Edward H. Seabury

Using electronic neutron generators in active interrogation to detect shielded fissionable material

Experiments have been performed at Idaho National Laboratory to study methodology and instrumentation for performing neutron active interrogation die-away analyses for the purpose of detecting shielded fissionable material. Here we report initial work using a portable DT electronic neutron generator with a 3He neutron detector to detect shielded fissionable material including enriched uranium and reactor grade plutonium. Measurements have been taken of bare material as well as of material hidden within a large plywood cube. Results from this work have demonstrated the efficacy of the die-away neutron measurement technique for quickly detecting the presence of special nuclear material hidden within plywood shields by analyzing the time dependent neutron signals in-between neutron generator pulses. Using a DT electronic neutron generator operating at 300 Hz with a yield of approximately 0.36 times 108 neutrons per second, 2.2 kg of enriched uranium hidden within a 61 cm times 61 cm times 71 cm volume of plywood was positively detected with a measurement signal 2-sigma above the passive background within 1 second. Similarly, for a 500 second measurement period a lower detection limit approaching the gram level could be expected with the same simple set-up.

Using Electronic Neutron Generators in Active Interrogation to Detect Shielded Fissionable Material

Experiments have been performed at Idaho National Laboratory to study methodology and instrumentation for performing neutron active interrogation die-away analyses for the purpose of detecting shielded fissionable material. Here we report initial work using a portable DT electronic neutron generator with a He-3 fast neutron detector to detect shielded fissionable material including enriched uranium and reactor grade plutonium. Measurements have been taken of bare material as well as of material hidden within a large plywood cube. Results from this work have demonstrated the efficacy of the die-away neutron measurement technique for quickly detecting the presence of special nuclear material hidden within plywood shields by analyzing the time dependent neutron signals in-between neutron generator pulses. Using a DT electronic neutron generator operating at 300 Hz with a yield of approximately 0.36 x 108 neutrons per second, 2.2 kg of enriched uranium hidden within a 0.60 m x 0.60 m x 0.70 m volume of plywood was positively detected with a measurement signal 2-sigma above the passive background within 1 second. Similarly, for a 500 second measurement period a lower detection limit of approaching the gram level could be expected with the same simple set-up.

Dose profile modeling of Idaho National Laboratory's active neutron interrogation laboratory

A new laboratory has been commissioned at Idaho National Laboratory for performing active neutron interrogation research and development. The facility is designed to provide radiation shielding for deuterium-tritium (DT) fusion (14.1 MeV) neutron generators (2 x 10(8) n/s), deuterium-deuterium (DD) fusion (2.5 MeV) neutron generators (1 x 10(7) n/s), and (252)Cf spontaneous fission neutron sources (6.96 x 10(7) n/s, 30 microg). Shielding at the laboratory is comprised of modular concrete shield blocks 0.76 m thick with tongue-in-groove features to prevent radiation streaming, arranged into one small and one large test vault. The larger vault is designed to allow operation of the DT generator and has walls 3.8m tall, an entrance maze, and a fully integrated electrical interlock system; the smaller test vault is designed for (252)Cf and DD neutron sources and has walls 1.9 m tall and a simple entrance maze. Both analytical calculations and numerical simulations were used in the design process for the building to assess the performance of the shielding walls and to ensure external dose rates are within required facility limits. Dose rate contour plots have been generated for the facility to visualize the effectiveness of the shield walls and entrance mazes and to illustrate the spatial profile of the radiation dose field above the facility and the effects of skyshine around the vaults.

Fast-neutron spectrometry using a 3He ionization chamber and digital pulse shape analysis

Digital pulse shape analysis (dPSA) has been used with a Cuttler-Shalev type (3)He ionization chamber to measure the fast-neutron spectra of a deuterium-deuterium electronic neutron generator, a bare (252)Cf spontaneous fission neutron source, and of the transmitted fast neutron spectra of a (252)Cf source attenuated by water, graphite, liquid nitrogen, and magnesium. Rise-time dPSA has been employed using the common approach for analyzing n +(3)He→(1)H+(3)H ionization events and improved to account for wall-effect and pile-up events, increasing the fidelity of these measurements. Simulations have been performed of the different experimental arrangements and compared with the measurements, demonstrating general agreement between the dPSA-processed fast-neutron spectra and predictions. The fast-neutron resonance features of the attenuation cross sections of the attenuating materials are clearly visible within the resolution limits of the electronics used for the measurements, and the potential applications of high-resolution fast-neutron spectrometry for nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards measurements are discussed.

Addressing different active neutron interrogation signatures from fissionable material

In a continuing effort to examine portable methods for implementing active neutron interrogation for detecting shielded fissionable material research is underway to investigate the utility of analyzing multiple time-correlated signatures. Time correlation refers here to the existence of unique characteristics of the fission interrogation signature related to the start and end of an irradiation, as well as signatures present in between individual pulses of an irradiating source. Traditional measurement approaches in this area have typically worked to detect die-away neutrons after the end of each pulse, neutrons in between pulses related to the decay of neutron emitting fission products, or neutrons or gamma rays related to the decay of neutron emitting fission products after the end of an irradiation exposure. In this paper we discus the potential weaknesses of assessing only one signature versus multiple signatures and make the assertion that multiple complimentary and orthogonal measurements should be used to bolster the performance of active interrogation systems, helping to minimize susceptibility to the weaknesses of individual signatures on their own. Recognizing that the problem of detection is a problem of low count rates, we are exploring methods to integrate commonly used signatures with rarely used signatures to improve detection capabilities for these measurements. In this paper we will discuss initial activity in this area with this approach together with observations of some of the strengths and weaknesses of using these different signatures.

Measurement Of The Neutron Spectrum Of A DD Electronic Neutron Generator

A Cuttler‐Shalev (C‐S) 3He proportional counter has been used to measure the energy spectrum of neutrons from a portable deuterium‐deuterium electronic neutron generator. To improve the analysis of results from the C‐S detector digital pulse shape analysis techniques have been used to eliminate neutron recoil artifacts in the recorded data. Data was collected using a 8‐GHz, 10‐bit waveform digitizer with its full scale corresponding to approximately 6‐MeV neutrons. The measurements were made with the detector axis perpendicular to the direction of ions in the ENG in a plane 0.5‐m to the side of the ENG, measuring neutrons emitted at an angle from 87.3° to 92.7° with respect to the path of ions in the ENG. The system demonstrated an energy resolution of approximately 0.040 MeV for the thermal peak and approximately 0.13 MeV at the DD neutron energy. In order to achieve the ultimate resolution capable with this type of detector it is clear that a higher‐precision digitizer will be needed.

Parametric evaluation of active neutron interrogation for the detection of shielded highly-enriched uranium in the field

Parametric studies using numerical simulations are being performed to assess the performance capabilities and limits of active neutron interrogation for detecting shielded highly enriched uranium (HEU). Varying the shield material, HEU mass, HEU depth inside the shield, and interrogating neutron source energy, the simulations account for both neutron and photon emission signatures from the HEU with resolution in both energy and time. The results are processed to represent different irradiation timing schemes and several different classes of radiation detectors, and evaluated using a statistical approach considering signal intensity over background. This paper describes the details of the modeling campaign and some preliminary results, weighing the strengths of alternative measurement approaches for the different irradiation scenarios.

Active Interrogation Using Electronic Neutron Generators for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

Active interrogation, a measurement technique which uses a radiation source to probe materials and generate unique signatures useful for characterizing those materials, is a powerful tool for assaying special nuclear material. The most commonly used technique for performing active interrogation is to use an electronic neutron generator as the probe radiation source. Exploiting the unique operating characteristics of these devices, including their monoenergetic neutron emissions and their ability to operate in pulsed modes, presents a number of options for performing prompt and delayed signature analyses using both photon and neutron sensors. A review of literature in this area shows multiple applications of the active neutron interrogation technique for performing nuclear nonproliferation measurements. Some examples include measuring the plutonium content of spent fuel, assaying plutonium residue in spent fuel hull claddings, assaying plutonium in aqueous fuel reprocessing process streams, and assaying nu...

X-Ray Measurements Of A Thermo Scientific P385 DD Neutron Generator

Idaho National Laboratory is experimenting with electrical neutron generators, as potential replacements for californium‐252 radioisotopic neutron sources in its PINS prompt gamma‐ray neutron activation analysis (PGNAA) system for the identification of military chemical warfare agents and explosives. In addition to neutron output, we have recently measured the x‐ray output of the Thermo Scientific P385 deuterium‐deuterium neutron generator. X rays are a normal byproduct from neutron generators, but depending on their intensity and energy, x rays can interfere with gamma rays from the object under test, increase gamma‐spectrometer dead time, and reduce PGNAA system throughput. The P385 x‐ray energy spectrum was measured with a high‐purity germanium (HPGe) detector, and a broad peak is evident at about 70 keV. To identify the source of the x rays within the neutron generator assembly, it was scanned by collimated scintillation detectors along its long axis. At the strongest x‐ray emission points, the generator also was rotated 60° between measurements. The scans show the primary source of x‐ray emission from the P385 neutron generator is an area 60 mm from the neutron production target, in the vicinity of the ion source. Rotation of the neutron generator did not significantly alter the x‐ray count rate, and its x‐ray emission appears to be axially symmetric. A thin lead shield, 3.2 mm (1/8 inch) thick, reduced the 70‐keV generator x rays to negligible levels.

Estimation of the performance of multiple active neutron interrogation signatures for detecting shielded HEU

A comprehensive modeling study has been carried out to evaluate the utility of multiple active neutron interrogation signatures for detecting shielded highly enriched uranium (HEU). The modeling effort focused on varying HEU masses from 1 kg to 20 kg; varying types of shields including cement, wood, polyethylene, aluminum, and steel; varying depths of the HEU in the shields, and varying engineered shields immediately surrounding the HEU including steel, lead, and cadmium. Neutron and gamma-ray signatures were the focus of the study and false negative detection probabilities versus measurement time were used as a performance metric. To facilitate comparisons among different approaches an automated method was developed to generate receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for different sets of model variables for multiple background count rate conditions. This paper summarizes results or the analysis, including laboratory benchmark comparisons between simulations and experiments.