H. Andrew Michener

Factors Affecting Concession Rate and Threat Usage in Bilateral Conflict

To test the reciprocity and level of aspiration hypotheses with respect to concession rate, this study utilized a bilateral negotiation paradigm involving coercive power capabilities. Subjects bargained against a confederate who followed a programmed strategy. Three independent variables (the confederates concession rate, the subjects relative power position, and the confederates punishment frequency) were manipulated in a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design. When subjects occupied the strong power

Revolutionary Coalition Strength and collective failure as determinants of status reallocation

Abstract This experiment investigated the effects of collective performance and coalition strength on the redistribution of status prerogatives in triads. A status hierarchy was established within triads, such that one person held higher control status and the two others held lower status. Each group performed an ambiguous, decision-making task over two trials. Collective performance (i.e., success vs failure) was manipulated via bogus feedback regarding the groups performance, while coalition strength was manipulated by varying the extent to which the two low-status members, acting together as a revolutionary coalition, could damage the outcomes received by the high-status member. Results indicate a collective-performance main effect, with the control prerogatives of the high-status person being reduced more under failure than under success. This effect is mediated by member dissatisfaction with the groups activities. As predicted, the results also indicate a significant Collective Performance × Coalition Strength interaction effect. Strong coalitions achieved more extensive reallocation of status prerogatives than weak ones, but this occurred only on the second trial for groups experiencing recurring failure. This effect elucidates some of the difficulties involved in mobilizing joint efforts to exercise coalition-based influence.

A Research Note on the Predictive Adequacy of the Kernel

The kernel, a game-theoretic solution concept, was tested competitively against minimum resource and pivotal power theories. Experimental data from six veto and six nonveto weighted-majority games served as the basis of the test. The kernel proved to be consistently inferior to both minimum resource and pivotal power theories in predicting payoffs.

SOCIAL EXCHANGE: PREDICTING TRANSACTIONAL OUTCOMES IN FIVE-EVENT, FOUR-PERSON SYSTEMS *

This paper reports an experimental test of Colemans theory of social exchange. The theory utilizes information on interest (X) and initial control (C) to make predictions concerning the value of events (V), the resources of persons (R), and the pattern of control at equilibrium (C*). The experimental paradigm, which incorporates three distinct five-event, four-person exchange systems, shows that the theorys predictions are highly accurate for V, R and C*. Competitive goodness-of-fit tests demonstrate that Colemans theory surpasses alternative theories based on less input information. The findings substantiate previous tests of Colemans theory conducted on smaller exchange systems. In an earlier paper, Michener, Cohen and Sorensen (1975) reported the first experimental test of Colemans (1972) theory of social exchange. That test, while

Minimum Resource and Pivotal Power Theories A Competitive Test in Four-Person Coalitional Situations

This paper reports a competitive test of minimum resource and pivotal power theories in tetradic situations. Using resource distributions for which the theories make distinct predictions, the study obtained data on the formation of coalitions and the division of payoffs. Results indicate that minimum resource theory is superior to pivotal power theory in predicting coalition formation, especially for resource distributions where one member has veto capabilities. The theories perform equally well in predicting payoff division, with each able to explain a large proportion of the variation. Both theories are more accurate in predicting payoff division for nonveto situations than for veto situations

On the predictive efficiency of the core solution in side-payment games

This paper reports the first cross-study competitive test of thecore solution in side-payment games where the core is nonempty and nonunique (i.e., larger than a single point). The core was tested against five alternative theories including the Shapley value, the disruption nucleolus, the nucleolus, the 2-center, and the equality solution. A generalized Euclidean distance metric which indexes the average distance between an observed payoff vector and the entire set of predicted payoff vectors (Bonacich, 1979) was used as the measure of goodness-of-fit. Analysis of data assembled from six previously reported studies (encompassing a total of 1,464 observations over 56 3-person and 4-person side-payment games) showed the core to predict less accurately than the Shapley value, disruption nucleolus, and nucleolus solutions (p < 0.01). These findings are consistent with previous empirical results that show the core to have a low level of predictive accuracy in side-payment games.

The Effects of Coalition Strength on the Formation of Contractual Norms 1

This study investigated the effect of coalition strength on the enactment of contractual norms restricting the usage of power tactics. Male subjects, participating in three-person groups, bargained over the division of rewards in a mixed-motive situation. This situation enabled two subjects to form a coalition against the third. The experimental design manipulated coalition strength by varying the extent to which the coalitional dyad could damage the third partys interests. Results indicate that the propensity to form regulatory contracts increased with coalition strength, as did the severity of the sanctions attached to the rules. The data also elucidate the importance of interpersonal trust for effective operations by the dyadic alliance. These findings, based on the tactic of coalition formation, extend the previous research on normative emergence, which had been limited to other power tactics. An array of recent studies (Thibaut and Faucheux, 1965; Murdoch, 1967; Thibaut, 1968; Murdoch and Rosen, 1970; Michener and Lawler, 1971) has demonstrated that participants in mixed-motive situations may form contractual agreements as a mechanism to control disruptive behavior that endangers satisfactory outcomes. Each of these studies has varied the amount of power available to participants. Taken together, their findings indicate that the greater the power possessed by individuals, the more likely

A Competitive Test of the M1(i) and M1(im) Bargaining Sets

Two game theoretic solution theories, the M1 (i) bargaining set and the M1 (im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M1 (im) is significantly and consistently superior to M1 (i) in predicting the distribution of payoffs in these conflicts (p <.01). Results are discussed in terms of the formal differences between the theories.

A probabilistic theory of coalition formation in n-person sidepayment games

This paper describes the central‐union theory, which offers a new approach to the formation of coalition structures in cooperative, sidepayment, superadditive n‐person games. This theory treats for...

A comparison of the alpha‐ and beta‐characteristic functions in cooperative non‐sidepayment n‐person games 1

This article reports a test of theories of payoff allocation in n‐person game‐theoretic systems. An experimental study was conducted to test the relative predictive accuracy of three solution concepts (imputation set, stable set, core) in the context of 4‐person, 2‐strategy non‐sidepayment games. Predictions from each of the three solution concepts were computed on the basis of both α‐effectiveness (von Neumann‐Morgenstern) and β‐effectiveness (Aumann), making a total of six predictive theories under test. Two important results emerged. First, the data show that the g‐imputation set was more accurate than the a‐imputation set, the β‐stable set was more accurate than the α‐stable set, and the (3‐core was more accurate than the α‐core; in other words, for each of the solutions tested, the prediction from any solution concept based on (β‐effectiveness was more accurate than the prediction from the same solution based on a‐effectiveness. Second, the β‐core was the most accurate of the six theories tested. Res...