Peter McKenna

Canada and the OAS: From dilettante to full partner.

Since the early 1900s, Canadas relations with the inter-American community have not engendered a great deal of attention among policy-makers and opinion-makers in Canada. For the most part, Canadas involvement in the hemisphere has consistently occupied a low priority in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy. However, the issue of Canadas association with inter-American political institutions--namely, the Pan American Union (PAU) and the Organization of American States (OAS)--has tended to dominate Canadian-Latin American relations. More specifically, the question of Canadian membership in these bodies has been not only a recurring issue, but also a contentious one.

Canada and Structural Adjustment in the South: The Significance of the Guyana Case

ABSTRACT During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Canadian government became a strong supporter of IFI-designed Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) for indebted Southern states, and altered its aid priorities accordingly. Despite the significance of this shift, however, little effort has been made to explain it theoretically. This paper addresses this gap through a case study of Canadas lead role in facilitating Structural Adjustment in Guyana. Several alternative theoretical explanations for Canadas role in North-South relations are set out. They are then applied to its role in Guyana. The authors argue that this case is best explained primarily through insights from a “historical materialist” approach, emphasizing the influence of hegemonic ideas and consensus, and secondarily a “middle power” approach, highlighting “niche-playing,” multilateralism, and “bridge-building.”

The Chrétien years: Evaluating ‘constructive engagement’

Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (The Globe and Mail, 1998: A2). A fair amount of media attention has focused on the strained nature of Canadian-Cuban relations under the conservative government of Stephen Harper. Just prior to the opening of the Fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, to which Cuba was not invited, Prime Minister Harper discussed Cuba’s absence with Fox News in the context of his credentials as an “anti-Communist Conservative” (Clark, 2009: A12). For his part, Fidel Castro, writing in the pages of state-run Granma, wrote scathingly of PM Harper as “an openly rightist man and the only one to have been ill mannered toward Cuba” (Castro, 2009: 1). By mid-May 2009, the Cubans had decided to cancel abruptly a scheduled visit to Havana by Peter Kent, Canada’s Minister of State for the Americas, and Ottawa reciprocated by delaying a visitor’s visa to Rodrigo Malmierca, Cuba’s Minister for Trade and Investment (Curry, 2009: A3; Kirk & McKenna, 2009). This ongoing bilateral discord perfectly captures how not to structure or conduct Canada-Cuba relations in a post-Fidel Castro and Barack Obama era. In sharp contrast, the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien (1993-2003) removed Canada’s Cuba policy from a similar deep freeze during the Brian Mulroney years, and embraced a policy of constructively engaging the Cubans across a wide range of policy areas, particularly during the first five years. Gone were the shrill rhetoric, the pro-Washington policy prism, the severely curtailed diplomatic and ministerial contact, and the non-existent development assistance programme—to say nothing of the embarrassingly paltry sums of hurricane relief dollars (Kirk & McKenna, 1997: 122-145). Instead, Chrétien’s Liberal government embarked on a strikingly different policy course—namely, one that emphasized contact over contempt, engagement over avoidance, and dialogue over virtual silence. In a word, Canada-Cuba relations would be framed in the context of a normal bilateral relationship, with its typical fits and starts. The central idea was a firm belief that engaging— rather than haranguing and ostracizing—the Cubans was the best way of fostering meaningful and positive political and economic change in Cuba. 81

Canadian‐Cuban Relations: Is the honeymoon over?

Over the last three years or so, Canadian‐Cuban relations have hit upon a bit of a rough patch in the bilateral road. This paper attempts to examine the current “icy” state of bilateral relations‐with a particular focus on the tenure of John Manley, when he held the Foreign Affairs portfolio. It seeks to discuss and account for the recent shift‐albeit more rhetorical than substantive‐in the Canada‐ Cuba relationship under Manley. It also strives to shed some explanatory light on how the Cubans see the current frosty state of bilateral relations. Finally, it concludes with a brief discussion of what the immediate future of Canadian‐Cuban relations is likely to look like.

How is Canada doing in tile OAS

Canada has undertaken a number of important initiatives in its first three years as a charter member of the Organization of American States (OAS). In addition to examining Canadas role in the Haitian crisis and, to a lesser extent, in Peru, this article looks at a host of smaller initiatives in areas such as the encouragement of democracy, OAS reform, human rights, and arms control. It concludes that Canadas commitment to making the OAS more active and responsive has increased the credibility of the institution.

Canada and Latin America: 150 years later

ABSTRACT The article examines Canada’s long-standing relationship with the Americas since Confederation. It focuses on various Canadian governments and their policies/initiatives toward the region. It also outlines the various explanatory reasons for why Ottawa has had an on-again, off-again relationship with the hemisphere. Lastly, the submission offers some policy suggestions to the present Trudeau government on how best to craft an effective Americas policy.

Nicaragua and The Esquipulas II Accord: Setting The Record Straight

AbstractThe signing of the August 1987 Esquipulas II Accord was heralded as a major achievement in Central American political life. All five sitting governments pledged their support for the various provisions of the Guatemala accord. Interesingly enough, it has been the tiny country of Nicaragua which has been singled out by the court of world opinion as the linch-pin of the Central American peace process. Many observers, from inside and outside of government, have focused their energies almost exclusively on how Nicaragua has sought to fulfil its obligations under the Guatemala accord. The compliance or non-compliance record of the ruling Sandinistas has, in effect, been subjected to intense international and media scrutiny. While much has been said and written about Nicaraguas failure to comply with the terms of the Esquipulas II accord, there is little evidence to support such a contention. In fact, the Ortega government has exhibited a remarkable willingness to fulfill, and indeed surpass, the lette...