Earl Conee

The Nature and the Impossibility of Moral Perfection

(MP) does not require enough of a morally perfect agent. The standard of perfection is utterly unsparing. A state of perfection is an absolute extreme, exceeding in merit any condition which could possibly be improved. Wholly moral conduct, on the other hand, can be enacted by agents who are not morally best in every relevant way. Three sorts of cases show this. First, the possibility of supererogation constitutes an objection to (MP). Supererogatory acts are morally right alternatives that are morally better than other alternatives which are also right. Any morally perfect agent would do whatever is supererogatory at every opportunity, because this would be the morally best course of action and morally perfect conduct could not be improved on. Agents who face the same alternatives and choose other right alternatives may be entirely morally upright, but they are not perfect. This shows that (MP)sf conditions on moral perfection are too weak.

The Moral Value in Promises

Nepotism Dean Baker is able to fund just one adjunct faculty position. Baker knows that if she assigns the position to the Classics department, they will regard Bakers cousin as the best candidate and hire him. Baker also knows that History is the one department with a considerably greater need for an adjunct than that of Classics. It happens that although Baker can promise the position to Classics, she cannot promise it to History. However, she can allocate it to either department. Wanting her cousin to have the job, Baker promises the position to Classics and later keeps that promise.2 (155)

Why Solve the Gettier Problem

The value of work on the Gettier Problem has been called into question. Michael Williams concludes a paper on this dark note: “That anything important turns on coming up with a solution to Gettier’s problem remains to be shown.”1 Mark Kaplan argues for a gloomier view: “My message is that it is time to stop and face the unpleasant reality that we simply have no use for a definition of propositional knowledge.”2