Edward D. Mansfield

The New Wave of Regionalism

Economic regionalism appears to be growing rapidly. Why this has occurred and what bearing it will have on the global economy are issues that have generated considerable interest and disagreement. Some observers fear that regional economic institutions—such as the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mercosur, and the organization of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)—will erode the multilateral system that has guided economic relations since the end of World War II, promoting protectionism and conflict. Others argue that regional institutions will foster economic openness and bolster the multilateral system. This debate has stimulated a large and influential body of research by economists on regionalisms welfare implications.

Power Politics and International Trade

Recent literature attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoners dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade. We argue that the prisoners dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system, namely, their security externalities. We consider these external effects explicitly. Doing so leads us to two conclusions: (1) free trade is more likely within, rather than across, political-military alliances; and (2) alliances are more likely to evolve into free-trade coalitions if they are embedded in bipolar systems than in multipolar systems. Using data drawn from an 80-year period beginning in 1905, we test these hypotheses. The results of the analysis make it clear that alliances do have a direct, statistically significant, and large impact on bilateral trade flows and that this relationship is stronger in bipolar, rather than in multipolar, systems.

Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict

The relationship between foreign trade and political conflict has been a persistent source of controversy among scholars of international relations. Existing empirical studies of this topic have focused on the effects of trade flows on conflict, but they have largely ignored the institutional context in which trade is conducted. In this article we present some initial quantitative results pertaining to the influence on military disputes of preferential trading arrangements (PTAs), a broad class of commercial institutions that includes free trade areas, common markets, and customs unions. We argue that parties to the same PTA are less prone to disputes than other states and that hostilities between PTA members are less likely to occur as trade flows rise between them. Moreover, we maintain that heightened commerce is more likely to inhibit conflict between states that belong to the same preferential grouping than between states that do not. Our results accord with this argument. Based on an analysis of the period since World War II, we find that trade flows have relatively little effect on the likelihood of disputes between states that do not participate in the same PTA. Within PTAs, however, there is a strong, inverse relationship between commerce and conflict. Parties to such an arrangement are less likely to engage in hostilities than other states, and the likelihood of a military dispute dips markedly as trade increases between them.

Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements

Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) have spread widely over the past fifty years. During the same era, multilateral openness has grown to unprecedented heights, spurred by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). If the cornerstone of the manifestly successful multilateral regime is nondiscrimination, why have its members increasingly resorted to preferential liberalization? We argue that developments at the heart of GATT/WTO encourage its members to form PTAs as devices to obtain bargaining leverage within the multilateral regime. Specifically, the growth in GATT/WTO membership, the periodic multilateral trade negotiation rounds, as well as participation and, especially, losses in formal GATT/WTO disputes, have led its members to seek entrance into PTAs. Conducting the first statistical tests on the subject, we find strong evidence in support of this argument.

Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War

The relationship between democratization and war has recently sparked a lively debate. We find that transitions from autocracy that become stalled prior to the establishment of coherent democratic institutions are especially likely to precipitate the onset of war. This tendency is heightened in countries where political institutions are weak and national officials are vested with little authority. These results accord with our argument that elites often employ nationalist rhetoric to mobilize support in the populist rivalries of the poorly-institutionalized democratizing state but then get caught up in the belligerent politics that this process eventually unleashes. In contrast, we find that transitions that quickly culminate in a fully coherent democracy are much less perilous. Further, our results refute the view that transitional democracies are merely the targets of attack due to their temporary weakness: in fact, they tend to be the initiators of war. We also refute the view that any regime change is likely to precipitate the outbreak of war: transitions toward democracy are significantly more likely to generate hostilities than transitions toward autocracy.

The political economy of nontariff barriers: a cross-national analysis

Nontariff barriers to trade are most pervasive when deteriorating macroeconomic conditions give rise to demands for protection by pressure groups, when countries are sufficiently large to give policymakers incentives to impose protection, and when domestic institutions enhance the ability of public officials to act on these incentives. Statistical results based on a sample of advanced industrial countries during the 1980s support the argument that the incidence of nontariff barriers tends to be greatest when the preferences of pressure groups and policymakers converge. More attention should be devoted to the interaction between societal and statist factors in cross-national studies of trade policy.

Democratization and International Organizations

International organizations ~IOs! have become increasingly pervasive features of the global landscape+ While the implications of this development have been studied extensively, relatively little research has examined the factors that prompt states to enter IOs+ We argue that democratization is an especially potent impetus to IO membership+ Democratizing countries are likely to enter IOs because leaders have difficulty credibly committing to sustain liberal reforms and the consolidation of democracy+ Chief executives often have an incentive to solidify their position during democratic transitions by rolling back political liberalization+ Entering an IO can help leaders in transitional states credibly commit to carry out democratic reforms, espe- cially if the organization is composed primarily of democratic members+ Tests of this hypothesis, based on a new data set of IOs covering the period from 1965 to 2000, confirm that democratization spurs states to join IOs+ In recent years, international organizations ~IOs! have become increasingly perva- sive features of the global landscape+ Both the number of such organizations and the range of issue-areas they cover have grown rapidly+ The implications of this development have been studied extensively and hotly debated in the field of inter- national relations+ Whereas some researchers believe that IOs have little effect on state behavior, many observers argue that the proliferation of these institutions will facilitate interstate cooperation and help to resolve the interstate conflicts that do arise+ 1 In contrast, relatively little research has been conducted on the factors that prompt states to enter IOs+ This gap in the literature is both surprising and important+ While many countries have rushed to join IOs, others participate in few of these organizations+ What determines the propensity of states to join IOs?

The Study of Interdependence and Conflict Recent Advances, Open Questions, and Directions for Future Research

A burgeoning literature has emerged on the relationship between economic interdependence and political conflict. This literature is evaluated, and three issues are raised for future research. First, there is a need to improve the theoretical basis of claims about the influence of interdependence on conflict and to specify more clearly the causal mechanisms underlying any such relationship. Second, future research should identify the boundary conditions of the effects of interdependence on conflict. Third, much more attention must be paid to the definition and measurement of interdependence and conflict.

Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade

We analyze the effects of alliances and preferential trading arrangements on bilateral trade flows. Both factors are likely to promote trade among members, but we argue that the interaction between them is central to explaining patterns of commerce. The combination of an alliance, which creates political incentives for participants to engage in trade, and a commercial institution, which liberalizes trade among members, is expected to provide a considerable impetus to commerce among parties to both. The results of our quantitative analyses support these arguments. Both alliances and preferential trading arrangements strongly affected trade from 1960 to 1990, and allies that included a major power conducted considerably more trade than their nonmajor-power counterparts. Moreover, the interaction between alliances and preferential trading arrangements is fundamental to explaining patterns of bilateral commerce: Parties to a common preferential trading arrangement and a common alliance engage in markedly greater trade than do members of either type of institution but not both.

The Political Economy of Regionalism

AcknowledgmentsContributorsThe Political Economy of Regionalism: An Overview, by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. MilnerRegionalism in Asia and the Americas, by Stephen HaggardThe Political Economy of Currency Regions, by Benjamin J. CohenIndustries, Governments, and the Creation of Regional Trade Blocs, by Helen V. MilnerRegional Agreements as Clubs: The European Case, by Pier Carlo PadoanDispute Settlement in International Trade: Regionalism and Procedural Coordination, by Beth V. Yarbrough and Robert M. YarbroughSystematic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Americas, by Joseph M. GriecoThe Political Economy of Major-Power Trade Flows, by Edward D. Mansfield and Rachel BronsonRegionalizing Europes Security: The Case for a New Mitteleuropa, by Charles A. KupchanBibliographyIndex