Edward J. Lawler

An Affect Theory of Social Exchange

This article develops a theory that explains how and when emotions, produced by social exchange, generate stronger or weaker ties to relations, groups, or networks. It is argued that social exchange produces positive or negative global feelings, which are internally rewarding or punishing. The theory indicates that social units (relations, groups, networks) are perceived as a source of these feelings, contingent on the degree of jointness in the exchange task. The jointness of the task is greatest if (1) actors find it difficult to distinguish their individual effects on or contributions to solving the exchange task (nonseparability) and (2) actors perceive a shared responsibility for success or failure at the exchange task. The theory explicates the effects of different exchange structures on these conditions and, in turn, on cohesion and solidarity. Implications are developed for network‐to‐group transformations.

Affective Attachments to Nested Groups: A Choice-Process Theory

This paper offers a theory linking choice processes with the experience of transitory emotion and the development of enduring affective attachments to nested collectivities, i.e., subgroups within a larger group, organization, or society. According to the theory, persons become emotionally attached to groups that strengthen their generalized sense of control. The underlying propositions are that: (1) choice processes that foster a high sense of control produce positive emotion (happiness, pride, gratitude); (2) such positive emotion strengthens affective attachments to groups perceived as most responsible for the choice opportunity; and (3) such positive emotion strengthens attachments to proximal subgroups more than to larger, more encompassing collectivities. Complementary predictions obtainfor lack of choice, negative emotion (sadness, shame, hostility), and the weakening of collective attachments. The theory explicates a subtle social process important to individuallgroup relations, and suggests conditions likely to produce behavior directed at the collective welfare.

Network structure and emotion in exchange relations

Network structures promote cohesive social relations among some actors and not others. Based on the theory of relational cohesion (Lawler and Yoon 1996), we hypothesize that an emotional/affective process explains how and when network structures produce such effects. The main ideas are: (1) If a network produces differential exchange frequencies among component dyads then, ceterus paribus, that network will tend to produce different degrees of internal cohesion within those dyads and will do so through the positive emotions or feelings generated by successful exchanges. (2) This effect should be more evident in equal than in unequal-power relations, and it should be weaker when network members share an overarching group identity. We conduct an experiment to test these hypotheses. The results indicate: Dyadic cohesion develops through an emotional/affective process in equal-power relations, as hypothesized, but not in unequal-power relations; and an overarching group identity reduces the degree that central actors exploit peripheral ones but does not impact dyad-level cohesion. The larger implication is that in networks containing both equal and unequal-power relations, internal pockets of cohesion are more likely to emerge in the former because of the mild, everyday positive feelings produced by successful exchanges.

Time Pressure and the Development of Integrative Agreements in Bilateral Negotiations

A laboratory experiment examined the effects of time pressure on the process and outcome of integrative bargaining. Time pressure was operationalized in terms of the amount of time available to negotiate. As hypothesized, high time pressure produced nonagreements and poor negotiation outcomes only when negotiators adopted an individualistic orientation; when negotiators adopted a cooperative orientation, they achieved high outcomes regardless of time pressure. In combination with an individualistic orientation, time pressure produced greater competitiveness, firm negotiator aspirations, and reduced information exchange. In combination with a cooperative orientation, time pressure produced greater cooperativeness and lower negotiator aspirations. The main findings were seen as consistent with Pruitts strategic-choice model of negotiation.

Social Exchange and Micro Social Order

This study uses an affect theory of social exchange (Lawler 2001) to investigate how and when network structures generate “micro social orders.” Micro social order entails recurrent interactions, emotional reactions, perceptions of a group, and affective sentiments. The core theoretical argument is that micro orders, involving behavioral, cognitive, and affective dimensions, develop and are stronger to the degree that (1) actors engage in highly joint tasks or activities and (2) these tasks generate a sense of shared responsibility for the interaction outcomes. A laboratory experiment varies different forms of social exchange—negotiated, reciprocal, generalized, and productive—within a network structure, and offers strong support for the core expectation that productive forms of exchange generate the strongest micro order. Conversely, generalized exchange generates the weakest order, with negotiated and reciprocal forms in between. In general, productive exchange bolsters more exchange behavior, more positive feelings, perceptions of cohesion at the network level, and affective attachments to the network as a social unit. This research has broad implications for the conditions under which task activity promotes micro social orders that involve strong person-to-group ties (as opposed to person-to-person ties) and affective sentiments regarding the social unit.

Commitment to Nested Organizational Units: Some Basic Principles and Preliminary Findings

Relying on the fact that many organizations exhibit nested organizational structures, we identify several basic principles for understanding what produces different levels of employee commitment to the nested units. The principles identify the importance of the units distance from the employee, the capacity of the more proximate units to produce positive emotions, and the attribution process whereby employees assign responsibility for their positive emotions to a particular organizational unit. Specific hypotheses are derived from Lawlers argument about nested units. These hypotheses undergo preliminary tests for two nested organizational structures, one more centralized than the other. The hypotheses are generally supported.

Coercive Capability in Conflict: A Test of Bilateral Deterrence Versus Conflict Spiral Theory

This research investigates how the magnitude of coercive power capability affects the use of punitive tactics in an explicit bargaining context. Two theories offer contradictory predictions for equal and unequal power situations. Bilateral deterrence theory predicts that when actors have equal power, higher levels of coercive capability will reduce the frequency of punitive tactics; conflict spiral theory predicts that higher levels of coercive capability will increase the frequency of punitive tactics. Comparing equal with unequal power relationships, bilateral deterrence predicts further that actors will use more punitive tactics under conditions of unequal power, while conflict spiral predicts that they will use fewer punitive tactics under such conditions. These predictions were tested in a two-party bargaining setting which manipulated the magnitude of coercive power available to actors and which allowed them to exchange offers and administer threats and punishments to one another. The results of two experiments support bilateral deterrence theory and generally contradict conflict spiral theory.

Structural Social Psychology and the Micro-macro Problem*

A unique multilevel perspective is explicated to help build theorical bridges between micro and macro levels of analysis in sociology. The perspective portrays actors as having minimal properties of purposiveness and responsiveness, encounters as interaction episodes between multiple actors, microstructures as local patterns of interaction emerging from and subsequently influencing encounters, and macrostructures as networks of social positions. These levels of analysis are connected via mutually contingent process. We illustrate the ability of the framework to strengthen the macrosociological import of micro theories of power, status, and justice. We argue that structural social psychology is an important metatheorical strategy for developing testable connections between individual and collective units of sociological analysis

Power and Tactics in Bargaining

This paper develops and tests an analytical framework for analyzing the selection of tactics in bargaining. Using a variant of power-dependence theory, the authors propose that bargainers will use different dimensions of dependence, such as the availability of alternative outcomes from other sources and the value of the outcomes at stake, to select among different tactics. To test this model, the authors conducted two simulation experiments that portrayed an employee-employer conflict over a pay raise, manipulating four dimensions of dependence: employees outcome alternatives, employees outcome value, employers outcome alternatives, and employers outcome value. Within this context, respondents estimated the likelihood of each actor (employee, employer) adopting four tactics: self-enhancement, coalition, threat to leave, and conflict avoidance. The results of one experiment show that an actors own dependence, rather than his opponents dependence on him, is the primary basis for his evaluation and selection of tactics, and also that decisions regarding different tactics are determined by different dimensions of dependence. The results of the other experiment indicate that the opponents initial tactic affects the links between dimensions of dependence and an actors tactics, and the dimensions of dependence affect the propensity toward “tactic matching.”

Commitment in Structurally Enabled and Induced Exchange Relations

Network structures both enable and constrain the development of social relations. This research investigates these features by comparing the development of commitments in structurally enabled and structurally induced exchange relations. We integrate ideas from the theory of relational cohesion and the choice process theory of commitment. In an experiment we manipulate and compare a structurally enabled relation with a structurally induced relation. The main hypotheses are that a structurally enabled relation generates a greater sense of control, more positive emotions, greater perceived cohesion, and more commitment behavior than a structurally induced relation. The results of the experiment support these hypotheses. The implication is that enabling and constraining features of network structures exert important effects on cohesion and commitment in relations within those structures.