Edward Dutton

Why Do Northeast Asians Win So Few Nobel Prizes?1

Most scientific discoveries have originated from Europe, and Europeans have won 20 times more Nobel Prizes than have Northeast Asians. We argue that this is explained not by IQ, but by interracial ...

Intelligence, competitive altruism, and "clever silliness" may underlie bias in academe

Why is social bias and its depressing effects on low-status or low-performing groups exaggerated? We show that the higher intelligence of academics has at best a very weak effect on reducing their bias, facilitates superficially justifying their biases, and may make them better at understanding the benefits of social conformity in general and competitive altruism specifically. We foresee a surge in research examining these mechanisms and recommend, meanwhile, reviving and better observing scientific ideals.

Even "Bigger Gods" developed amongst the pastoralist followers of Moses and Mohammed : consistent with uncertainty and disadvantage, but not prosocality

The gods of monotheistic religions, which began amongst pastoralists and defeated exiles, are closer to Big Gods than those associated with ancient city-based polities. The development of Big Gods is contingent upon a need to reduce uncertainty and negative feelings in combination with a relatively high level of prosociality, rather than a need to induce or assess prosociality.

An Armchair Traveller’s History of Finland

Barton, Sir Dunbar Plunket. Bernadotte: Prince and King, 1810–1844. London: John Murray, 1925. Bregnsbo, Michael. ‘The Motives behind the Foreign Political Decisions of Frederick VI during the Napoleonic Wars’. Scandinavian Journal of History 39 (2014): 335–352. Höjer, Torvald T:son. Carl XIV Johan. 3 vols. Stockholm: Norstedts, 1939–1960. Scott, Franklin D. Bernadotte och Napoleons fall. Stockholm: Natur och Kultur, 1937.

The Canadian IQ calculated from the standardization of the WAIS IV

The Canadian standardization sample of the WAIS IV obtained a Full Scale IQ 104.5 in relation to 100 for the American standardization sample, giving Canada a British (Greenwich) IQ of 102.5.

A problematic proxy? On Meisenberg, Rindermann, Pateland Woodley (2012): analysis of the relationship between religiosity and intelligence within countries

Meisenberg et al. (2012) are to be thanked for providing a long overdue analysis of the relationship between intelligence and religiosity within a large sample of countries. Drawing upon the World Values Survey between 1981 and 2009 (N = 345.743) across 96 countries they fi nd that overall intelligence is negatively correlated with religious belief (70 countries), though there are exceptions (25 countries where it is positively correlated and 1 with no correlation). This is a clear, well-argued and meticulous piece of research and those interested in the relationship between religion and intelligence are surely in Meisenberg et al’s (2012) debt. However, there are number of small issues in their article which I felt might be open to a slightly different interpretation from that which they suggest, or at least open to a parallel interpretation. Firstly, they note that in countries with a very low average IQ (in sub-Saharan Africa), religiosity positively correlates with intelligence. They suggest that this is because, in such societies, religion is a system of explanation meaning that the more intelligent will be more religious because they can comprehend a more complex explanation. I think a more obvious explanation is that in such countries those with low intelligence are more likely to adhere to what might be regarded as ‘superstition’ rather than ‘religion.’ If researchers attempted to discern the extent to which the ‘superstitious’ and ‘religious’ were fervent and perceived a hidden hand behind events (a reasonable operational defi nition of religion, see Boyer, 2001) sub-Saharan Africa may well end up with an inverse relationship between intelligence and religiousness. Indeed, Meisenberg et al. concede that small scale societies do not employ “elaborated religion” (2012, p. 15). Moreover, Meisenberg et al. (2012) used ‘education’ as a proxy for intelligence in reaching their correlations. This is slightly problematic because educational success only correlates with intelligence at .5 (e.g., Jensen, 1980, p. 316). The personality characteristics Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, Agreeableness and Openness-Intellect are positively correlated with educational success. However, they are also all positively associated with either religiosity per se (Conscientiousness and Agreeableness) or certain forms of it (Neuroticism with extrinsic religiosity and religious quest, and OpennessIntellect with liberal religiosity) (e.g., Saroglou, 2002 or Feist 1998). As such, it is perfectly possible that intelligence does predict relative religiosity, even if only weakly, within Sub-Saharan African countries. Secondly, they found that in a number of countries, such as Sweden and Britain, being ‘religious’ is positively correlated with education. They put this down to the highly intelligent

“Anthropology-Lite”: An Education Perspective on the Ideology of Religious Studies

There has been considerable criticism of religious studies as a separate discipline, focusing on the category of religion. This article aims to develop this debate by defending the religion category but nevertheless criticizing religious studies in terms of its practical consequences for scholarship. Working on the view that scholarship aims to criticize accepted knowledge in pursuit of truth and foster a rational atmosphere for discussion, the article will argue that religious studies, as a separate discipline within the restrictions in which it often operates, potentially damages this aim. Solutions will be proposed to the religious studies problem and the article will aim to open-up a debate.

A Rejoinder to Gallagher

I would like to thank Prof. Gallagher for his thoughtful, insightful and considered response to my article ‘‘Anthropology Lite.’’ The primary aim was to begin a debate over the issues raised in it and Prof. Gallagher has certainly risen to the bait with some fascinating and challenging points that I think really move the issue forward. I deliberately presented my article with considerable hesitance. Various ideas had occurred to me but—and as Prof Gallagher points out—this involved mounting a challenge to a long-established discipline and it involved doing so within various limitations which I fully conceded and which Prof. Gallagher also highlights: My main experience is with religious studies in the United Kingdom and there is a lack of data to prove some of the possibilities that I suggest. At points in his response Prof. Gallagher appears to rather exaggerate what I’m attempting to accomplish, forgetting the hesitance that I stress many times: ‘‘Thus, although Professor Dutton cautions that at times he is advocating positions that he does not fully endorse, his call for a debate quickly enough resolves into a proposal for the dissolution of a well-established field of academic enquiry.’’ But there is, as far as I can see, no such dogmatism in the way I have expressed the points and nor is there in relation to the view that anthropology-based religious studies can develop into ‘‘anthropology lite’’. It is a possibility that I raise to be, perhaps, knocked-down. It is not a firm assertion. ‘‘Anthropology lite’’ probably is a ‘‘provocative’’ essay but I see that as the most fruitful way to start a real debate and, if Prof. Gallagher’s response is anything to go by, I am correct in that regard. With regard to Eliade, Gallagher has highlighted an insightful counterargument to my suggestion for which I am grateful. I did not suggest that