Donald Braman

The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception Commons: Culture Conflict, Rationality Conflict, and Climate Change

The conventional explanation for controversy over climate change emphasizes impediments to public understanding: Limited popular knowledge of science, the inability of ordinary citizens to assess technical information, and the resulting widespread use of unreliable cognitive heuristics to assess risk. A large survey of U.S. adults (N = 1540) found little support for this account. On the whole, the most scientifically literate and numerate subjects were slightly less likely, not more, to see climate change as a serious threat than the least scientifically literate and numerate ones. More importantly, greater scientific literacy and numeracy were associated with greater cultural polarization: Respondents predisposed by their values to dismiss climate change evidence became more dismissive, and those predisposed by their values to credit such evidence more concerned, as science literacy and numeracy increased. We suggest that this evidence reflects a conflict between two levels of rationality: The individual level, which is characterized by citizens’ effective use of their knowledge and reasoning capacities to form risk perceptions that express their cultural commitments; and the collective level, which is characterized by citizens’ failure to converge on the best available scientific evidence on how to promote their common welfare. Dispelling this, “tragedy of the risk-perception commons,” we argue, should be understood as the central aim of the science of science communication.

The Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making Sense of - and Making Progress In - The American Culture War of Fact

Cultural Cognition refers to the disposition to conform ones beliefs about societal risks to ones preferences for how society should be organized. Based on surveys and experiments involving some 5,000 Americans, the Second National Risk and Culture Study presents empirical evidence of the effect of this dynamic in generating conflict about global warming, school shootings, domestic terrorism, nanotechnology, and the mandatory vaccination of school-age girls against HPV, among other issues. The Study also presents evidence of risk-communication strategies that counteract cultural cognition. Because nuclear power affirms rather than threatens the identity of persons who hold individualist values, for example, proposing it as a solution to global warming makes persons who hold such values more willing to consider evidence that climate change is a serious risk. Because people tend to impute credibility to people who share their values, persons who hold hierarchical and egalitarian values are less likely to polarize when they observe people who hold their values advocating unexpected positions on the vaccination of young girls against HPV. Such techniques can help society to create a deliberative climate in which citizens converge on policies that are both instrumentally sound and expressively congenial to persons of diverse values.

Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization

The cultural cognition thesis posits that individuals rely extensively on cultural meanings in forming perceptions of risk. The logic of the cultural cognition thesis suggests that a two-channel science communication strategy, combining information content (“Channel 1”) with cultural meanings (“Channel 2”), could promote open-minded assessment of information across diverse communities. We test this kind of communication strategy in a two-nation (United States, n = 1,500; England, n = 1,500) study, in which scientific information content on climate change was held constant while the cultural meaning of that information was experimentally manipulated. We found that cultural polarization over the validity of climate change science is offset by making citizens aware of the potential contribution of geoengineering as a supplement to restriction of CO2 emissions. We also tested the hypothesis, derived from a competing model of science communication, that exposure to information on geoengineering would lead citizens to discount climate change risks generally. Contrary to this hypothesis, we found that subjects exposed to information about geoengineering were slightly more concerned about climate change risks than those assigned to a control condition.

The Cultural Orientation of Mass Political Opinion

Most Americans lack any substantial degree of ideological sophistication (Kinder 1998), yet they often manage to express coherent views across a range of issues.The conventional explanation for this is that people rely on judgmental shortcuts (e.g., Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). These “heuristics” permit individuals with sufficient political sophistication to sort and filter incoming messages to form relatively consistent views that align with preexisting values (Zaller 1992). If the key cueing device in such models is the source credibility heuristic (Mondak 1993), how do people who lack the time and ability to become actual policy experts have the time and capacity to figure out which policy experts are credible? How does this theory explain the coherence some have found in the views of those with limited political knowledge (Goren 2004)? We approach these two questions with the perspective offered by Mary Douglas (1982) and Aaron Wildavsky’s (1987) cultural theory. In brief, we argue that most peoples neither have the time, inclination, and ability to derive policy positions from abstract ideological principles, nor do they have the inclination or resources at-hand to sort through the empirical claims advanced in technical policy debates. Instead, as Wildavsky (1987, 8) said, “ordinary folk” use the orienting force of culture “to generate miles of preferences” from only “inches of fact.” To make the case for this conception of public opinion, we begin with a theoretical overview of how this process, which we call the Wildavsky Heuristic Model, relates to existing accounts of mass political opinion, particularly those featuring ideology. Then, we test some of this model’s core propositions using original national survey data, and finally, we draw out the theoretical and practical implications of those results.

The WEIRD are even weirder than you think: Diversifying contexts is as important as diversifying samples

We argue that Henrich et al. do not go far enough in their critique: Sample diversification, while important, will not lead to the detection of generalizable principles. For that it will be necessary to broaden the range of contexts in which data are gathered. We demonstrate the power of contexts to alter results even in the presence of sample diversification.

The Future of Nanotechnology Risk Perceptions: An Experimental Investigation of Two Hypotheses

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test competing conjectures about the evolution of public attitudes toward nanotechnology. The rational enlightenment hypothesis holds that members of the public will become favorably disposed to nanotechnology as balanced and accurate information about it disseminates. The cultural cognition hypothesis, in contrast, holds that members of the public are likely to polarize along cultural lines when exposed to such information. Using a between-subjects design (N = 1,862), the experiment compared the perceptions of subjects exposed to balanced information on the risks and benefits of nanotechnology to the perceptions of subjects exposed to no information. The results strongly confirmed the cultural polarization hypothesis and furnished no support for the rational enlightenment hypothesis. Data obtained in the experiment also suggested that the observed correlation in the general public between familiarity with nanotechnology and a positive view of it is spurious: familiarity does not cause a favorable view; rather other influences, including individualistic cultural values, incline certain individuals both to form a positive view and to learn about nanotechnology. The paper also discusses the implications of these findings for promoting informed public understandings of nanotechnology.

The 'Wildavsky Heuristic': The Cultural Orientation of Mass Political Opinion

In a provocative 1987 article, Aaron Wildavsky asserted that culture operates as the fundamental orienting force in the generation of mass public opinion. The meanings and interpersonal associations that inhere in discrete ways of life, he argued, shape the heuristic processes by which politically unsophisticated individuals, in particular, choose what policies and candidates to support. We systematize Wildavskys theory and integrate it with existing accounts of mass opinion formation. We also present the results of an original national survey (N = 1843), which found that the cultural orientations featured in Wildavskys writings accounted for policy-related attitudes on gun control, environment, capital punishment, and gay marriage, even at low levels of political sophistication and after controlling for demographics, left-right ideology, and partisanship. By contrast, much of the predictive power of demographics, left-right ideology, and partisanship on policy attitudes dissipated after taking into account cultural orientations.

Caught in the Crossfire: A Defense of the Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions

In this article, Dan Kahan and Donald Braman expand upon the cultural theory of gun-risk perception and respond to the commentaries on their previous article, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1291 (2003). Their critics argue that the authors are too quick to dismiss the power of empirical information to influence individuals’ positions on gun control. But in analyzing the variety of their critics’ arguments, Kahan and Braman note the strange pattern of opinions that has emerged on the relative importance of culture and data in the gun debate. What could explain the puzzling congruence of opinion among staunch procontrollers and anticontrolles, all of whom concluded that data mattered most? What commonality could explain the agreement of a Texas law professor and a British social anthropologist that culture is in fact more important? Committed to furnishing empirical proof of the powerlessness of empirical proofs, Kahan and Braman constructed a regression analysis to answer these questions. They conclude in this article that this final study conclusively proves their assertion that statistics are incapable of persuading anyone to accept anything they don’t already believe; or, in other words, that the cultural basis of gun-risk perceptions better explains public perceptions in the gun control debate than a pure empirical information theory.

Gunfight at the Consequentialist Corral: The Deadlock in the United States over Firearms Control, and How to Break it

For most Americans, the ‘Great American Gun Debate’1 is not particularly great.2 The question of how strictly to regulate firearms has convulsed the national polity for the better part of four decades without producing results satisfactory to either side. Drowning in a sea of mind-numbing statistics, ordinary citizens stand little chance of even understanding their opponents’ arguments, much less being persuaded by them. Battered by pro-control forces in one election, and by anti-control ones in the next, moderate politicians say as little as they can get away with. The organizers of relatively extreme interest groups, in contrast, say — indeed, scream — as much as they possibly can, symbiotically nurturing a divided public’s anxiety that one side or the other is poised to score a decisive victory.