Edwin G. West

Private Versus Public Charity: Reassessing Crowding Out from the Supply Side

This paper tests a model where governmentand private charity are perfect substitutesin consumption, but the cost of providingcharitable assistance differs betweenprivate and government suppliers. Theanalysis demonstrates that higher costs oftransferring through the government canaccount for the observed phenomenon of lessthan complete crowding out and theempirical results are broadly consistentwith that approach. Overall the evidenceis consistent with the hypothesis thatindividuals both care about the leakagesinvolved in transferring funds to the poorthrough government and respond in theirprivate giving to changes in thedifferential public cost.

The cost disease and government growth: Qualifications to Baumol

Changes in real world wage movements across sectors account for about a third of the rise in the cost of U.S. government services between 1959 and 1989, while relatively slower productivity in the public sector accounts for the remaining two-thirds. Even though it is slower, however, the productivity record still is positive even in the labor intensive government sector. Consequently Baumol argues that the publics likely future objection to necessary increases in the share of expenditures over the next 50 years will betray a fiscal illusion unless policymakers take pains to dissolve it. But slower productivity may be equally due to the structural organization. Removing public monopolies, reducing bureaucracies, and undertaking privatization in education for example, are other policy options that could radically change the productivity record. Meanwhile in his recent calculations of dramatic government expenditure increases expected in the next half century, Baumol omits reference to the marginal welfare cost of public funds, which on our estimates, will increase at least ten times to reach 1.71 by the year 2040.

Education Vouchers, the Peer Group Problem, and the Question of Dropouts

This paper extends the analysis of, who argue that vouchers encourage private schools to “skim the cream off” public schools. Because the education received by students depends on the quality of their classmates, this loss reduces the quality of education received by those remaining in the public system—the peer group effect. In our model, vouchers allow low-income students to escape the frustration of having to conform to the uniformity of the public school system. Ultimately, the size of the dropout effect relative to the peer group effect is an empirical question. Nevertheless, to the extent that voucher use reduces the student dropout rate, the peer group externality becomes insufficient in itself to prevent reconsideration of a voucher system on equity as well as efficiency grounds.

Cost Disease versus Leviathan Explanations of Rising Government Cost: An Empirical Investigation

In this paper we reexamine the apparently conflicting empirics of Borcherding et al. (1977) versus those of Barry and Lowery (1984). The latter, designed to test the cost disease versus bureau voting power hypotheses on US Citibase annual data between 1947 to 1979, was retested for the longer period available through 1989. Second, and more importantly, we isolate and test for the presence of a second channel for the exercise of bureaucratic power. That channel is the bureaus ability to use its information advantage to capture a portion of newly generated government rents through higher personal benefits (such as higher salaries). Such an analysis (following West, 1991) requires first that those factors generating new rents for government actually result in successful bureaucratic rent-seeking in the form of higher compensation levels. In addition, the analysis requires that these “artificial” increases in bureaucratic wages show up as significant determinants of the higher cost of providing government services. Incorporating a constructed Kau/Rubin variable into the Barry and Lowery database is then shown to improve the predictive power of both the cost disease and bureaucratic power hypotheses for US annual data between 1948 and 1989.

Autonomy in school provision: Meanings and implications — review essay

Abstract Using expanded evidence from the Administrator and Teacher Survey and the High School and Beyond data, the book Politics, Markets, and Americas Schools , by Chubb and Moe (C&M), measures differential progress of students who remain in their chosen high schools. Of the variables positively associated with student achievement gain, school organization is clearly significant. C&M describe good school organization as inversely related to the size and dominance of bureaucracy and positively correlated with autonomy. In the absence of a precise definition by C&M this article explores the full meaning of autonomy and finds that when applying it to C&Ms ultimate reform proposals, serious inconsistencies emerge. Thus, while they start with the finding that bureaucracy is “unambiguously bad” for school organization, in their last chapter the authors nevertheless recommend reforms in which the existing bureaucracy rather than autonomy is in central charge. In the same vein, their treatment of the voucher system and private schooling, which would clearly promote more autonomy, is decidedly and unexpectedly cool.

Unilateral Free Trade Versus Reciprocity in The Wealth of Nations

In Chapter 2, Book IV, of The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith assesses the appropriateness of the policy of tariff retaliation or reciprocity. His deliberations are prefaced by a discussion of two rather innocuous cases that turn out to have very little to do with the main topic. In the first case it is advantageous “to lay some burden upon foreign, for the encouragement of domestic industry†(WN, p. 463) when that particular industry is necessary for the defence of the country. Smiths second case refers to the situation when some domestic tax is being imposed on a good produced at home. In this situation Smith believed it reasonable that an equal tax should be imposed on the same good when it was imported (WN, p. 465).

Student loans in developing countries: government versus company loans

Using data from the International Finance Corporation study on private investment in education, Tooley and West give details of two types of international experience with student loans. In particular they look at the government student loan scheme in Thailand and loan schemes offered by various for-profit and nonprofit education companies in Peru, Colombia and India. Difficulties are pointed out with regard to the government scheme, which it may be possible to alleviate under the company schemes.

The role of income tax in student loan repayments

West keeps score of the continuing and growing inadequacies of the British student loan scheme to 1998 and shows how an income-contingent loan could better satisfy its aims. He explores a common objection to any form of student loan scheme, that students pay for their university education through progressive income taxes. West shows how this argument falls short, and hence that some form of income contingent loan is required if equity and efficiency are to be satisfied.

Adam Smith and Modern Economics

Adam Smith and Modern Economics provides a lively introduction to some of the very latest economic concepts and debates reinterpreted from the work of the ‘father of economics’. Professor West demonstrates the continuing relevance of his work, two centuries after his death, with special emphasis on the inspiration he has given to economic research during the last two decades. Most notable has been the focus in the 1980s on refutable hypotheses in Smiths writing and the work of testing them with systematic data that were not available in his time. It is shown that even Smith’s central invisible hand theorem is now being translated into a set of falsifiable predictions and that these have withstood important empirical tests in the late 1980s. The book makes an important contribution by demonstrating the continuing relevance of Smiths work to economics in the late 20th century.