Donald Barry

Defense against Help: Explaining Canada-U.S. Security Relations

A core concept in international relations theory, especially among realists, is that to survive in an anarchical world, states must rely on self-help. As John Mearsheimer explains, [S]tates cannot depend on others for their own security. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival.... This emphasis on self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances. But alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: todays alliance partner might be tomorrows enemy, and todays enemy might be tomorrows alliance partner. (1) Self-help may apply to great powers, but it loses its explanatory force when extended to smaller states. As Robert Rothstein points out, lesser states are not simply Great Powers writ small. (2) John Holmes observes that the foreign policy ... of a middle power is generically different from that of a great power, let alone a superpower. (3) Small states, Rothstein adds, think and act differently, and any analysis which fails to take that fact into account is bound to be simplistic and inadequate. (4) What sets lesser states apart from their great-power counterparts is that they cannot obtain security primarily by the use of their own resources and that they have to rely fundamentally on outside help to maintain their independence. (5) It is clear that self-help does not reflect Canadas security reality. Canada shares a continent with its superpower neighbor, the United States, against which war is inconceivable. In fact, the United States serves as a powerful deterrent to external threats to Canadas safety. But while Canada relies on American power for its protection, the United States also depends on Canada--with its crucial land, air, and maritime approaches--for its own safety. In short, Canada-U.S. security is interdependent. It follows that Canada cannot ignore U.S. safety requirements, nor can Canada easily isolate itself from the consequences of American security decisions. Canada, therefore, participates in North American defense not only to deter possible external threats but also to ensure national control over the Canadian territory in the face of possible demands from the United States. (6) Canada does so through defense against help, a strategy articulated by Nils Orvik, by which a mid- or small-sized state maintains a sufficient level of defense unilaterally, or in cooperation with a large state that is committed to its safety, to avoid unwanted help from the large state. (7) Defining Defense Against Help In Canada, defense against help is a policy response to that nations somewhat unconventional security dilemma, the essence of which is that the United States, in the process of guaranteeing Canadas safety, could itself become a security threat. If Canada were to become a strategic liability to the United States through military weakness or otherwise, Washington could take any measures deemed necessary for its own defense, regardless of Ottawas preferences. (8) Moreover, if Canada failed to contribute to North American defense, Ottawa would forfeit opportunities to affect U.S. strategic policy decisions on which Canadas safety ultimately depends. The significance of the defense against help strategy in Canadian policy is evident in what can be called the U.S.-Canada security bargain, the elements of which were first publicly expressed in statements exchanged between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King in 1938. These statements, which still constitute the core of U.S.-Canada strategic obligations, reveal both similarities and differences in the two countries priorities and preoccupations. President Roosevelt expressly committed the United States to the defense of Canada, giving the assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire. …

Chrétien, Bush, and the War in Iraq

The war in Iraq overshadowed Canada-U.S. relations during the Chretien-Bush years. Prime Minister Jean Chretiens refusal to support the U.S.-led invasion to remove Saddam Husseins regime from power without the backing of the United Nations enjoyed solid parliamentary and public support. But conservative commentators, politicians, and the business community criticized the government for substituting process for policy, letting down its closest ally, and risking American retaliation. Bush administration officials expressed disappointment and hinted at possible damage to the relationship. (1) This essay examines the rift between the Chretien and Bush governments over Iraq. It argues that Chretiens decision to stand aside reflected a deep skepticism about President George Bushs case for war. (2) As the Canadian government saw it, the U.S. administrations contention that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction was uncertain at best. Ottawas calls for a vigorous UN inspection program and Security Council sanction were aimed at subjecting the claim to international scrutiny and decision. Chretien judged correctly that the close intertwining of the Canadian and U.S. economies made substantive retaliation unlikely. However, anti-Bush rhetoric from members of the governing party complicated the management of the Iraq issue and irritated the president, who canceled a planned visit to Ottawa in the spring of 2003. At a deeper level, the issue appears to have widened differences in values and outlook between the two countries, and complicated Prime Minister Paul Martins efforts to improve Canada-U.S. relations. Setting the Stage It is generally agreed that relations between Canada and the U.S. deteriorated in the post-2000 period. Many observers attribute this to the philosophical gulf between the Chretien and Bush governments, the implication being that dealings would improve when one or both of them was replaced. (3) Underlying this, however, were two factors that conditioned the management of the relationship and the handling of the Iraq war. The first was the growing divergence between values and worldviews of the Canadian and American publics in the post-cold war era, despite the steadily increasing integration of the two countries. Michael Adams has argued that Canadians became more socially liberal, skeptical of traditional authority, and supportive of a cooperative approach to the resolution of international issues. Americans, by contrast, became more socially conservative, deferential to authority in a highly competitive national environment, and inclined to a survival of the fittest view of the world. (4) In international affairs this could be seen in Canadians embrace of a multilateral, rules-based order and the American view, which relied more on power and less on cooperation and the expanding role of international law in pursuing U.S. interests abroad. (5) Chretien sometimes went out of his way to highlight Canadas policy differences with the U.S., a practice he defended as good domestic politics. (6) The second factor was the impact of the attacks upon the U.S. by al Qaeda terrorists on September 11, 2001. The attacks created a profound sense of vulnerability among Americans and elevated security to the top of Washingtons agenda. Bush made cooperation in the war on terrorism the litmus test of other countries relations with the U.S., saying Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. (7) Chretien declared that while Ottawa would stand with the U.S., the laws of Canada will be passed by the Parliament of Canada. (8) Canadian officials took the lead in drafting a plan to increase border security and facilitate low-risk trade and travel, which became the basis of the Smart Border Declaration, signed by Deputy Prime Minister John Manley and Director of Homeland Security Tom Ridge, in December 2001. The Canadian government demonstrated its commitment by announcing a

Regionalism, multilateralism, and the politics of global trade

7 billion (Cdn) program over five years. …

Canada's Department of External Affairs

Preface / Rt. Hon. Joe Clark Acknowledgments Acronyms Introduction: Changing Perspectives on Regionalism and Multilateralism / Donald Barry and Ronald C. Keith Part 1: Regionalism, Globalism, and the State 1. A Matter of Synergy: The Role of Regional Agreements in the Multilateral Trading Order / Michael Hart 2. Regionalism and the Evolving Global Trade System / Gilbert R. Winham 3. Globalization, Regionalism, and the Analysis of Domestic Public Policy / William D. Coleman and Anthony Perl Part 2: Dynamics of Regional Integration 4. The European Union as a Regional System / Charles C. Pentland 5. The Dynamics of Integration in the Americas: A Look at the Political Economy of NAFTA Expansion / Robert K. McCleery 6. APECs Evolving Trade Structure / Steve Chan Part 3: Interregional Relations 7. The European Union and the United States: A New Balance of Influence in the Global Political Economy / Carolyn Rhodes 8. North American-Asian Relations, Asian Regionalism, and the Future of Asia Pacific Regionalism / Charles E. Morrison 9. ASEM: Toward the Institutionalization of the East Asia-Europe Relationship? / Richard Higgott Part 4: Whither Canada? 10. Thinking Globally, Acting Regionally: Assessing Canadas Response to Regionalism / Tom Keating 11. The Pursuit of Economic Architecture by Diplomatic Means: The Case of Canada in Europe / Denis Stairs 12. Playing by the Rules? Canadas APEC Policy / Ronald C. Keith and Patricia L. Maclachlan Part 5: Summing Up 13. A World of Regions, or a Single Trade Order? / Charles F. Doran Contributors Index