the Web site does not contain advertising) were not found to be correlated with accuracy. However, the link structure of the Internet can be used to identify Web sites that are more likely to contain accurate reference information.

Information ethics for twenty‐first century library professionals

Purpose – To provide an introduction to concepts and resources that will be useful to library professionals learning about information ethics.Design/methodology/approach – This paper argues for the importance of information ethics to twenty‐first century library professionals. It describes what various authors have said about how information ethics can be applied to the ethical dilemmas faced by library professionals.Findings – In order to deal effectively with their ethical dilemmas, library professionals must have a good working knowledge of information ethics. Codes of professional ethics can help to provide such knowledge, but they are not sufficient. Courses on information ethics must be part of the education of information professionals. Such courses should provide library professionals with an understanding of ethical theories and how they apply to concrete practical cases. Such courses should also make explicit the connection between information ethics and the mission of the library professional.R...

Intentional Gaps In Mathematical Proofs

A central question in the philosophy of mathematics is: How do mathematicians know that mathematical propositions are true? The standard answer is that a mathematician knows that a proposition is true because she knows a proof of that proposition. Of course, this answer leaves a couple of important things unexplained. First, how does the mathematician know that the axioms that her proof appeals to (e.g., the axiom of choice) are true? Second, how does the mathematician know that the rules of inference that her proof appeals to (e.g., the law of the excluded middle) are truth preserving? A lot of work in the philosophy of mathematics has gone into trying to give answers to these two questions (see, e.g., Maddy 1988). In this paper, I argue that even if we had completely satisfactory answers to these two questions, we would still not have a completely satisfactory explanation of how mathematicians actually know on the basis of proof that mathematical propositions are true. The reason is that mathematicians often intentionally leave gaps in their proofs.

The ethical presuppositions behind the library bill of rights

The American Library Associations (ALAs) Library Bill of Rights is based on a foundation of ethical presuppositions. In this article, these presuppositions are spelled out and critically examined in light of several ethical theories (for example, utilitarianism, natural rights theory, and social contract theory). We suggest that social contract theory provides the strongest argument for a right to access to information (and to have that information provided by public libraries). We argue, however, that the right to access to information is not unlimited. Limiting access (including censorship) is appropriate, for example, when such a limitation is necessary to protect a more fundamental right. Finally, we argue that the ALAs advocacy of an unlimited right to access is based on a mistaken understanding of what follows from the fact that all of our judgments are fallible.

Epistemic Value Theory and Information Ethics

Three of the major issues in information ethics – intellectual property, speech regulation, and privacy – concern the morality of restricting people’s access to certain information. Consequently, policies in these areas have a significant impact on the amount and types of knowledge that people acquire. As a result, epistemic considerations are critical to the ethics of information policy decisions (cf. Mill, 1978 [1859]). The fact that information ethics is a part of the philosophy of information highlights this important connection with epistemology. In this paper, I illustrate how a value-theoretic approach to epistemology can help to clarify these major issues in information ethics. However, I also identify several open questions about epistemic values that need to be answered before we will be able to evaluate the epistemic consequences of many information policies.

Epistemic Values and Information Management

The philosophy of information is concerned with the nature, management, and use of information. Thus, it should be able to help us make better decisions about how to manage information (e.g., decisions about intellectual property laws, collection development policies, and Internet evaluation techniques). These decisions have knowledge acquisition as one of their principal goals. Thus, one way to improve these decisions is to clarify our epistemic values. In this article, we combine epistemology and decision analysis in an attempt to assist people in this important task.

Attitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of Experiments

Several different Bayesian models of epistemic utilities (see, e.g., [37], [24], [40], [46]) have been used to explain why it is rational for scientists to perform experiments. In this paper, I argue that a model–suggested independently by Patrick Maher [40] and Graham Oddie [46]–that assigns epistemic utility to degrees of belief in hypotheses provides the most comprehensive explanation. This is because this proper scoring rule (PSR) model captures a wider range of scientifically acceptable attitudes toward epistemic risk than the other Bayesian models that have been proposed. I also argue, however, that even the PSR model places unreasonably tight restrictions on a scientist’s attitude toward epistemic risk. As a result, such Bayesian models of epistemic utilities fail as normative accounts–not just as descriptive accounts (see, e.g., [31], [14])–of scientific inquiry.

Collective Epistemic Goals

We all pursue epistemic goals as individuals. But we also pursue collective epistemic goals. In the case of many groups to which we belong, we want each member of the group – and sometimes even the group itself – to have as many true beliefs as possible and as few false beliefs as possible. In this paper, I respond to the main objections to the very idea of such collective epistemic goals. Furthermore, I describe the various ways that our collective epistemic goals can come into conflict with each other. And I argue that we must appeal to pragmatic considerations in order to resolve such conflicts.

Introduction: Social Epistemology and Information Science

Most of our knowledge is acquired through communication with other members of society rather than through direct observation of the world. Much of this sociallyacquired knowledge is transmitted via recorded information (books, journals, websites, etc.). Libraries and other information services facilitate knowledge acquisition by collecting, organizing and providing access to this recorded information. Fifty years ago, two information scientists, Margaret Egan and Jesse Shera, claimed that in order for libraries and other information services to effectively carry out this epistemic task, ‘a new discipline must be created that will provide a framework for the effective investigation of the whole complex problem of the intellectual processes of society’ (Egan and Shera, 1952). The name that they gave to this new discipline was social epistemology. 1 According to Egan and Shera, ‘the focus of attention for the

Lies, damned lies, and statistics: An empirical investigation of the concept of lying

There are many philosophical questions surrounding the notion of lying. Is it ever morally acceptable to lie? Can we acquire knowledge from people who might be lying to us? More fundamental, however, is the question of what, exactly, constitutes the concept of lying. According to one traditional definition, lying requires intending to deceive (Augustine. (1952). Lying (M. Muldowney, Trans.). In R. Deferrari (Ed.), Treatises on various subjects (pp. 53–120). New York, NY: Catholic University of America). More recently, Thomas Carson (2006. The definition of lying. Nous, 40, 284–306) has suggested that lying requires warranting the truth of what you do not believe. This paper examines these two prominent definitions and some cases that seem to pose problems for them. Importantly, theorists working on this topic fundamentally disagree about whether these problem cases are genuine instances of lying and, thus, serve as counterexamples to the definitions on offer. To settle these disputes, we elicited judgments about the proposed counterexamples from ordinary language users unfettered by theoretical bias. The data suggest that everyday speakers of English count bald-faced lies and proviso lies as lies. Thus, we claim that a new definition is needed to capture common usage. Finally, we offer some suggestions for further research on this topic and about the moral implications of our investigation into the concept of lying.