Marc L. Busch

The political economy of nontariff barriers: a cross-national analysis

Nontariff barriers to trade are most pervasive when deteriorating macroeconomic conditions give rise to demands for protection by pressure groups, when countries are sufficiently large to give policymakers incentives to impose protection, and when domestic institutions enhance the ability of public officials to act on these incentives. Statistical results based on a sample of advanced industrial countries during the 1980s support the argument that the incidence of nontariff barriers tends to be greatest when the preferences of pressure groups and policymakers converge. More attention should be devoted to the interaction between societal and statist factors in cross-national studies of trade policy.

The intergovernmental network of world trade : IGO connectedness, governance, and embeddedness

Membership in certain intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the World Trade Organization, has long been argued to stimulate trade. Yet, evidence linking IGOs to trade is mixed. The authors argue that identifying the influence of IGOs requires attention not only to the institutions IGOs enact, but also to the network through which they enact them. This approach allows them to demonstrate that trade between two countries increases by an average of 58% with every doubling of the strength of IGO connection between the countries. They also contribute to debates regarding the mechanisms through which structural relationships influence economic behavior by showing that substantial trade benefits occur not only through economic IGOs, but also through IGOs that were formed for social and cultural purposes, and that connections through IGOs that are organizationally strong have more impact than those through minimalist IGOs.

Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade

Preferential trade agreements offer members an alternative to dispute settlement at the World Trade Organization. This gives rise to forum shopping, in that complainants can file regionally, multilaterally, or not at all. What explains this choice of forum? I argue that complainants strategically discriminate among overlapping memberships: on a given measure(s), some prefer to set a precedent that bears only on a subset of their trade relations, others a precedent that bears on all their trade relations, while still others prefer not to set a precedent. Thus, the key to forum shopping is not simply which institution is likely to come closest to the complainants ideal ruling against the defendant, but where the resulting precedent will be more useful in the future, enabling the complainant to bring litigation against other members, rather than helping other members bring litigation against the complainant. I consider disputes over Mexican brooms and Canadian periodicals.For comments, I thank Vinod Aggarwal, Raj Bhala, Jane Bradley, Bill Davey, Rob Howse, Miles Kahler, Simon Lester, Rod Ludema, Ed Mansfield, Lisa Martin, Petros C. Mavroidis, John Odell, Joost Pauwelyn, Amy Porges, Eric Reinhardt, Peter Rosendorff, Ken Scheve, Ed Schwartz, Christina Sevilla, Michael Simon, Jay Smith, Debra Steger, Joel Trachtman, Todd Weiler, seminar participants in the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security (PIPES) at the University of Chicago, and two anonymous referees. All shortcomings are, of course, my own. For research support, I thank the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. For research assistance, I thank Alex Muggah, Krzysztof Pelc, and Scott Winter.

The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Testing international trade law: Empirical studies of GATT/WTO dispute settlement

Law did play an important role in this lawyerless multilateral trade order, but which one? Roessler (1999, 10) Introduction Dispute settlement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), is the very “backbone of the multilateral trading system” (Moore 2000). Indeed, despite being likened to a “court with no bailiff” (Rossmiller 1994, 263), the GATT/WTO system is widely touted as the most successful of any comparable institution today (Hudec 1993, 353; Petersmann 1997, 63–65; Moore 2000). Add to this that the WTOs Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) has corrected many of the shortcomings of GATT 1947, and it is little wonder that most observers are even more optimistic about the future. Until recently, however, there has been virtually no empirical evidence brought to bear on the most important questions in the field. Why do countries take some of their complaints to GATT/WTO and prosecute others unilaterally, “out of court”? Why are some disputes settled with liberalization by the defendant, while the status quo prevails in others? And has greater legalization of the system made dispute settlement more efficacious? Taking Robert Hudecs Enforcing International Trade Law as its point of departure, a growing literature has begun to tackle these and related questions, testing hypotheses against data on the hundreds of complaints filed since 1948. Some of the results confirm prevailing views about the political economy of GATT/WTO dispute settlement.

Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT:

Studies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) stress the role of formal panels in adjudicating trade conflicts. Yet most cases are settled beforehand in informal consultations. This article tests two sets of hypotheses about the decision to escalate GATT cases, one concerning the significance of the right to a panel, the other concerning the effects of political regime type. Results show that the right to a panel did not inspire more early settlement, more escalation, or more resolution through concessions at the panel stage; however, highly democratic dyads are more likely to achieve concession, but only at the consultation stage. This suggests that a strategy of tying hands, rather than adherence to legal (and other) norms of conflict resolution, is likely to shed light on the way democracies use formal third-party adjudication at GATT.

Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains The Problem of Cooperation under Anarchy

The debate between neoliberals and realists in the field of international relations draws heavily on the findings offered in Robert Axelrods Evolution of Cooperation. Axelrods well-known argument is that cooperation can emerge among egoists despite the absence of a central authority. This article assesses the robustness of Axelrods findings in light of the realist critique that relative gains concerns make cooperation less likely than neoliberals contend. We build on an amended prisoners dilemma (PD) game and conduct a computer simulation tournament in which we vary (1) the payoff structure and (2) Axelrods population of strategies. The results indicate that cooperation can emerge even under strong relative gains concerns, so long as the population of strategies is sufficiently retaliatory. On the basis of this finding, we argue that the realist critique is overstated: the introduction of greater relative gains concerns does not necessarily limit the prospects for cooperation among states.

Industrial Location and Voter Participation in Europe

Does the geographic concentration of industry ‘matter’ outside the United States? Observers have long speculated that while geographically concentrated industries may be influential in American politics, this is probably not the case in countries where the electorate votes more as a national constituency. Others disagree, urging that clustered industries have an advantage regardless of how the political map is drawn. We sharpen the terms of debate and weigh in with empirical evidence from a cross-sectional analysis of intended voter turnout in eight member-states of the European Union and a multi-year study of voter turnout in the Netherlands. These tests uniformly show that, across different types of electoral systems, including those in which voters vote as a national constituency, thereby removing any effects of electoral geography per se, workers in traded industries that are physically concentrated are, in fact, substantially more likely to vote than employees in traded but geographically dispersed sectors.

The politics of international economic law

1. Introduction: some observations on the politics of international economic law Tomer Broude, Marc L. Busch and Amelia Porges Part I. The Politics of Law-Making in International Trade: 2. The politics and indirect effects of asymmetrical bargaining power in free trade agreements Meredith Kolsky Lewis 3. The politics of linkages in US preferential trade agreements Kimberlee G. Weatherall 4. The politics of African trade negotiations in the WTOs Doha Round Uche Ewelukwa 5. The politics of legitimacy in the UNCITRAL working methods Claire R. Kelly Part II. The Politics of International Investment Treaty-Making: 6. The politics of the European Unions investment treaty-making Marc Bungenberg 7. The politics of Chinas investment treaty-making programme Axel Berger 8. The politics of south-south bilateral investment treaties Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen Part III. The Politics of Sovereign Wealth and International Financial Law: 9. The politics of sovereign wealth funds: benign investors or smoking guns? Yvonne C. L. Lee 10. The politics of international financial law Douglas Arner Part IV. The Politics of Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law: 11. The politics of judicial economy at the WTO Marc L. Busch and Krzysztof Pelc 12. The politics of competing jurisdictions in WTO and RTA disputes, and the use of private international law analogies Henry Gao and C. L. Lim Part V. Linkages between International Economic Law and Foreign Policy: 13. The politics of rules of origin Moshe Hirsch 14. The politics of divestment Perry S. Bechky.

The Politics of International Economic Law: Contents

1. Introduction: some observations on the politics of international economic law Tomer Broude, Marc L. Busch and Amelia Porges Part I. The Politics of Law-Making in International Trade: 2. The politics and indirect effects of asymmetrical bargaining power in free trade agreements Meredith Kolsky Lewis 3. The politics of linkages in US preferential trade agreements Kimberlee G. Weatherall 4. The politics of African trade negotiations in the WTOs Doha Round Uche Ewelukwa 5. The politics of legitimacy in the UNCITRAL working methods Claire R. Kelly Part II. The Politics of International Investment Treaty-Making: 6. The politics of the European Unions investment treaty-making Marc Bungenberg 7. The politics of Chinas investment treaty-making programme Axel Berger 8. The politics of south-south bilateral investment treaties Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen Part III. The Politics of Sovereign Wealth and International Financial Law: 9. The politics of sovereign wealth funds: benign investors or smoking guns? Yvonne C. L. Lee 10. The politics of international financial law Douglas Arner Part IV. The Politics of Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law: 11. The politics of judicial economy at the WTO Marc L. Busch and Krzysztof Pelc 12. The politics of competing jurisdictions in WTO and RTA disputes, and the use of private international law analogies Henry Gao and C. L. Lim Part V. Linkages between International Economic Law and Foreign Policy: 13. The politics of rules of origin Moshe Hirsch 14. The politics of divestment Perry S. Bechky.

The Politics of International Economic Law: Index

1. Introduction: some observations on the politics of international economic law Tomer Broude, Marc L. Busch and Amelia Porges Part I. The Politics of Law-Making in International Trade: 2. The politics and indirect effects of asymmetrical bargaining power in free trade agreements Meredith Kolsky Lewis 3. The politics of linkages in US preferential trade agreements Kimberlee G. Weatherall 4. The politics of African trade negotiations in the WTOs Doha Round Uche Ewelukwa 5. The politics of legitimacy in the UNCITRAL working methods Claire R. Kelly Part II. The Politics of International Investment Treaty-Making: 6. The politics of the European Unions investment treaty-making Marc Bungenberg 7. The politics of Chinas investment treaty-making programme Axel Berger 8. The politics of south-south bilateral investment treaties Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen Part III. The Politics of Sovereign Wealth and International Financial Law: 9. The politics of sovereign wealth funds: benign investors or smoking guns? Yvonne C. L. Lee 10. The politics of international financial law Douglas Arner Part IV. The Politics of Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law: 11. The politics of judicial economy at the WTO Marc L. Busch and Krzysztof Pelc 12. The politics of competing jurisdictions in WTO and RTA disputes, and the use of private international law analogies Henry Gao and C. L. Lim Part V. Linkages between International Economic Law and Foreign Policy: 13. The politics of rules of origin Moshe Hirsch 14. The politics of divestment Perry S. Bechky.