Don Harris

Distributed situation awareness in dynamic systems: theoretical development and application of an ergonomics methodology

The purpose of this paper is to propose foundations for a theory of situation awareness based on the analysis of interactions between agents (i.e. both human and non-human) in subsystems. This approach may help to promote a better understanding of technology-mediated interaction in systems, as well as helping in the formulation of hypotheses and predictions concerning distributed situation awareness. It is proposed that agents within a system each hold their own situation awareness, which may be very different from (although compatible with) that of other agents. It is argued that we should not always hope for, or indeed want, sharing of this awareness, as different system agents have different purposes. This view marks situation awareness as a dynamic and collaborative process binding agents together on tasks on a moment-by-moment basis. Implications of this viewpoint for the development of a new theory of, and accompanying methodology for, distributed situation awareness are offered.

Engineering Psychology and Cognitive Ergonomics

Engineering psychology and cognitive ergonomics , Engineering psychology and cognitive ergonomics , کتابخانه دیجیتال جندی شاپور اهواز

Distributed situation awareness in an Airborne Warning and Control System: application of novel ergonomics methodology

This paper applies a distributed theory of situation awareness based upon the analysis of interactions between agents (both human and non-human) in an Airborne Warning and Control System (Boeing E3D Sentry). The basic tenet of this approach is that agents within a system each hold their own component(s) of situation awareness, which may be very different from, but compatible with, other agent’s view of the situation. However, it is argued that it is not always necessary to have complete sharing of this awareness, as different system agents have different purposes. Situation awareness is regarded as a dynamic and collaborative process that binds agents together on tasks on a moment-by-moment basis. Situation awareness is conceptualised as residing at a system, not an individual level. Data were collected from crew-members in theE3D during a series of simulated air battles. These data pertained to task structure, communications between the crew and the collection and analysis of crew actions at critical decision points. All phases of operations were considered. From these data propositional networks were developed in which key knowledge objects were identified. Analysis of these networks clearly shows how the location and nature of distributed situation awareness changes across agents with regard to the phase of operation/air battle.

A human‐centred design agenda for the development of single crew operated commercial aircraft

Purpose – This paper aims to make a case that with the appropriate use of human factors methods it is possible to design and develop a single crew commercial aircraft using largely existing technology.Design/methodology/approach – From a review of the literature it is suggested that some of the functions of the non‐flying pilot would be better assumed by either onboard automation or ground‐based systems.Findings – It is argued that the design of the flight deck and the role of the pilot require re‐conceptualising to accommodate the requirements for flying a highly automated aircraft single‐handed. With such re‐design, considerable efficiency gains will be achieved, but to fully realise these gains a system‐wide approach is required which extends beyond the design of the aircraft per se.Research limitations/implications – This is only a high‐level thought piece to stimulate debate. Much greater consideration of all the issues raised is required, as is a change in regulatory requirements.Practical implicati...

Predicting Design Induced Pilot Error Using HET (Human Error Template) -- A New Formal Human Error Identification Method for Flight Decks

Human factors certification criteria are being developed for large civil aircraft with the objective of reducing the incidence of design-induced error on the flight deck. Many formal error identification techniques currently exist which have been developed in non-aviation contexts but none have been validated for use to this end. This paper describes a new human error identification technique (HET - human error template) designed specifically as a diagnostic tool for the identification of design-induced error on the flight deck. HET is benchmarked against three existing techniques (SHERPA systematic human error reduction and prediction approach; human error HAZOP - hazard and operability study; and HEIST - human error In systems tool). HET outperforms all three existing techniques in a validation study comparing predicted errors to actual errors reported during an approach and landing task in a modern, highly automated commercial aircraft. It is concluded that HET should provide a useful tool as a adjunct to the proposed human factors certification process. Language: en

The future flight deck: Modelling dual, single and distributed crewing options

It is argued that the barrier to single pilot operation is not the technology, but the failure to consider the whole socio-technical system. To better understand the socio-technical system we model alternative single pilot operations using Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) and analyse those models using Social Network Analysis (SNA). Four potential models of single pilot operations were compared to existing two pilot operations. Using SOCA-CAT from CWA, we were able to identify the potential functional loading and interactions between networks of agents. The interactions formed the basis on the SNA. These analyses potentially form the basis for distributed system architecture for the operation of a future aircraft. The findings from the models suggest that distributed crewing option could be at least as resilient, in network architecture terms, as the current dual crewing operations.

Aviation as a system of systems: Preface to the special issue of human factors in aviation

Aviation is a system of systems. Maier (1998) characterised a ‘system of systems’ as possessing five basic traits: operational independence of elements; managerial independence of elements; evolutionary development; possessing emergent behaviour; having a geographical distribution of elements. In the context of aviation, these systems have distinct operational independence (aircraft operations; maintenance; air traffic management/control) and each of these aspects has managerial independence (they are offered by independent companies or national providers); however, they are bound by a set of common operating principles and international regulations for design and operation. All aspects of aviation encompass technical, human and organisational aspects. It is a sociotechnical ‘system of systems’ encompassing critical human factors considerations such as usability, training, design, maintenance, safety, procedures, communications, workload and automation. It is fair to say, though, that the aviation ‘system of systems’ was never designed, it is a legacy system that has evolved over the past century. All the components in aviation are themselves open systems (i.e. they must interact with their environment). Open Systems Theory is derived from General Systems Theory (von Berthalanfry 1956); however, these organisations are only selectively open, in that they interact with their environment but also need boundaries in order to exist. For example, civil airlines operate into a wide range of airports (none of which they own), aircraft maintenance is often provided by third parties, aircraft ramp servicing is almost invariably provided by a range of external suppliers and air traffic management/ air traffic control (ATC) is provided by the air traffic service providers from the countries into which they either operate or overfly. In the operation of civil aircraft, there are a great number of interand intraorganisational boundaries that information and resources must cross in this system of systems. Leveson (2002, 2004) has proposed that the nature by which systems of systems remain in a dynamic equilibrium is via the control and communication of constraints. In Systems-Theoretical Accident Model and Processes, accidents are considered to result from inadequate control or enforcement of safety-related constraints (occurring during the design, development or operation of the system) and not from individual or component failures. Safety is a product of control structures embedded in an adaptive socio-technical system. Accidents are viewed as control failures. The papers in this special issue of Ergonomics address all aspects of the aviation system. Some adopt a macro-ergonomics approach investigating system-wide issues in the safe operation of aircraft. Other papers are much more focused in their aims and objectives, addressing a very specific issue in human performance. However, all papers can be viewed from a wider, socio-technical system perspective.

The Influence of Human Factors on Operational Efficiency

Purpose – To describe how airline operational efficiency may be improved by adopting a socio‐technical systems approach which emphasises and integrates the role of human factors within a wider context.Design/methodology/approach – After describing what is meant by a socio‐technical system, the paper uses four short case studies to illustrate the benefits and dis‐benefits of using (or failing to use) a socio‐technical systems approach.Findings – Readers are encouraged to acknowledge the role of the human being in a wider system context. It is also suggested that improving individual aspects of airline operations in isolation may not actually improve overall efficiency.Research/limitations/implications – The case studies discussed are meant to be illustrative of the socio‐technical systems approach rather than an authoritative review of the area.Practical implications – The practical implications of adopting a socio‐technical systems view of improvements aimed at improving efficiency are emphasised in that ...

Human factors for civil flight deck design

Contents: Flight Deck Design: Flight deck design and integration for commercial air transports, Brian D. Kelly Flight deck design process, Florence Reuzeau and RenA(c) Nibbelke Using cognitive function analysis to prevent controlled flight into terrain, Guy A. Boy and Daniel Ferro Head-down flight deck display design, Don Harris Head-up displays, Christopher D. Wickens, Patricia May Ververs and Steve Fadden Warning system design in civil aircraft, Jan M. Noyes, Alison F. Starr and Mandana L.N. Kazem Handling qualities and their implications for flight deck design, Edmund Field On the other side of promise: what should we automate today?, Sidney Dekker Anthropometrics for flight deck design, Ted Lovesey Stressors in the flight deck environment, Don Harris. Flight Deck Evaluation: Evaluating the flight deck, Peter G.A.M. Jorna and Piet J. Hoogeboom Human factors in flight test and flight deck evaluation, Gideon Singer Assessing the human hazard, Hazel Courteney Index.

Development of a bespoke human factors taxonomy for gliding accident analysis and its revelations about highly inexperienced UK glider pilots

Low-hours solo glider pilots have a high risk of accidents compared to more experienced pilots. Numerous taxonomies for causal accident analysis have been produced for powered aviation but none of these is suitable for gliding, so a new taxonomy was required. A human factors taxonomy specifically for glider operations was developed and used to analyse all UK gliding accidents from 2002 to 2006 for their overall causes as well as factors specific to low hours pilots. Fifty-nine categories of pilot-related accident causation emerged, which were formed into progressively larger categories until four overall human factors groups were arrived at: ‘judgement’; ‘handling’; ‘strategy’; ‘attention’. ‘Handling’ accounted for a significantly higher proportion of injuries than other categories. Inexperienced pilots had considerably more accidents in all categories except ‘strategy’. Approach control (path judgement, airbrake and speed handling) as well as landing flare misjudgement were chiefly responsible for the high accident rate in early solo glider pilots. Statement of Relevance: This paper uses extant accident data to produce a taxonomy of underlying human factors causes to analyse gliding accidents and identify the specific causes associated with low hours pilots. From this specific, well-targeted remedial measures can be identified.