Kay Mathiesen

Introduction to Special Issue of Social Epistemology on “Collective Knowledge and Collective Knowers”

Taylor and Francis SEP_A_267243.sgm 10.1080/0 91720701673934 Social Epistemology 0269-1728 (pri t)/1464-5297 (online) Original Article 2 07 & Francis 1 3 000July-Sep ember 2007 K M th es kmathies@ema .arizona.edu We freely attribute doxastic and epistemic features to groups. Perusing some recent headlines, one finds such statements as “Outsourcing giant Infosis believes it’s the new model,” “Pakistan believes consensus on IPI gas tariff likely,” “Scientists believe photos show evidence of flowing water on Mars,” “Privacy board knows the number of Americans targeted by NSA,” “Michelin knows how to keep its cool,” “France knows Nascar,” and “NBC knows what it wants.” Of course, one might worry that such talk is too much like the following headlines: “Ethernet knows where it is going” and “Nature knows the parents children need.” These attributions are clearly using “knows” in a metaphorical sense and are, thus, not properly the concern of epistemology. Questions such as “Did the ethernet come to such knowledge via a reliable process?,” “Does nature have propositional or non-propositional knowledge about how to assign parents to children?,” or “Is the ethernet certain or does it just assign a high probability to its reaching its destination?” are clearly out of place. Such questions about group knowledge and other group epistemic features, however, are not so obviously out of place. Indeed, given that our epistemic lives are increasingly dependent on complex social systems of investigation and dissemination of knowledge, not only is such epistemic investigation of social groups possible, it is essential. The premise of this special issue of Social Epistemology is that we can use the tools of epistemology to understand the nature of group knowledge and other group epistemic features. In taking social groups seriously as epistemic agents, we are advocating a novel (although not unprecedented) approach. The standing assumptions of analytic epistemology have been that

Human Rights for the Digital Age

Human rights are those legal and/or moral rights that all persons have simply as persons. In the current digital age, human rights are increasingly being either fulfilled or violated in the online environment. In this article, I provide a way of conceptualizing the relationships between human rights and information technology. I do so by pointing out a number of misunderstandings of human rights evident in Vinton Cerfs recent argument that there is no human right to the Internet. I claim that Cerf fails to recognize the existence of derived human rights. I argue further that we need to consider what other human rights are necessitated by the digital age. I suggest we need a Declaration of Digital Rights. As a step toward the development of such a declaration, I suggest a framework for thinking through how to ensure the human rights are satisfied in digital contexts.

Human rights as a topic and guide for LIS research and practice

In this global information age, accessing, disseminating, and controlling information is an increasingly important aspect of human life. Often, these interests are expressed in the language of human rights—for example, rights to expression, privacy, and intellectual property. As the discipline concerned with “facilitating the effective communication of desired information between human generator and human user” (Belkin, 1975, p. 22), library and information science (LIS) has a central role in facilitating communication about human rights and ensuring the respect for human rights in information services and systems. This paper surveys the literature at the intersection of LIS and human rights. To begin, an overview of human rights conventions and an introduction to human rights theory is provided. Then the intersections between LIS and human rights are considered. Three central areas of informational human rights—communication, privacy, and intellectual property—are discussed in detail. It is argued that communication rights in particular serve as a central linchpin in the system of human rights.

Facets of Access: A Conceptual and Standard Threats Analysis

The concept of information access is central to both Library and Information Science and to human rights discourse and practice. This paper offers a definition of information access and proposes a relational understanding of it. Using a “standard threat analysis,” based on the work of political philosopher Henry Shue (1996), the access relation is analyzed in terms of five facets: (1) availability, (2) reachability, (3) findability, (4) comprehensibility, and (5) useability. It is shown how this theory can be synthesized with another prominent account of access (Burnett, Jaeger, and Thompson, 2008) to create a rubric to guide the evaluation and creation of information systems and services that satisfy the human right to information access.

Informational justice: a conceptual framework for social justice in library and information services

This article presents a conceptual framework of social justice for library and information science (LIS) and services responsive to their core concerns and drawing from the disciplinary literatures in both philosophy and LIS. The framework is introduced in terms of the multifaceted concept of informational justice, defined as the just treatment of persons as seekers, sources, and subjects of information. The article also expands on the central aspect of informational justice, namely iDistributive justice, defined as the equitable distribution of access to information. An iDistributively just system is one that ensures all persons have sufficient access to information, where access is understood as a capability sensitive resource.

Toward a Political Philosophy of Information

Many of the most pressing issues in information ethics—informational privacy, surveillance, intellectual property, access to information, and the distribution of information resources—can only be addressed at the level of global politics. This paper develops an approach to theorizing about political questions of concern to information ethics. It begins by situating a political philosophy of information within the broader field of ethics and defending a theoretical approach that is practical, person-centered, and pluralistic. The method of dialogic public reason, as articulated by John Rawls and supplemented with insights from Jürgen Habermas, is described and defended. It is argued that dialogic public reason provides a way to justify political principles in a diverse global context. The paper concludes by relating the idea of dialogic public reason to international human rights. The putative human right to intellectual property is criticized on the grounds that it does not pass the test of public reason.

Veritistic Epistemology and the Epistemic Goals of Groups: A Reply to Vähämaa

In his “Groups as Epistemic Communities: Social Forces and Affect as Antecedents to Knowledge,” Vähämaa claims that the epistemic goal of most groups is a “shared understanding of how things are.” Moreover, he criticizes Fallis’s article on “Collective Epistemic Goals” for taking true beliefs to be an epistemic goal of groups. In this note, we argue that there is really no deep disagreement between the two articles. Any impression that there is is based on a misunderstanding of Fallis’s article and/or of the larger project of veritistic epistemology.

Human Rights without Cultural Imperialism

Abstract Purpose To discuss the problem of cultural imperialism as it relates to human rights and to provide a framework for applying human rights to Library and Information Services (LIS) so as to respect diverse worldviews. Methodology/approach The chapter is theoretical in nature but also draws out important practical implications. The problem is described and addressed using the approach of philosophical ethics emphasizing moral pluralism. Political and moral theories are compared and lessons drawn from them for LIS practice. Findings Drawing on the work of philosopher Jacques Maritain (1949) as well as contemporary human rights theory, an understanding of human rights as pluralistic and evolving practical principles is developed. Using Maritain’s conception of human rights as a set of common principles of action, guidelines for applying human rights in ways that avoid cultural imperialism are provided. Social implications The findings of this chapter should assist LIS professionals in understanding the relationship between human rights and cultural diversity. In addition, it gives professionals a framework for understanding and applying human rights in a ways that respects cultural diversity. Originality/value This chapter develops an original approach to applying human rights in a way that respects cultural diversity.

Philosophy and information science: The basics

Judging by the reception of recent special issues of Social Epistemology (16, no. 1, 2002), Library Trends (52, no. 3, 2004), and the Journal of Documentation (61, no. 1, 2005), current levels of interest in philosophical topics among information scientists are high. Yet it can be difficult for the non-specialist to gain effective entry to a literature that is sometimes perceived to have limited practical application and to be characterized by a forbidding technical vocabulary. In this panel session, four speakers with expertise in both information science and philosophy (Fallis, Ph.D. Philosophy, UC Irvine; Furner, M.A. Philosophy, Cambridge; Mathiesen, Ph.D. Philosophy, UC Irvine; Renear, Ph.D. Philosophy, Brown) will introduce attendees to the disciplinary intersection of the two fields by considering current issues, inviting comments, and provoking discussion among the panelists and the audience. The general questions to be discussed will include the following: What can information scientists learn from the advances being made in contemporary analytical philosophy? What relevance do ontology, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of art have for the practicing information professional? What distinguishes “philosophy of information” from related fields? What are the issues and trends that are revealed as significant when we look at information-related phenomena, practices, and scholarship from a philosophical viewpoint? What are the various ways in which taking a philosophical approach can help us to understand information-related problems? How may philosophical work in information science be evaluated? And in what directions is such work likely to proceed in the future?