Richard Feldman

Modest deontologism in epistemology

Deontologism in epistemology holds that epistemic justification may be understood in terms of “deontological” sentences about what one ought to believe or is permitted to believe, or what one deserves praise for believing, or in some similar way. If deonotologism is true, and people have justified beliefs, then the deontological sentences can be true. However, some say, these deontological sentences can be true only if people have a kind of freedom or control over their beliefs that they do not in fact have. Thus, deontologism in epistemology, combined with anti-skepticism, has implausible implications. I first describe one sort of control that people typically have over ordinary actions but do not have over typical beliefs. I then argue that there is a paradigmatic type of epistemic evaluation that does properly apply to beliefs even though we lack this sort of control over them. Finally, I argue that these paradigmatic epistemic evaluations are sufficient to make true some of the deontological sentences.

Rationality, Reliability, and Natural Selection

A tempting argument for human rationality goes like this: it is more conducive to survival to have true beliefs than false beliefs, so it is more conducive to survival to use reliable belief-forming strategies than unreliable ones. But reliable strategies are rational strategies, so there is a selective advantage to using rational strategies. Since we have evolved, we must use rational strategies. In this paper I argue that some criticisms of this argument offered by Stephen Stich fail because they rely on unsubstantiated interpretations of some results from experimental psychology. I raise two objections to the argument: (i) even if it is advantageous to use rational strategies, it does not follow that we actually use them; and (ii) natural selection need not favor only or even primarily reliable belief-forming strategies.

Clifford’s Principle and James’s Options

In this paper I discuss William J. Clifford’s principle, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” and an objection to it based on William James’s contention that “Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds.” I argue that on one central way of understanding the key terms, there are no genuine options that cannot be decided on intellectual grounds. I also argue that there is another way to understand the terms so that there are cases of the sort James describes, but then, as an objection to Clifford, the argument is needlessly complex, invoking concepts such as genuine options and intellectual undecidability, that play no crucial role.

Stich and Nisbett on Justifying Inference Rules

Stich and Nisbett offer an analysis of the concept of a justified inference rule, building upon the efforts of Goodman. They fault Goodmans view on the grounds that it is incompatible with some recent psychological research on reasoning. We criticize their proposal by arguing that it is subject to much the same objections as those they raise against other accounts.

Klein on Certainty and Canonical Beliefs

In “Epistemic Compatibilism and Canonical Beliefs” Peter Klein argues that we can’t know much about the world around us, but we can know that most of our ordinary beliefs about the world are true.1 He calls the set of the most obviously true common-sense beliefs about the world around us “the canon”.2 The canon includes beliefs such as that there are tables, there are dogs, and there are trees outside. According to Klein, we can’t know any of the propositions in the canon. About them, skeptics are right. But, contrary to what skeptics assert, we can know a general proposition about these canonical beliefs, namely, that the preponderance of them is true. Let us call this general proposition ‘the meta-proposition’. Thus, on Klein’s view, although we can’t know what we might call “specific facts” about the world, we can know that the meta-proposition is true, i.e., we can know that our general world view is correct.

Lehrer’s Coherence Theory of Knowledge

In two recent papers (1986 and 1988), Keith Lehrer has developed the coherence theory of knowledge and justification that he originally proposed in Knowledge, In broad outline, Lehrer’s new view is that one has knowledge when “the right combination of internal and external factors” are present, and this obtains when there “is a rational connection between subjective states and truth.” (1988, 330) Knowledge requires the proper “evaluation of incoming information in terms of background information.” (1988, 330) When a proposition coheres with one’s new information and one’s background information, it is justified. But this sort of justification is merely “personal justification”. One’s background information might be largely erroneous, so coherence with it (together with truth) is not sufficient for knowledge. What is required is also coherence with a system resulting from correcting the errors in the background system. When such coherence obtains, one has undefeated justification and, therefore, knowledge.

Between Belief and Disbelief

Sometimes instead of believing or disbelieving a proposition one does not take a stand on it. This essay explores that middle ground. We begin by distinguishing a variety of different attitudes or cognitive relations one might have to a proposition that one does not believe or disbelieve. We argue that identifying all of them as suspending judgment or withholding judgment neglects important differences. We then discuss epistemic evaluations of these attitudes and relations. Finally, we examine the implications of our findings for the attitudes that a philosopher might take toward contentious philosophical theses. Evidentialism, our preferred view of epistemic justification, is helpful in clarifying the issues and addressing the problems.

The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism.

This book raises questions about the nature of philosophy by examining the source and significance of one central philosophical problem: how can we know anything about the world around us? Stroud discusses and criticizes the views of such philosophers as Descartes, Kant, J.L. Austin, G.E. Moore, R. Carnap, W.V. Quine, and others.